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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 71 SPRING 1997 NUMBER 2
NEW WINE, NEW BOTTLES: PRIVATE
PROPERTY METAPHORS AND PUBLIC
FORUM SPEECH
MARIE A. FAIINGER*
The controversy over regulating indecent material on the In-
ternet, being won so far by speech proponents,' reminds one of
' Marie A. Failinger, Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law. B.A.
1973, J.D. 1976, Valparaiso University; LL.M. 1983, Yale Law School. For what I
have learned on these topics, I am indebted to Patrick R. Keifert and Howard J.
Vogel, my friends and colleagues. For their fine research and attention to detail, Su-
san DeVos and Robert Hatch deserve more than this acknowledgment. And to Emily
Fowler Hartigan and Michael McConnell, my thanks for reminding me to pay more
attention to public trust issues.
' See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996)
(invalidating mandatory segregation and blocking of indecent programming over
cable leased access channels, and operators' control over indecency on public access
channels, but permitting operators to ban indecent programming on leased chan-
nels) [hereinafter Denver Area E.T.C.]; ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (three judge panel) (overturning portions of Communications Decency Act
based on overbreadth and vagueness). For a discussion of the controversy, compare,
Todd Copilevitz, Censoring Cyberspace Centers on Semantics, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Dec. 17, 1995, at 4F (stating Christian Coalition demands "stronger tools to
keep pornographers [and] pedophiles ... off line"), with Jon Auerbach, Fences in Cy-
berspace: Governments Move to Limit Free Flow of the Internet, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb.
1, 1996, at 1 (stating that Electronic Privacy Information Center director calls gov-
ernment censorship of Internet "Orwellian); see also James Coates, No Sure-Fire
Way to Shield Children from On-Line Smut, Cm1. TRIB., Feb. 17, 1996, at 1 (arguing
that parents, not government, need to monitor child's access to Internet); John J.
Keller & Jared Sandberg, Decency Law for Computers Hits a Glitch, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 16, 1996, at A3 (stating that new law has been challenged as unconstitutional
because its definition of indecency is too vague); Joe Kilsheimer, Law Arrives on In-
ternet Frontier: Sexually Explicit Material Targeted by Decency Act, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Feb. 11, 1996, at GI (quoting director of public policy for America Online
who noted that there are not enough "Net cops" to enforce the law and "[tlhere's not
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the Biblical admonition against putting new wine in old bottles:
No man putteth a piece of new cloth unto an old garment, for
that which is put in to fill it up taketh away from the garment,
and the rent is made worse. Neither do men put new wine into
old bottles: else the bottles break, and the wine runneth out,
and the bottles perish: but they put new wine into new bottles,
2and both are preserved.
Justice Souter was right to surmise that " 'if [members of
the Court] had to decide today ... just what the First Amend-
ment should mean in cyberspace ... [they] would get it funda-
mentally wrong.'"' The Supreme Court Justices' questions com-
paring the Internet to a telephone, a radio, and a public park, as
they heard a recent challenge to the Communications Decency
Act, were described by a Washington Post writer as "Nine Jus-
tices in Search of a Metaphor."4 Searching for alternatives, the
Court has fallen back to "old bottles" like FCC v. Pacifica Foun-
dation5 and the public forum doctrine,6 engendering the kind of
enough money in the Treasury" to do so); It's a Key Week in Court Battle Over On-
line Indecency Laws, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 15, 1996, at A3 [hereinafter Key Week];
George Stuteville, Coats Fortifies His Bill Attacking 'Cyber-Porn' by Using Legal
Precedents, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 11, 1996, at D1; U.S. Says New Internet Law
Should Be Upheld; Courts: Officials Back Ban on Allowing Minors Access to Inde-
cent Material, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1996, at D2.
2 Jesus' reply was to John's disciples who questioned why Jesus' disciples did
not obey all of the Jewish customs, including fasting. Matthew 9:16-17 (King James).
3 Denver Area E.T.C., 116 S. Ct. at 2402 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Law-
rence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L. J. 1743, 1745 (1995)).
4 Shouting Porn! On a Crowded Net, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1997, at C1. On
March 19, 1997, the Supreme Court heard Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (three judge court), which invalidated the Communications Decency Act's
provisions banning patently offensive material on the Internet.
5 In Denver Area E.T.C., Justice Breyer, writing for the plurality, chose FCC v.
Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) as his analogy, combining it with interest-balancing
and rejecting categorical doctrine. Denver Area E.T.C., 116 S. Ct. at 2386-87
(plurality opinion). Justice Thomas resorted to eminent domain-like arguments, al-
though he did not go so far as to say that the cable regulations were a taking, noting
that cable operators have not formally dedicated their property to public use and
therefore retain property rights of control. Id. at 2426-29 (Thomas, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). Indeed, in a footnote, he refers to eminent domain concerns
when he notes that "[t]he court has never recognized a public forum based on a
property interest 'taken' by regulatory restriction." Id. at 2427 n.11 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
'Compare 116 S. Ct. at 2409 (Kennedy, J., concurring) where Justice Kennedy
advocates the application of the public forum doctrine with id. at 2426 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting the public forum doctrine) and id. at 2388 (plurality opinion)
and id. at 2398 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Souter suggested that a new cate-
gorical rule regarding communicative technology may develop as time goes on, just
as the public forum category "settled out" over 40 years. Id. at 2402-03.
PUBLIC FORUM SPEECH
confusion evidenced in the Internet oral argument:
Court: You're asking us to say that the Internet is not a public
forum.
[Deputy Solicitor General Seth P. Waxman]: The Internet is-
we don't think it is, but if it is, in any event, it certainly is, like
other public forums, subject to reasonable time, place and man-
ner restrictions.
Court: A public forum is something created by the Government,
isn't it?
Waxman: Right. We don't think it's a public forum, whereas a
park would be but...
Court: Well, it's a pretty public place, though, because anyone
with a computer can get on-line ... and convey information and
images, so it is much like ... a street corner or a park, in a
7
sense.
The Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consor-
tium v. FCC case, the passage of the Telecommunications Act of
1996,8 and the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Action for
Children's Television v. FCC,9 again verify the power of the Fed-
eral Communication Commission to regulate non-traditional
communication modes, such as computer transmissions." Yet,
' The Justices and the Analogies, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1997, at C4.
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.A. & 47 U.S.C.A.).
9 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 701 (1996)
(challenging constitutionality of Section 16(a) of 1992 Public Telecommunications
Act, which restricted indecent radio and television broadcasts to specific hours of
day). The court noted that the government has a compelling interest in protecting
children under 18 from exposure to indecent programs and that restricting the
hours available to broadcasters did not unduly burden the First Amendment. Id. at
656. The court, however, found that the distinction between the two categories of
broadcasters had no apparent relationship to the compelling interests. Id. Thus, the
statute was declared unconstitutional because the least restrictive means available
were not used to further the government's compelling interest. Id. at 683.
0 Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124-26 (1989) (upholding
prohibition on obscene telephone messages, but striking down prohibition on inde-
cent telephone messages); ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 829, 849 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(upholding temporary injunction against portion of Communications Decency Act
which prohibits transmission of indecent communication through telecommunica-
tions device to anyone under 18 years of age). But see FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726 (1978) (plurality) (holding that FCC may regulate indecent radio broad-
casts); Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en
banc) (upholding constitutionality of portions of Cable Television Consumer Protec-
tion and Competition Act of 1992, which FCC implemented to regulate obscene and
indecent programming by cable operators), afftd in part, rev'd in part sub. nom.,
19971
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these cases, along with the Internet follow-on, Shea v. Reno,"
demonstrate both the limitations of those regulatory powers,'
and the inability of the government to keep up with the public, 3
to turn from old workhorses like the public forum doctrine"' to
Denver Area E.T.C., 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996); Dial Info. Serv. Corp. v. Thornburgh,
938 F.2d 1535, 1543-44 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding it unnecessary to grant preliminary
injunction of Helms Amendment, which prohibited commercial providers of indecent
telephone messages from communicating their messages to anyone under 18 years
old or to anyone else without their consent), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1072 (1992). For
an overview of issues surrounding the mass media and the First Amendment, see
JONATHAN W. EMORD, FREEDOM, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1991).
11 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (three judge court). Shea followed Denver
Area E.T.C. in striking down the Communications Decency Act provisions on pat-
ently offensive material on the Internet on overbreadth grounds, rather than resort-
ing to vagueness, as did the court in ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 829 (E.D. Pa.
1996). However, the court chose to apply strict scrutiny rather than relying on Jus-
tice Breyer's more equivocal test in Denver Area E. T. C..
"See, e.g., Sable Communications, Inc., 492 U.S. 115; Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726; Dial Info. Serv. Corp., 938 F.2d 1535, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1072 (1992); ACLU,
929 F. Supp. 829.
13 For instance, North Carolina is constructing a statewide information
"superhighway," linking 110 schools and colleges, state agencies, hospitals, police,
and prisons. North Carolina: A Superhighway Microcosm, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., June 27, 1994, at 14. North Carolina's goal is to add private industry and to
ensure access to every resident through his or her local library. Id. Internet usage
has increased rapidly, from 217 networks linked to the Internet in July 1988, to
46,318 in January 1995; and from 28,174 host computers in December 1987, to
4,852,000 in January 1995. M. Ethan Katsh, Rights, Camera, Action: Cyberspatial
Settings and the First Amendment, 104 YALE L.J. 1681, 1693 (1995). The number of
World Wide Web servers has also increased from about 500 in the fall of 1993 to
nearly 10,000 in the fall of 1994; and it is estimated that between 30-40 million
people had some kind of Internet access at the beginning of 1995. Id. at 1693-94.
Some have even suggested that e-mail and computer conferencing will bring a ren-
aissance in letter writing and prose. See Philip E. DeWitt, Bards of the Internet,
TIME, July 4, 1994, at 66.
14 The public forum doctrine, described in Part I, grew out of two competing
viewpoints. One, stated by Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515
(1939), is that, "[w]herever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have imme-
morially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and dis-
cussing public questions." Id. Other justices believe, for speech purposes, public
property should be treated as if it were private property. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD
D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.45, at 1138 (5th ed. 1995). This position
arose from Justice Holmes' view that "iflor the legislature absolutely or condition-
ally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringe-
ment of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private house to
forbid it in his house." Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (1895), affd sub
nom., Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). A third view claims a "special
right of access by the public to treat public places as a Public Forum." See NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra, at 1138 (citing Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v.
Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 1).
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new images befitting the new technology.
Within the context of this Internet dispute, the statute un-
der attack, the Communications Decency Act15 (CDA), covers
telephone, broadcast, cable, and video programming provided by
telephone companies, 6 and broadens the ban against indecency 7
to telecommunications. 8 The Act prohibits the use of telecom-
munications devices to transmit any "comment, request, sugges-
tion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent, with intent to annoy, abuse,
threaten, or harass another person." 9 Additionally, the CDA
punishes any "obscene or indecent" remark made to a person the
sender knows to be under eighteen," as well as any sexual
"comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other com-
munication" which is patently offensive if it is sent to a child by
use of an interactive computer.2'
sCommunications Decency Act of 1996 § 502, 47 U.S.C.A. § 223 (West Supp.
1996) [hereinafter CDA].
" The definition of "Telecommunications" in the Telecommunications Act of
1996 is cryptic, referring to "the transmission, between or among points specified by
the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or con-
tent of the information as sent and received." 47 U.S.C.A. § 153 (West Supp. 1996).
17 David Sobel, a lawyer at the Electronic Privacy Information Center, noted
that the Justice Department, trying to block a preliminary injunction against the
CDA, attempted to convince the court that it was about obscenity. "[Ilt isn't.... Inde-
cency is not obscenity," Sobel stated, noting that the Internet was already governed
by obscenity law. Key Week, supra note 1, at A3. Many had favored a standard tied
to the phrase "harmful to minors," used in most states to prosecute such crimes,
rather than the focus on "indecent" communications. See Copilevitz, supra note 1, at
4F.
"The CDA consolidates and adds to criminal bans in already existing law. See
infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.1CDA § 502(1), 47 U.S.CA. § 223(a)(1)(A). The "image or other communication"
language and the intent section are new to the statute. The statute applies to those
who make, create, solicit, or initiate the transmission of such remarks. Id.
21 Id. § 223(a)(1)(B). Previous federal laws already prevented computer distri-
bution of obscene or pornographic materials harmful to minors, under 18 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1465, 2252, and 2423(a) (1996). See 142 CONG. REC. Sl180 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1994)
(statement of Sen. Leahy); see also 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(A), (b)(1) (1994) (banning
phone obscenities); 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)(2) (1994) (banning indecent commercial com-
munications by phone to any person under eighteen years of age). Transmitting ob-
scenities over a cable system was previously banned under 47 U.S.C. § 559 (1991).
21 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)(1). The three-judge court in ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 858,
enjoined each of these provisions, however, on the grounds that the "indecency" lan-
guage was vague and violative of the free speech and due process clauses. Id. The
provisions which sought to punish those who permit their facilities to be used to
transmit such messages were similarly enjoined. Id. at 849 (enjoining sections
223(a)(1)(B) and 223(d)(1) of Act, along with sections 223(a)(2) and 223(d)(2)). In the
court's words, these sections "make it a crime for anyone to 'knowingly permit any
1997]
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The CDA also creates an advisory committee to recommend
television ratings,22 mandates the inclusion of signal blocking
features on televisions, 3 and requires cable operators to scram-
ble or block channels upon request without charge to nonsub-
scribers.24 Such operators must also either ensure that service
subscribers do not receive sexually explicit adult or other
"indecent" programming, or limit children's access to adult ma-
terial by confining such programming to those hours of the day,
determined by the FCC, "when a significant number of children
are [not] likely to view it."25 Cable operators are correspondingly
telecommunications facility under [his or her] control to be used for any activity
prohibited' in §§ 223 (a)(1)(B) and 223 (d)(1). The challenged provisions impose a
punishment of a fine, up to two years imprisonment, or both for each offense." Id. at
829.
The Act pertains to anyone in interstate or foreign commerce who uses a com-
puter service to send or display such matter, or who has control of such a facility
and knowingly and with intent permits the facility to be used in such a manner.
CDA § 502(2), 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d). It applies whether the user of the service initi-
ated the communication or placed the call. Id. § 223(d)(1). The test for what is pro-
hibited is borrowed from the relaxed standard applied to sexual matter restricted
from children. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). The material covered
by the act "in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured
by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs."
CDA § 502(2), 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)(1).
Violators may be punished up to two years in prison and fined. Id. § 223(d)(2).
Employers who do not authorize, ratify or recklessly disregard an employee's pro-
hibited conduct are exempt from liability. Id. § 223(e)(4). Persons who take good
faith measures to restrict access by minors to a communication, whether technologi-
cally or by requiring verification of a credit card or personal identification number,
are similarly protected from liability. Id. § 223(e)(5). Finally, those who provide ac-
cess or connections to a facility, system or network for transmission, downloading,
storage, etc., but do not have control over it, are not liable. Id. § 223(e)(1).
Coercion of children into prostitution or criminally prohibited sexual acts is a
more serious criminal offense, which was previously barred. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251
(1994) (criminalizing solicitation of minor via computer network); 18 U.S.C.A. §
2423(b) (Supp. 1997) (stating that luring minor into sexual activity through com-
puter communications is illegal). In 1995, Congress passed laws increasing the
penalties for these crimes. 142 CONG. REC. S1180 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1996) (statement
of Sen. Leahy).
CDA § 551(b)(2), 110 Stat. 56, 140, 142 (to be codified as 47 U.S.C.A. §
303(w)(1)) (effective Feb. 8, 1997, if voluntary rating system not developed by dis-
tributors).
CDA § 551(c), (e)(2), 110 Stat. 56, 141-42 (to be codified as 47 U.S.C.A. §
303(x), date of effectiveness not prior to Feb. 8, 1998, FCC to determine specific
date) (creating mandatory blocking feature to allow viewers to block all programs
with common feature).
24 CDA § 504, 47 U.S.C.A. § 560(a).
CDA § 505(a), 47 U.S.C.A. § 561. Previous law contemplated limited access of
children to indecent programming by blocking a single channel on which all indecent
programs would be aired. 47 U.S.C. § 532(j) (1994).
[Vol. 71:217
PUBLIC FORUM SPEECH
permitted to reject public access or leased programming which
contains "obscenity, indecency, or nudity."26
Although obscene communications have been banned in the
past, those statutes, and the cases that parallel them, mark an
important moment for the Internet as well as other new tech-
nologies, such as cable, that have exploded over the past decade.
The federal government's original "yes" to public speech, evi-
denced by its participation in creating and encouraging the new
technologies, has been replaced by an equally firm "no" to certain
other kinds of speech." The shift is compelling in two ways:
first, the CDA, which imitates regulation once restricted to tele-
vision and radio,28 has broadened the scope of regulated commu-
26 CDA § 506(a), 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 531(e), 532(c)(2); see also Alliance for Commu-
nity Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 111 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (allowing cable operators to re-
fuse to carry access to matter it reasonably believes is patently offensive).
27 See Auerbach, supra note 1, at 1 (quoting Marc Rotenberg, Electronic Privacy
Informaticn Director, who described the legislation as "the morning after" and "a
cyberspace place shift"). The Clinton Administration has expressed ambivalence re-
garding regulation of the Internet. See Eric Handelman, Comment, Obscenity and
the Internet: Does the Current Obscenity Standard Provide Individuals with the
Proper Constitutional Safeguards?, 59 ALBANY L. REv. 709, 713-14 (1995). While
Vice President Gore is a proponent of self-regulation on Internet, the Clinton ad-
ministration has stated only that it supports a continued dialogue to provide par-
ents ways to regulate access to indecent material. Id.
The U.S. is not alone in this effort to prohibit such speech. Countries such as
Germany, China, and Saudi Arabia are also trying to regulate the Internet. Accord-
ing to Senator Leahy, China is attempting to ensure that no one uses the Internet
except through authorized channels. 142 CoNG. REc. S1180, Sl181 (daily ed. Feb. 9,
1996) (statement of Sen. Leahy). Additionally, German prosecutors tried to cut ac-
cess to over 200 Internet news groups with the words "sex," "gay," or "erotica" in the
name, including support and advocacy groups for gays and lesbians. Id.; see also,
Kilsheimer, supra note 1, at GI (requiring CompuServe to take action after German
prosecutor warned that some erotic pictures might violate German law). Germany
has also threatened an Internet access provider with prosecution for permitting a
Toronto-based neo-Nazi to use its channels. Auerbach, supra note 1, at 1. Vietnam
has refused to open its doors to the Internet until it has regulations, and Saudi
Arabia permits its Ministry of the Interior to review e-mail accounts and prosecute
the ordering of material, such as a Playboy centerfold, over the Internet. Id. at 1.
One well-cited incident of U.S. censorship involved America Online's blockage of the
word "breast" from member profiles, deleting information for breast cancer survi-
vors. See Kilsheimer, supra note 1, at G1. See generally, Amy Knoll, Comment, Any
Which Way But Loose: Nations Regulate the Internet, 4 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 275
(1996).
2 See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-258 (1974)
(clarifying that Red Lion standard will not apply to publishing); Columbia Broad.
Sys. Inc. v. Democratic Nat-l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117-18 (1973) (plurality)
[hereinafter CBS]; Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (permitting
FCC to regulate broadcast media more extensively than print media).
1997]
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nication vehicles 29  despite the absence of communicative
"scarcity" used to justify regulation of the broadcast media, in-
cluding the infamous "Fairness Doctrine."" The broadcast cases
evince the Court's reluctance to stifle speech, since they theorize
that a public trust must be imposed on broadcasters primarily to
ensure more speech, or at least more diverse views.3' Otherwise,
the Court has been suspicious of governmental control of media
content,32 other than obscenity.33 The CDA, and other recent de-
2 The Government's control over communications in nontraditional public fora
such as the media has been termed a scheme which protects press and public forum
interests at the highest tier, broadcast medium at a second tier, and common carri-
ers such as telephone companies at the lowest tier. Lynn Becker, Electronic Publish-
ing: First Amendment Issues in the Twenty-First Century, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
801, 828-31 (1985). For a more detailed explanation of the differences, see Thomas
G. Krattenmaker & L. A. Powe, Jr., Converging First Amendment Principles for
Converging Communications Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719 (1995).
o See CBS, 412 U.S. 94 (plurality) (finding that CBS was not required, beyond
fairness doctrine, to sell advertising time to those seeking to comment on public is-
sues). The "Fairness Doctrine" imposed responsibilities on the broadcaster to pro-
vide coverage of issues of public importance which is adequate and fairly reflects
different viewpoints. See id. at 127; cf. Stephen L. Carter, Technology, Democracy,
and the Manipulation of Consent, 93 YALE L.J. 581, 596 (1984) (reviewing ITHIEL DE
SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983) (quoting Professor Pool, who argues
that there never really was any spectrum scarcity in broadcast media)). Scarcity of
broadcast frequencies does not characterize all communications vehicles regulated
by the Communications Decency Act, as the court in ACLU pointed out. See ACLU,
929 F. Supp. at 873-76 (opinion of Dalzell, J.).
3' See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("Because of the
scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to put restraints on li-
censees in favor of others whose views should be expressed on this unique me-
dium."). Judge Dalzell relied very heavily on the diversity rationale in striking down
the Communications Decency Act provisions, noting that the Internet is one of the
few media in today's world that disperses the power of speech into the hands of each
of us, including the powerless and non-wealthy. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 880-81;
see also Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 29, at 1721-22, 1730-31; Lawrence E.
Spong, Note, Cable Television Rights of Way: Technology Expands the Concept of
Public Forum, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1293, 1299 (1987) (noting that Congress
aimed to diversify fora in passing Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984).
32 As Justice Douglas stated in his concurrence in CBS, "one hard and fast
principle which [the First Amendment] announces is that Government shall keep its
hands off the press." CBS, 412 U.S. at 160-61 (Douglas, J., concurring); see also FCC
v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984) (invalidating statute that for-
bade publicly funded radio and television stations to engage in editorializing).
Senator Patrick Leahy, speaking on the Senate Floor about the Communica-
tions Decency Act, noted that child pornographers, child molesters, and obscenity
"purveyors" are already subject to prosecution for distributing obscenity harmful to
minors and for soliciting minors into sexual activity. 142 CONG. REC. S1180 (daily
ed. Feb. 9, 1996) (statement of Sen. Leahy); see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 387 (1992) (holding that obscenity has no constitutional protection and may be
banned by government in certain or all media).
[Vol. 71:217
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velopments, such as the must-carry regulations imposed on the
cable industry,' not only expand trust responsibilities to other
media, but may signal that Congress finds "scarcity" irrelevant,
though some of the judges deciding these cases do not.35
Second, Congress has gone beyond what was necessary to
meet the major public concern, namely, ensuring that parents
and unwilling viewers can say "no" to unwanted material." Such
worries could have been met simply by mandating blocking tech-
nology for radio and television and perhaps for the Internet,
7
though even the Court is divided on whether the technology is
sufficiently developed to meet public concerns.38 Television and
The Supreme Court has reviewed the "must-carry" provisions of the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. §§
534(b)(1)(B), (h)(1)(A), 535(a) (relevant portion) twice, in Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994) (plurality) [hereinafter Turner 1] and 1997 WL 141375
(April 1, 1997) [hereinafter Turner II]. The Act provided that cable operators were
required to devote a portion of their channels to transmitting local broadcast sta-
tions. 47 U.S.C. §§ 534(b)(1)(B), 535(a). In Turner I, the Court carved out a middle
ground between regulation of television and radio, and the print media, holding that
the broadcast standard of earlier cases was not applicable to cable, but refusing to
apply strict scrutiny. 114 S. Ct. at 2465. In Turner II, the Court held that the must-
carry provisions were consistent with the First Amendment, as they were designed
to preserve the benefits of free broadcast TV, promote dissemination of information
from a multiplicity of sources, and promote fair competition. 1997 WL 141375. Thus,
the Court held, such regulations are narrowly tailored to meet the needs of the 40%
of households who do not have cable TV. See also Adam R. Spilka, Note, An Excess
of Access: The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 and First Amendment Pro-
tection of Editorial Discretion, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 317, 340-41 (1986) (noting differ-
ences between cable and broadcast and effect on First Amendment).
' See Denver Area E.T.C., 116 S. Ct. 2374,2418 (Thomas, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part); ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 873 (opinion of Dalzell, J.).
" In Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, the Supreme Court noted "that 'the
government may not reduce the adult population ... to ... only what is fit for chil-
dren.' "Sable, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Prod. Corp.,
462 U.S. 60, 73 (1983) (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957))); see
also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968) (recognizing compelling in-
terest in protecting minors from literature that is not obscene to adults).
3, For interactive computer services, the Communications Decency Act gives the
FCC the power to describe measures to restrict access "which are reasonable, effec-
tive and appropriate" (e.g., blocking devices) but not to "approve, endorse, sanction,
or permit the use of such measures." CDA § 502(2), 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(6) (West
Supp. 1996). However, blocking technology is available from major services such as
CompuServe, America Online and Prodigy. See CompuServe Reinstates Access to
Banned Net Sites, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Feb. 14, 1996, at 4A. The
opinions in the ACLU case note the availability of blocking software and the future
availability of PICS rating services, and stress that the responsibility for making
such decisions belongs with parents. ACLU, 929 F. Supp at 838-42, 883 (opinion of
Dalzell, J.).
3 In Denver Area E.T.C., for instance, Justice Breyer championed the use of
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radio have been singled out for regulation in the past because
"unwilling viewers" are unable to avoid a violent or offensive
scene once they turn on their sets.39 Blocking technology, how-
ever, makes it fully possible for viewers to "avert their eyes" and
avoid the unwanted offense.0
To further pursue the "new wine" metaphor, the media cases
and the Internet controversy also demonstrate that neither Con-
gress nor the Court is sure in which bottle to "pour" speech util-
izing a non-traditional media such as telephone, computer, and
television.4 Joining those commentators and lower courts that
devices in televisions that automatically identify and block certain programs, as less
restrictive alternatives to a statutory ban, 116 S. Ct. at 2392. By contrast, Justice
Thomas claims that reverse blocking and lockboxes will not successfully block ran-
domly presented programs on leased channels without constant vigilance over pro-
grams; and that many will not have the expertise to use these devices. Id. at 4736.
n See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 759-62 (1978) (plurality) (arguing
that television warnings cannot protect viewers from unexpected contact and ability
to tune out after hearing language does not undo previous hearing of indecent lan-
guage).
40 See Kilsheimer, supra note 1, at G1 (quoting Mike Godwin, legal counsel for
Electronic Frontier Foundation, who believes that regulation of broadcast media is
fundamentally different from computer communication); Barbara M. Ryga, Com-
ment, Cyberporn: Contemplating the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 6 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 221, 248-50 (1995) (describing "Internet Nanny" which screens child
computer users; "George Carlin" software program available through Prodigy, which
filters messages posted through service provider; and "InternetRate," proposed vol-
untary rating system for materials on Internet). But see Carlin Meyer, Reclaiming
Sex from the Pornographers: Cybersexual Possibilities, 83 GEo. L.J. 1969, 1980-88
(1995) (arguing that it is easy to post images but difficult for services to screen
them, due to need to rely on specific words without context).
By comparison, the court in the ACLU case noted the difficulty and cost of
"tagging" information from the sender's end in order to ensure that people can be
apprised of indecent material. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 845-48 (opinion of the Court),
856 (opinion of Sloviter, C.J.). With the CDA, Congress has chosen to prohibit some
speech which has previously been protected in public fora. For instance, with a few
exceptions such as school settings, see Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260, 271-73 (1988) (stating that educators may censor "vulgar or profane" material
in high school newspaper produced as part of school's curriculum); Bethel Sch. Dist.
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (holding that delivering vulgar school
assembly speech could be punished), the Court has not permitted complete censor-
ship of "indecent" materials even for juveniles who are willing recipients. The stan-
dard for pornography targeting or depicting children is stricter than the standard
for regulating obscenity. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-64 (1982)
(plurality); Handelman, supra note 27, at 724-25. Yet, as Justice Brennan points
out, not all indecent material is obscene, even as to children. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at
767-68 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-73 (reasoning
that personal expression on school premises is subject to different censorship stan-
dard than speech in authorized school vehicles such as newspapers).
"' The courts' confusion over the various media involved is shared by the FCC,
which regulates various forms of communication. The Communications Act of 1934,
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have attempted to "pour" such speech into the public forum doc-
trine,42 the Court's discussions in both Denver Area E.T.C. and
Shea show that the Court has not altogether rejected the "public
forum" path for the new technologies or media, even when it
speaks about statutory "deference." Behind the broadcast regu-
lation regime lies the implication that the government owns the
"property" of the airwaves, or at least their use rights, and there-
fore has the power to control them in the public interest.43 The
Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) which
established the FCC to avoid "bedlam on broadcast frequencies," distinguished
broadcasters regulated by Title III (such as radio), common carriers such as tele-
phone (Title I1), and nonbroadcast radio spectrum users (e.g., CB and mobile radio
users). Becker, supra note 29, at 818-19. The FCC's decision in 1970 not to separate
data processing and communications into two separate industries became more
problematic as time went by. Id. at 820-22. Meanwhile, cable, which at first was un-
regulated, came under the FCC umbrella and it was not until the FCC's 1976 Sec-
ond Computer Inquiry that the FCC reorganized services into basic transmission
and enhanced fields. Id. at 818-27.
42 See, e.g., Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Communication Internetwork
Found., 22 F.3d 1423, 1429 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 500 (1994), and
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1962 (1995) (discussing public television as limited or non-
public forum); Tele-Communications of Key West, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.2d
1330, 1335-39 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (applying public forum doctrine to find First Amend-
ment cause of action in suit brought by cable television provider who was forced to
stop providing services to United States Air Force base); Preferred Communications,
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1407-09 (9th Cir. 1985) (using public fo-
rum doctrine as one of several justifications for reversing dismissal of First
Amendment claim by cable television corporation desiring access to public utility
poles and conduits), affd, 476 U.S. 488 (1986); see also Daniel Brenner, Cable Tele-
vision and the Freedom of Expression, 1988 DUKE L.J. 329, 377 (1988) (arguing that
"rights of access under the Cable Act create a public forum on the operator's prop-
erty without the operator's consent"); Andrew A. Bernstein, Note, Access to Cable,
Natural Monopoly, and the First Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1663, 1669-72
(1986) (discussing regulation of speech on cable); Wally Mueller, Comment, Contro-
versial Programming on Cable Television's Public Access Channels: The Limits of
Government Response, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 1051, 1099-1105 (1989) (arguing that
public access channels are limited public fora); Spong, supra note 31, at 1299-1309
(arguing that cable companies should have speech rights in access public fora). But
see John J. Brunelli, Why Courts Should Not Use Public Forum Doctrine Analysis in
Considering Cable Operators' Claims Under the First Amendment, 24 AM. BUS. L.J.
541, 545-60 (1987) (positing that public forum analysis is not appropriate to cable
regulation); cf. Spilka, supra note 34, at 342 (discussing cable television jurispru-
dence and need for greater First Amendment protections for cable industry); Cass
R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHi. L. REV. 255, 294-95 (1992) (arguing for
abandonment of public forum doctrine because streets and parks no longer serve
their common law roles as fora).
43 See Sen. Larry Pressler, Telecom Reform: It Ain't Over 'Til It's Over, ROLL
CALL, Mar. 11, 1996, reprinted in 142 CONG. REC. S2207 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1996)
(referring to electromagnetic spectrum as one of United States' "most valuable re-
sources" and discussing Senate's plans to examine federal government's manage-
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CDA, particularly with respect to the Internet controversy, may
constitute a similar Congressional attempt to declare that the
government should have certain ownership-like rights over
transmission vehicles," or computer networks, even though it
does not own the actual mechanisms to enable these transmis-
sions. Thus, the Act provides yet another good excuse to revisit
the Supreme Court's public forum doctrine.
The tone of the CDA goes farther than the public forum doc-
trine, moving toward the notion of public property to be used for
public good. However, if the Act is stripped of the assumption of
government "ownership" over the means of communication, the
justification for banning and blocking indecent material becomes
more problematic. This is particularly true when the govern-
ment is regulating what has traditionally been considered
"private" speech: speech about private matters, such as sex, and
speech involving a small number of participants communicating
ment and allotment of spectrum). The cases, however, differ in their emphasis on
who ultimately "owns" the property. In Red Lion Broadcasting Company v. FCC, the
Court states: "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broad-
casters, which is paramount.... It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas ... rather than to countenance monopolization
of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee." 395
U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
"Although the United States government has not taken complete "ownership
and control" over broadcasting, it has created a system which requires private li-
censing and government regulation. See CBS, 412 U.S. at 116; see also Red Lion
Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 389 (quoting National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.
190, 227 (1943) (stating that "Congress unquestionably has the power to grant and
deny licenses and to eliminate existing stations .... [T]o deny a station license be-
cause 'the public interest' requires it 'is not a denial of free speech' ")). But see Yo-
semite Park & Curry Co. v. United States, 686 F.2d 925, 934 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (citing
National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974) (stating that
power of government to regulate "the airwaves and to issue licenses came not from
its ownership of the airwaves but from its sovereign power to regulate certain ac-
tivities-in the case of the FCC, interstate commerce")). For another view on the
ownership of airwaves, see Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, where the
court asserted that" '[t]o say that the airways or spectrum can be owned by anyone
is simply to indulge in fantasy. Surely no one seriously supposes that the airways
are a thing of nature which can be possessed, occupied, or used in any normal sense
of the word.' " 473 F.2d 16, 67-68 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting)
(quoting Glen 0. Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40
Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 67, 152 (1967)). These
cases have also been interpreted as transferred public trust cases. See Becker, supra
note 29, at 840. For instance, in CBS, 412 U.S. at 117-18, Justice Burger under-
scored the propriety of requiring licensors with a privilege to assume the obligation
of attention to matters of public concern. See infra notes 423-45 and accompanying
text (discussing public trust doctrine).
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in a secluded setting."
The literature on the public forum doctrine, especially since
its resurrection by Harry Kalven in 1965,"6 is substantial, and
the cases numerous.48 Some commentators have stressed the
importance of public space for communication for essentially
utilitarian reasons,49 while others have recently focused on the
4- Of course, not all speech on the Internet resembles a private conversation.
Bulletin boards and chat rooms can involve dozens and hundreds of participants,
and viewing a Web site is more passive than participatory. But in terms of the pub-
lic-private distinction which the Supreme Court has used to determine whether a
state may regulate the viewing of obscenity, an individual's solo visit to a Web site
would seem more analogous to his viewing a pornographic movie in his living room,
see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969), than attending an adult theater,
see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 51 (1973), though perhaps not to his
receiving pornography through the mail, see United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351,
353 (1971), or transporting it for private use, see United States v. Orito, 413 U.S.
139, 140 (1973).
"' Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965
Sup. CT. REV. 1.
47 See, e.g., David S. Day, The End of the Public Forum Doctrine, 78 IOWA L.
REV. 143 (1992); C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in
First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 109 (1986); Daniel A. Farber &
John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Con-
text in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA_ L. REV. 1219 (1984); Adam M. Kanzer,
Misfit Power, the First Amendment and the Public Forum: Is There Room in Amer-
ica for the Grateful Dead?, 25 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 521 (1992); Gary C.
Leedes, Pigeonholes in the Public Forum, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 499 (1986); Michael J.
Mellis, Modifications to the Traditional Public Forum Doctrine: United States v.
Kokinda and Its Aftermath, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 167 (1991); Robert C. Post,
Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum,
34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987); Keith Werhan, The Supreme Court's Public Forum
Doctrine and the Return of Formalism, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 335 (1986); Brett W.
Berg, Note, Diminishing the Freedom to Speak on Public Property: International
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1265 (1993);
Marianne E. Dixon, Note, International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Lee: The Failure of the Public Forum Doctrine to Protect Free Speech, 37 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 437 (1993); Peter Jakab, Note, Public Forum Analysis After Perry Education
Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association-A Conceptual Approach to
Claims of First Amendment Access to Publicly Owned Property, 54 FORDHAM L. REV.
545 (1986); Richard T. Pfohl, Note, Hague v. CIO and the Roots of Public Forum
Doctrine: Translating Limits of Powers into Individual Rights, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 533 (1993); Pamela A. Schechter, Note, Public Forum Analysis and State
Owned Publications: Beyond Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 55 FORDHAM L.
REV. 241 (1986); Michael A. Scherago, Note, Closing the Door on the Public Forum,
26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 241 (1992); The Supreme Court, 1991 Term - Leading Cases,
106 HARV. L. REV. 163, 279 (1992).
43 See cases cited infra notes 92-128.
49 See THOMAS I. EMEERSON, TOwARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 5 (1966) (stating that "expression is an integral part of the develop-
ment of ideas, of mental exploration and of the affirmation of self); David A. J.
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"communal worth" of free speech in public circles-an effort that
espouses the protection of community interests.50 Like the
"communal" commentaries, this Article focuses on how the Su-
preme Court implicitly defines the present and future of our
communities and the relationship between government and citi-
zen when it uses the public forum doctrine.
Yet, my starting place is not the liberal presumption that
speech functions as a vehicle towards achieving a more humane
world in the future. In the liberal view, the harm which the Su-
preme Court's public forum doctrine and similar free speech
compromises have caused is to lock us into the status quo, pre-
venting progress toward the good society or the ideal human be-
ing. Liberals often justify free speech regimes politically, citing
how speech will ultimately guide us towards better self-
government. In their view, free speech is necessary if voters are
to acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous
devotion to the general welfare that demarks effective and hu-
mane citizenship.5' Others view free speech as necessary to the
improvement (in traditional language) or authenticity (in mod-
ern terms) of both the human race and the individual person.
Full "humanness," they claim, is inextricably dependent on in-
creasing the freedom and depth of internal, interpersonal and
communal dialogue. Richards, for example, describes how
speech permits and encourages "the human capacity to create
and express symbolic systems" which "nurture[] and sustain[]
the self-respect of the mature person."52
My concern is more immediate than whether we have
achieved progress toward some far-off enlightened society.53 I
am concerned that the Court's public forum doctrine has made
an intellectual contribution to the erosion of existing public life
Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First
Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974).
'0 See Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Right:
The First Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1990).
"' Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT.
REV. 245, 256-57 (stating that voters have access to knowledge, among other things,
required to vote through human communications); see also William J. Brennan, Jr.,
The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn's Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1965) (echoing Dr. Meildejohn's statement that freedom of
speech means presence of government).
52 See Richards, supra note 49, at 62.
Justice Kennedy seems to take this view. See Day, supra note 47, at 184




in America, that it has actively aided and abetted the destruction
of community. In turning away from the idea that human beings
are constituted by their public speech and action,54 the Court's
doctrine threatens to empty the public square.5 By alienating
the people from their own property, the Court encourages those
who are needed in the public conversation to leave public space,
eroding our common, public life. By subverting the traditional
self-understanding of the role government and its employees
play in public life, and altering the concept of citizenship, the
Court's doctrine poses a significant danger to the relationship
between the individual and government." To explore this devel-
opment, this article will focus first on the Court's discussion of
the public forum doctrine in its most recent technology case,
Denver Area E.T.C., before returning to the traditional doctrine
and to the place where the public forum story can best be told-
the government building. Through attention to its traditional
development, this article will suggest why new metaphors-new
bottles-are necessary for both old public property and the new
public "space" of computer/telecommunication. The Nine Jus-
tices' search for a metaphor is critical to our conception of public
life, not just rhetorical window-dressing. Metaphors create our
social realities; as they tell us who we will be in the future, they
-See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 156, 159 (1958). For Arendt,
speech and action reveal the distinctness of the human person:
[O]nly man can express [his] distinction and distinguish himself, and only
he can communicate himself and not merely something.... Through [speech
and action], men distinguish themselves instead of being merely distinct;
they are the modes in which human beings appear to each other, not in-
deed as physical objects, but qua men.
... In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their
unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human
world....
Id. at 159.
5 RICHARD SENNETT, THE FALL OF PUBLIC MAN: ON THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
OF CAPITALISM, 12-15 (1978) (stating that public squares are intended to "intermix
persons and diverse activities"); see also RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC
SQUARE 86-87 (1984).
6 My other concerns are social and ethical and will be discussed elsewhere. The
social concern is that the public forum doctrine exacerbates the split between the
public and private in American life by relegating speech to the private sphere with
the same implications for public life that the Courfs marginalization of religious be-
lief has had for religion. The ethical claim is that the public forum doctrine adopts
the liberal and, some have argued, patriarchal view of the stranger as enemy, and
thereby heightens the perception of the public place as a place of danger rather than
of community.
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also make our experience coherent.5 7
Until the Internet argument, Denver Area E.T.C. most
clearly delineated the quarrel within the Court about using a
property metaphor to define the new communications media.
Denver Area E.T.C. considered three provisions of the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 58
modified slightly in the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 5' The
first, section 10(a), permitted cable operators to ban patently of-
fensive0 material from access channels they lease to others.
This section of the Act was upheld by the Court as an appropri-
ately tailored remedy to achieve the "extremely important justi-
fication ... [of protecting] children from exposure to patently of-
fensive sex-related material."6
The Denver Area E. T. C. plurality opinion followed the deci-
sion in Pacifica62 in balancing the medium's accessibility to chil-
dren, its invasion of a homeowner's privacy, and the "extreme"
importance of the state's protective interest against the only
moderate restriction on speech. This opinion suggests that the
Court is likely to uphold the 1996 Act's modification of the rule
permitting cable operators to ban a program on a leased channel
which "contains obscenity, indecency or nudity."63
"' G. LAKOFF AND M. JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LwVE By 156 (1980).5 106 Stat. 1486, § 10(a), 10(b), 10(c), 47 U.S.C. §§ 532(h), 532(j) and 531 note.
"9 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, Title V, 110 Stat. 56, §§
503-06, 640-41. The most important modifications require cable operators to scram-
ble or block indecent programming without charge for nonsubscribers upon sub-
scriber requests, 47 U.S.C.A. § 560(a), and applies the mandatory scrambling re-
quirement to "sexually explicit adult video service programming." Sections 640 and
641 permit cable operators to refuse to transmit indecent or obscene materials (or
those containing nudity) over public or leased access channels. See CDA § 506(a), 47
U.S.C.A. §§ 531(3), 532(c)(2).
Operators must also limit children's access to adult material by limiting such
programming to hours of the day determined by the FCC "when a significant num-
ber of children are [not] likely to view it." CDA § 505(a), 47 U.S.C.A. § 561. Previous
law contemplated limited access by blocking a single channel on which all indecent
pro gams would be put. 47 U.S.C. § 532(j) (1994).
Targeted material included that which "the operator reasonably believes de-
scribes or depicts sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive
manner." 47 U.S.C. § 532(h)(a).
6' DenverArea E.T.C., 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2386 (1996).
6FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978)(plurality).
63 Section 506(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56, to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 532(c)(2). Of course, speech advocates might
argue indecent material or nudity does not rise to the level of patent offense regu-
lated by the 1992 statute. However, if Pacifica is indeed the standard, the Court can
rely on the fact that it used the terms "indecent" and "patently offensive" inter-
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By contrast, the 1992 Act's requirement that operators must
scramble or block patently offensive programs was overturned by
the Court as an unjustified limitation on speech, since less
speech-restrictive alternatives are available, like scrambling sex-
dedicated channels, blocking on subscriber request, and using V-
chips or lockboxes." The Denver Area E.T.C. Court further in-
validated the government's transfer of the discretion for blocking
patently offensive programs from community programmers to
cable operators on public access channels. The Court reasoned
that the transfer of the responsibility back to the operator to de-
cide whether to offer patently offensive programs would not sig-
nificantly restore editorial rights of cable operators, but would
greatly increase the risk that certain categories of programming
(say, borderline offensive programs) will not appear."65 Given the
Court's rationale, the 1996 additions, which permit operators to
block obscene, indecent or nude materials on public access sta-
tions, would also seem at risk.66
Justice Kennedy's concurring/dissenting opinion in Denver
Area E.T.C., joined by Justice Ginsburg, flatly adopted the public
forum doctrine as the controlling metaphor for cable. In his
view, cable public access channels are a dedicated public forum,
despite the fact that they utilize property whose title is held by
the cable operator.67 In support of this conclusion, Kennedy
noted the low cost of access; first-come, first-serve availability of
the channels; control and responsibility over shows which rests
in the programmer; and frequent use of public facilities to pro-
duce and/or transmit such programs."
Indeed, Kennedy suggested that local government franchise
contracts with cable authorities have created a property ease-
ment in cable property, and partially stripped cable operators of
the "right to exclude" programmers from using the property for
particular purposes.69 Since the government has in turn opened
changeably in that opinion. See 438 U.S. at 731-32.
e 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2397 (1996).
c Id. at 2387.
" Section 506(a) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, to be codified at 47
U.S.C.A. § 531(a), provides that "a cable operator may refuse to transmit any public
access program or portion of a public access program which contains obscenity, in-
decency, or nudity."
67 Denver Area E.T.C., 116 S. Ct. at 2409-10. Kennedy describes leased cable
channels as common carriers with appropriate obligations. Id. at 2405, 2412.
Id. at 2409.
6' Id. at 2409-10.
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its easement up to the public for general speech uses, with one
exception, it has created a fully dedicated public forum, where
content regulations will be subject to strict scrutiny, rather than
a limited public forum."0
Justice Thomas' concurrence/dissent took issue with the
public forum characterization, but he did not depart from the
property metaphor in the least. For Thomas, Red Lion did not
apply because "[clable systems are not public property. Rather,
cable systems are privately owned and privately managed, and
petitioners point to no case in which we have held that govern-
ment may designate private property as a public forum."71 In-
deed, he contrasted such property with public forum-available
property, namely "property the government owns outright, or in
which the government holds a significant property interest con-
sistent with the communicative purpose of the forum to be des-
ignated."72 The implication, for Justice Thomas, was that since
neither the government nor especially a cable programmer
seeking access has any property-type interest in cable systems,
the only speech interest to be considered is the cable operator's.73
However, for Justice Thomas, the state's compelling interest in
protecting children, and supporting parents' moral upbringing of
their children, was narrowly served by Congressional bans of in-
decent material, since parent-initiated blocking alternatives do
not easily do the job.74
Given the two votes he garnered, Justice Kennedy's public
forum position would not seem so significant if not for two facts.
First, most members of the Court challenged him on this issue,
rather than ignoring his argument in favor of their own distinc-
tions, e.g., the cable act was "forced speech" by the operator,75 the
Act failed (or did not fail) the strict scrutiny test,76 or that a bal-
ancing test should be deployed instead of strict scrutiny.7  Jus-
70 Indeed, Kennedy likens the case not to a bandshell dedicated solely to classi-
cal music, as the plurality opinion claims, which would create a limited public fo-
rum, but to a band shell which permits all types of music but rap, which would con-
stitute content discrimination in a full public forum. Id. at 2414.
" Denver Area E.T.C., 116 S. Ct. at 2426.
72 Id. at 2427.
73 Id. at 2427-28.
4 Id. at 2429.
'5 Id. at 4735-36 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
16 Denver Area E.T.C., 116 S. Ct. at 2412-13.
77 Id. at 2384 (plurality opinion).
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tice Breyer noted the inflexibility of the public forum doctrine7"
and suggested that it excluded important interests, such as those
of the cable operator.79
Separately, Justice Stevens expressed concern that applica-
tion of the public forum doctrine would chill the government's
desire to open new forums, such as public access cable channels,
on an experimental basis, though he did not expressly reject the
doctrine for public access channels." Justice Souter concen-
trated on the "fluidity" of the technology, and the need for the
Court to proceed incrementally rather than categorically under
the public forum doctrine so it can "[f]irst, do no harm."81 And, of
course, Justice Thomas denied that public regulation can trans-
form private property owned by cable operators, even where the
government exacts a contractual promise of access, noting that
such public forums can only be found where private property is
formally dedicated for streets and parks. 2
Justice Kennedy's public forum approach was also important
because the plurality did not wholly reject the public forum doc-
trine as applicable to the new technology. Rather, Justice Breyer
merely suggested that it was "unnecessary, unwise" and "too
premature" for the Court "definitively to decide whether or how
to apply the public forum doctrine" to cable, and that the case
could be decided without resort to the categories created by the
doctrine.' Indeed, Justice Breyer took the bait, by querying
whether the 1992 provisions made a "totally open 'forum' "into a
limited public forum,' and by siding with Justice Kennedy
against Justice Thomas on the public access channel-dedicated
easement analogy.' Thus, the public forum debate in Denver
Area E.T.C. is likely to continue to surface in the new technology
cases as the contours of the problems are defined.
78 Id. at 2384-85.
Id. at 2385.
El Stevens does argue that the leased access channels do NOT create a public
forum. Id. at 2399.
8' DenverArea E.T.C., 116 S. Ct. at 2402.
6 Id. at 2427.
3Id. at 2384.
' Id. at 2385.
' Id. Justice Breyer notes that the requirement to reserve capacity for public
access "is similar" to reserving land for streets and parks in approving a subdivision.
Id. at 2394. In this part of the opinion, Breyer is joined by Stevens and Souter,
making five votes (with Kennedy and Ginsburg) for a possible public forum ap-
proach in the future.
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As suggested above, a critical Pandora's box that Justice
Kennedy's opinion in Denver Area E. T. C. re-opens is the question
about what and whose property is governed by the public forum
doctrine. In addition to reaffirming that public forums are not
limited to "physical gathering places" but may include non-real
property,86 Justice Kennedy pointed out that even quintessential
public forums often traverse privately titled lands.
To Justice Thomas's outright denial that privately owned
property can ever become a public forum through government
regulation,88 Justice Kennedy cleverly pointed out that some
communications vehicles, such as cable, require the government
to contribute some of its property-in the case of cable, ease-
ments to string cables under public lands. When a new commu-
nications vehicle requires not just the government's oversight
but its contribution of resources, the contractual scheme created
begins more to resemble shared property rights than governmen-
tal regulation, especially if the government's bargained-for re-
strictions involve speech-related promises by the private owner.
The line between co-ownership and regulation may be easier to
draw in the case of some technologies, where no government
funds, equipment or land are necessary; and harder to draw in
others. That these categories may be distinct, however, poses
the possibility that even Justice Thomas' private property may
be converted into public forum-available property in that "the
government holds a significant property interest consistent with
the communicative purpose of the forum to be designated."89
The unanswered questions that Denver Area E.T.C. and the
Internet pose make it important to revisit the private property
metaphor in traditional settings to see what assumptions it
makes about individual relationships with government. Heeding
Justice Souter's admonition to "do no harm," this Article will fo-
cus more on what is problematical about the existing metaphor
than propose what alternatives should take its place for the new
communication technologies. However, if we can define what is
happening symbolically through the public forum doctrine, we
are on the way to reconstructing an ethics of citizenship and gov-
"a Kennedy cites Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia,
115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995). Denver Area E.T.C., 116 S. Ct. at 2409.
Id. at 2409-10.




ernment servanthood that will help us name new metaphors for
the new world.
I. ONE MORE TIME ON THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes is credited with the first
enunciation of the public forum doctrine, a doctrine particularly
significant because it mixed public power and private right doc-
trines, two ideas traditionally kept separate." While the histori-
cal development of the doctrine is considerably more complex, "
Holmes' property metaphor is a good starting point for the dis-
cussion.
In Commonwealth v. Davis,92 then-Massachusetts Supreme
Court Justice Holmes argued that prohibiting public speaking
"in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the
rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private
house to forbid it in his house." 9 By analogizing the government
to the owner of a house, and equating public lands with private
real property belonging to that owner, Justice Holmes set the
stage for later public forum arguments.
These distinctive metaphors of property and person, emanat-
ing from such a distinguished jurist, were pursued in Supreme
Court cases that followed. In Hague v. Committee for Industrial
"' See, e.g., MORRIS R. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER: ESSAYS IN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 41 (1967) (quoting Montesquieu's distinction between political laws
from which we acquire liberty-the Roman imperium-and civil laws-dominium-
governing individuals' rights over things); Ingber, supra note 50, at 24-26
(explaining that constant tension exists between two conflicting traditions of indi-
vidualism and community).
' Several pre-1919 cases, such as In re Frazee, 30 N.W. 72 (Mich. 1886), ex-
plored protection of speech through challenges to the limitation of government pow-
ers, although most such challenges were unsuccessful. See Pfohl, supra note 47, at
547 & n.72 (explaining that most state courts faced with public speech cases prior to
1919 decided to uphold municipal restrictions). See generally id. at 536, 538-55
(providing historical development of public speech concepts from Civil War through
World War II).
39 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1895), affd, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
93 Id. at 113. The Supreme Court unanimously adopted Holmes' position, noting
that that the right to exclude, being the greater property power, included the right
to constrain use. See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897); see also
Kalven, supra note 46, at 13 (explaining that U.S. Supreme Court endorsed Holmes'
decision and rationale). However, in a case which seems to contradict this metaphor,
Judge Holmes held that the City of Boston could not be held liable for damages for
shying a horse by firing a cannon on Boston Common since the Common was held
"not for emolument or revenue ... but public benefit," so its use can be regulated.
SILAS BENT, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 239-40 (1932).
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Organization,94 Justice Roberts argued that, "[wiherever the title
of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held
in trust for the use of the public and time out of mind, have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions."95 Thus, Justice Rob-
erts implicitly acceded to Holmes' metaphors-that the govern-
ment is a person and that public property is "his" private prop-
erty-yet amended them using easement theory.96  Under
Roberts' version of the public trust doctrine, the government
might be the owner, but the public has obtained an easement
over the government's private land.
Although mentions of Holmes' doctrine occasionally sur-
faced, and the Court thereafter constructed a rule for judging
regulation of public forum speech,97 Harry Kalven is often cred-
ited with reviving Justice Holmes' words, and Justice Roberts'
caveat, in his 1965 article.99 Kalven sought to constitutionally
justify the exercise of speech rights in the civil rights protest
cases, proposing that we reconsider public property as a "public
forum."99 The issue he raised was whether the "street [as op-
posed to other public places such as swimming pools which are
dedicated to recreational uses such that a discussion of such
307 U.S. 496 (1939) (plurality).
9' Id. at 515 (Roberts, J., concurring). However, Justice Butler noted in his dis-
sent that the ordinance was, in principle, no different from that in the Davis case.
Id. at 533 (Butler, J., dissenting).
Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. CT.
REV. 233, 238 (discussing that public forum right is predicated upon established
common law notions of adverse possession and public trust); see also Pfohl, supra
note 47, at 536-38 (tracing three theories underlying modern public forum doctrinal
analysis to Hague).
97 See Stone, supra note 96, at 239-41 (citing three cases decided within four
years of Roberts which described propositions that would govern public forum: Ja-
raison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (holding that assertion of title by state does not
permit flat ban on use of streets and parks for speech purposes); Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (holding that courts must "weigh the circumstances and ...
appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of [speech] regula-
tion"); and Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (holding that statute's time,
place, and manner restriction is fair accommodation between public safety and or-
der, and First Amendment rights)).
9' Kalven, supra note 46, at 12-13; see Day, supra note 47, at 154 (explaining
that many credit Kalven for public forum doctrine's separate title and identity);
Kenneth L. Karst, Public Enterprise and the Public Forum: A Comment on Southern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 247, 248 n.7 (noting that Kalven's pub-
lication may have triggered public forum doctrine).
99 Kalven, supra note 46, at 11-12. Professor Geoffrey Stone described this as a
"Fora Americana." Stone, supra note 96, at 233.
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places as public forums is "unpersuasive"] ... [is] a kind of public
hall, a public communication facility?"' In other words, is the
street private property owned (with its rights of use) by the peo-
ple rather than the government?' Yet Kalven failed to pursue
the implications of his metaphor, perhaps not knowing where it
would lead.
Kalven's question effectively resurfaced in Grayned v. City of
Rockford1' and Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District.' Both cases focused on whether differing public
uses of a particular forum, including speech, were compatible
and could therefore be simultaneously exercised.' In what was
known as the "incompatibility" doctrine, short-lived as a Su-
preme Court majority test,0 5 the Supreme Court did an about-
... Kalven, supra note 46, at 12.
'0' Id. at 16 (explaining that Roberts called for balancing of personal rights and
public convenience).
102 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
'03 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
"" Even prior to Grayned or Tinker, contextual interest-balancing was some-
times employed by justices who dissented from opinions upholding speech and as-
sembly rights. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1963) (Clark,
J., dissenting) (arguing that good faith determination that disorder was imminent
during civil rights protests by State House justified arrest, so long as there was no
viewpoint discrimination). The incompatibility doctrine did not rely on the Kalven
analysis, but Kalven's article is occasionally linked with language similar to the doc-
trine. See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 100-01 (1972) (citing Tinker
which uses incompatibility doctrine).
"' The Court turned to the public forum doctrine in place of the incompatibility
test just two years after Grayned. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298 (1974) (plurality); Day, supra note 47, at 157-58 (stating that Lehman signaled
end of Grayned's approach). Justices Brennan and Marshall later returned to the
incompatibility tests in concurring and dissenting opinions. See, e.g., United States
v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 185 (1983) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S.
114, 134-35 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring). Justices Kennedy, Souter, Blackmun,
and Stevens advocated a related sort of incompatibility standard in International
Society for Krishna Consciousness Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 698-99 (1992) (plurality)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) [hereinafter ISKCON]. Kennedy's three-part test focuses
on the physical similarity of the forum with other public fora, past acquiescence to
broad public access to the property, and whether the speech would interfere with
the government's intended use of the property. Id.
Moreover, some lower courts have grafted a form of incompatibility doctrine
onto the public forum analysis of Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). For instance, in Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v.
Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 579 F. Supp. 90, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd, 745 F.2d 767
(2d Cir. 1984), the court went through the Perry analysis to determine if there was a
dedicated public forum, but then decided that the First Amendment exercise could
be banned only when it is " 'unavoidably incompatible' with the use to which the
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face on the question of the public forum. The Court did not as-
certain who was the owner of public property, what his property
boundaries were, or whether anyone gained an easement inter-
est in his property, by sale or prescription. Rather, the incom-
patibility doctrine presumed that the people have the right of ac-
cess to government property. Grayned and Tinker questioned
whether the public's uses of a particular forum were compatible
with each other-whether the speech use would disrupt the non-
speech use-and thus, whether they could both coincide at the
same time.' The incompatibility cases are the best available
evidence that at least some members of the Court have pre-
sumed that "public" property belongs to the people, rather than
the government.
The Court's incompatibility cases, however, go somewhat
beyond the property scrutinized by Kalven-the property physi-
cally situated within the people-owned easement-the street or
sidewalk."7 Both Grayned and Tinker involved potentially dis-
ruptive speech on a sidewalk just outside a public school. Both
thus ask whether the speaker is protected if his voice strays be-
yond the physical boundaries of the public easement, or if the
speaker himself physically strays beyond those boundaries.
Nevertheless, Kalven's proposal that "Robert's Rules" be used as
the governing metaphor within the public forum and his query
whether it is not "possible, if difficult, to work out mutually sat-
isfactory arrangements," come to fruition in the incompatibility
doctrine. 8 That doctrine emphasizes the desirability of accom-
modating both speech and non-speech interests unless the harm
caused by the speech to the non-speech interest is both concrete
and substantial. 9
At about this same time, the private ownership metaphor
property is dedicated." Moreover, the district court used the Grayned language
when asking whether the actual distribution of newspapers through newsracks was
"incompatible with or disruptive of the transportation-related function of the fo-
rum."Id.
106 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 512-13.
107 Kalven, supra note 46, at 12. "When the citizen goes to the street, he is exer-
cising an immemorial right of a free man, a kind of First-Amendment easement." Id.
at 13. Grayned and Tinker involve potentially disruptive speech on a public school
sidewalk within hearing distance of the school, and political speech within the pub-
lic school. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 105; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504-05.
108 Kalven, supra note 46, at 27.
09' See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512-13 (stating that constitutional rights of students
could not be abridged absent showing that students' activities materially and sub-
stantially disrupt work and discipline of school).
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once again emerged in Justice Black's opinions employing simi-
lar language"0 to decry civil rights demonstrations in Brown v.
Louisiana... and Adderley v. Florida." It was not until after
1972, in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, however, that
the Holmes private ownership metaphor began to garner im-
pressive support from members of the Court,"' including Jus-
tices Blackmun,"' Rehnquist, 5  Stewart, 6  White,"7  and
O'Connor,"8 as well as detractors like Justice Stevens."9
The most significant doctrinal expansion of the Holmes
metaphor as it focused on property language occurred in 1983 in
Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Associa-
tion."0 In Perry, the Court devised a three-category approach to
10 Interestingly, although he does not cite Holmes, Justice Black employs effec-
tively the same language, noting that "[the First Amendment] does not guarantee to
any person the right to use someone else's property, even that owned by government
and dedicated to other purposes...." Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 166 (1966)
(plurality) (Black, J., dissenting).
" 383 U.S. 131, 151 (1966) (plurality) (Black, J., dissenting).
12 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
13 Justice Stevens has claimed that it does not "illuminate the interests at
stake" in public forum cases. The Honorable John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of
Speech: Inaugural Address, Ralph Gregory Elliot First Amendment Lecture at Yale
Law School (Oct. 27, 1992), 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1302 (1993) (explaining that attach-
ing label of true public forum to certain places guarantees "nothing more than free-
dom from discriminatory treatment").
14 See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (plurality)
(holding that city advanced reasonable legislative objectives in proprietary capacity
and that, accordingly, there was no First Amendment violation).
"s1 See ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 679 (holding that airports are nonpublic fora);
United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 132
(1981); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (plurality) (stating that letter box does
not constitute traditional public forum).
" See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 835-36 (1976) (citations omitted) (stating
that the fact that people are permitted to freely visit place owned or operated by
government does not make such place a public forum).
117 See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 183-84 (1983); Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Heffron v. International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981).
m See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (plurality); Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985). Professor Mellis
notes the sharp contrast between Justice O'Connor's opinions in Frisby v. Schultz,
487 U.S. 474 (1988) (arguing that sidewalks were always public fora) and in Kok-
inda, 497 U.S. 720, 721 (1990) (noting that post office sidewalk did not have charac-
teristics of quintessential public sidewalks, and therefore was not public forum).
Mellis, supra note 47, at 188-89.
11 Stevens, supra note 113, at 1302.
'2' Perry, 460 U.S. at 37. Many lower courts have followed the Perry analysis.
See, e.g., Slotterback v. Interboro Sch. Dist., 766 F. Supp. 280, 291-92 (E.D. Pa.
1991); ACT-UP v. Walp, 755 F. Supp. 1281, 1287 (M.D. Pa. 1991); Gannett Satellite
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understanding the property rights of the government in publicly
owned real estate."' Each of these categories followed the pri-
vate ownership metaphor. In the first category-quintessential
or traditional public forums-reasonable time, place, and man-
ner restrictions are permitted1" but content restrictions are
largely banned.'23 In short, quintessential forums are Justice
Roberts' speech easements.24 Although in some cases, such fo-
rums are established by long-time or immemorial actual use of
the property, 21 the Perry Court continued the fiction of general
Info. Internetwork, Inc. v. Berger, 716 F. Supp. 140, 148-49 (D.N.J. 1989), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 894 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1990); United Black Community Fund Inc. v.
City of St. Louis, 613 F. Supp. 739, 742-43 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (stating that city work-
place is not public forum for solicitation of contributions), affd, 800 F.2d 758 (8th
Cir. 1986). One interesting contrast in which clashing private property metaphors
were used can be seen in Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. Public Utilities Com-
mission, 475 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1986), where the Court decided that a utility commis-
sion's right to require billing envelopes to carry political messages did not depend on
who owned the extra space in the envelopes.
121 Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46. The Court does not consistently apply the Perry
analysis. For instance, in Madsen v. Women's Health Center., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 764
(1994) (plurality), the Court held that injunctions carry "greater risks of censorship
and discriminatory application" than ordinances, id. at 764, and so applied a higher
standard than the time, place, and manner analysis, i.e., whether the injunction
burdens no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest.
Id. at 765.
See Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Township of Pennsauken, 709 F.
Supp. 530, 536 (D.N.J. 1989) (stating that newspaper vending boxes on public
streets are in public forum, but city ordinances controlling placement and box form
are reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions).
In traditional public fora, the Court has required content restrictions to meet
the strict scrutiny test. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980). There has, however, been liti-
gation over what constitutes a content-based restriction. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at
762 (rejecting argument that injunction restricting actions of abortion protesters at
clinic was content or viewpoint regulation, noting that any injunction applies "only
to a particular group (or individuals) and regulates the activities, and perhaps the
speech, of that group ... because of the group's past actions in the context of a spe-
cific dispute"). Id. In Madsen, the Court re-described the question in such cases as
whether the government regulates speech on the basis of" 'hostility-or-favoritism
towards the underlying message expressed.' " Id. at 763 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992)). But see Thomason v. Jernigan, 770 F. Supp.
1195, 1197 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (holding that Planning Commission's decision to vacate
cul-de-sac by abortion clinic because of demonstrations is content restriction); Pin-
eros Y Campesinos Unidos Del Noroeste v. Goldschmidt, 790 F. Supp. 216, 218 (D.
Or. 1990) (striking down statute limiting picketing of agricultural lands as content
regulation).
See Perry, 469 U.S. at 45-46 (citing Justice Roberts' landmark opinion in
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (plurality).
125 See Grutzmacher v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 700 F. Supp. 1497, 1500 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (describing public uses of Daly Plaza since 1960s). In some cases, other crite-
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adverse possession that it confirmed in United States v. Grace26
but later denied in United States v. Kokinda.2 That is, the
Court concluded that if the public has used particular streets
and parks for free expression from time immemorial, all streets
and parks (whatever their actual use) are easements for the
public's speech.'
According to the Perry Court, non-traditional dedicated pub-
lic forums, the second category, are subject to the same speech
rules as quintessential forums, but only where the government
owner has "dedicated" them to such speech."9 Following the
dedication theory, the owner (the government) must have in-
tended to make a dedication of his land3 ° to specified public
uses,131 and must have made an act of dedication through a
ria are also used to reach this decision. See, e.g., Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619
(5th Cir. 1981) (recognizing religious organization's right, subject to reasonable
regulation, to distribute literature and solicit funds in Dallas Airport); U.S. South-
west Africa/Namibia Trade & Culture Council v. United States, 708 F.2d 760, 761
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (finding that First Amendment freedoms apply in Dulles Airport).
'2' 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
497 U.S. 720 (1990) (plurality).
2' See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)
(plurality) ("[Sitreets and parks ... 'have immemorially been held in trust for the use
of the public.' ")); see also Madsen, 512 U.S. at 761 (noting previous public use in
finding public forum). Some courts have extended this assumption to other public
places, such as state and federal capitol complexes and similar buildings. See, e.g.,
ACT-UP v. Walp, 755 F. Supp. 1281, 1287 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (extending to Pennsylva-
nia state capitol rotunda, but not gallery of House chamber); Reilly v. Noel, 384 F.
Supp. 741, 746 (D.R.I. 1974) (State House rotunda); Jeannette Rankin Brigade v.
Chief of Capitol Police, 342 F. Supp. 575, 584 (D.D.C. 1972) (U.S. Capitol grounds),
affd mem., 409 U.S. 972 (1972).
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
Courts have held events, as well as land, to be public fora. See Cinevision
Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 570-71 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding municipal
amphitheater to be public forum); Irish Subcomm. v. Rhode Island Heritage
Comm'n, 646 F. Supp. 347, 352 (D.R.I. 1986) (stating that public ethnic festival, held
on public property, is public forum); North Shore Right to Life Comm. v. Manhasset
Am. Legion Post No. 304,452 F. Supp. 834, 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (declaring Memorial
Day Parade to be public forum). But see Committee for Creative Non-Violence v.
Hodel, 623 F. Supp. 528,533 (D.D.C. 1985) (holding Christmas Pageant of Peace not
public forum). See generally James C. Farrell, Comment, Should Irish Eyes Be Smil-
ing? The Hidden Issue of State Action in Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group of Boston, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 313 (1996) (analyzing free speech
rights of private parade organizers). Similarly, vehicles of communication such as
newspapers may not be public fora. See Sinn v. Daily Nebraskan, 638 F. Supp. 143,
151 (D. Neb. 1986) (holding that university newspaper had not been dedicated as
public forum), affd, 829 F.2d 662 (8th Cir. 1987).
'3 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802
(1985) (holding that government does not create public fora through inaction or by
allowing limited discussion, but through intentional dedication to public debate);
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writing or other action evidencing the owner's intent."' Appar-
ently, such intent to dedicate must be particularly clear when it
is made by the government.
The Supreme Court has suggested that even permitting
some speech activities on public property33 or opening up public
property to general access T3 does not amount to a dedication of
the property for speech purposes. Justice Thomas continued this
theme in Denver Area E. T. C., when he suggested that public fo-
rum analysis applies only to private property formally dedicated
as a public easement, such as subdivision dedications required
Slotterback v. Interboro Sch. Dist., 766 F. Supp. 280, 293 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (declaring
school limited public forum because of governmental intent to allow school to ac-
commodate broad types of communications among students).
132 "Dedication requires an offer by the owner of the land and an acceptance by
the public.... [It] may be express or implied by language or circumstances." RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 2.18 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1993); see
also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994) (finding city's requirement
that commercial property owner who planned to expand must dedicate property for
public use constituted governmental taking); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987) (holding that under Fifth Amendment, California Coastal
Commission could not require landowners who desired building permit to provide
public easement across their property without just compensation). As in a private
property dedication, courts may also look to the scope of the use granted in deter-
mining whether a forum is fully public or limited to certain speech uses. See Slotter-
back, 766 F. Supp. at 292.
1 See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990) (plurality); Hazel-
wood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 269 (1988) (holding that school newspa-
per is not public forum); see also Leedes, supra note 47, at 521 (discussing need of
governmental intent in dedication of non-traditional forum for public discourse).
Similarly, public access alone does not create a public forum. See Daniel v. City of
Tampa, 38 F.3d 546, 550 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that public housing authority is
not public forum by virtue of public access). But see University of Utah Students
Against Apartheid v. Peterson, 649 F. Supp. 1200, 1209 (D. Utah 1986) (declaring
that Student Bill of Rights including free speech and assembly clauses with time,
place, and manner limitation creates limited public forum).
However, the frequency of communicative activity is often used in other cases
to establish the existence of a public forum. See Chabad-Lubavitch of Georgia v.
Harris, 752 F. Supp. 1063, 1068 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (finding state capital plaza used re-
peatedly for demonstrations is public forum; but private menorah may be banned
under reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions).
"4 ACT-UP v. Walp, 755 F. Supp. 1281, 1286 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that open
House gallery at State Capitol is not speech dedication even when "public is allowed
to roam about unhindered"); see also Daniel v. City of Tampa, 843 F. Supp. 1445,
1447 (1993) (open housing authority). Some have even argued that the selection of
only one speaker, such as one cable company franchise, evidences an intent not to
dedicate. See, e.g., Spong, supra note 31, at 1302. This claim would also be consis-
tent with the Court's finding that the school mailboxes in Perry were not a public
forum because selective access was granted to certain organizations. Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1993).
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by municipalities as a condition of rezoning."5
In Perry, the Court effectively found neither an intent to
dedicate teachers' mailboxes to general discussion about public
issues or even labor issues, nor an act that consummated a dedi-
cation, notwithstanding a prior act of permitting Scout flyers and
PTA notices to be placed in teachers' mailboxes.3 ' Consistent
with the rights of a private property owner, Perry and other
cases establish that the government can close a dedicated public
forum altogether for any apparent reason, except to silence the
content of particular speech."7
Finally, the third category in the Perry analysis consists of
nonpublic forums in which the government has exercised its
property right of exclusion. In such forums the government has
fairly plenary power."8  Its rights are distinguished from the
rights of a private property holder in two respects. First, unlike
the private property owner, the government's regulations must
be "reasonable." Second, in contrast to the private property
owner, the government cannot choose between viewpoints on the
same subject, although it can ban a subject from discussion alto-
gether.39
The Denver Area E.T.C. case also affirms the Court's occa-
sional suggestions that there might be a fourth category of pub-
" DenverArea E.T.C., 116 S. Ct. at 2426.
"G Perry, 460 U.S. at 47.
37 Id. at 46.
= Id. Professor Day notes that the public forum doctrine gives the government
two bites at the apple, one at the public forum threshold and the other when the
substantiality of the government's interest is analyzed in the time, place, and man-
ner test. See Day, supra note 47, at 188; see also Jakab, supra note 47, at 552-53
(discussing application of nonpublic forum analysis to intersection of two streets
where leafletters were stopping cars in ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 603 F. Supp. 869
(D. Ariz. 1985), affd, 798 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1986)). The courts have found non-
public fora in such cases as Shopco Distribution Co. v. Commanding General, 885
F.2d 167, 172 (4th Cir. 1989) (military base residential areas); Estiverne v. Louisi-
ana State Bar Ass'n, 863 F.2d 371, 377 (5th Cir. 1989) (state bar journal); Interna-
tional Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition
Authority, 691 F.2d 155, 161 (3d Cir. 1982) (sports complex); Pritchard v. Carlton,
821 F. Supp. 671, 677-78 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (Holocaust memorial); and Clark v. Bur-
leigh, 841 P.2d 975, 981 (Cal. 1992) (candidate's statement on voter's pamphlet).
See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46; see also Daniel, 38 F.3d at 549 (stating that public
housing authority can apply reasonableness standard to bar trespassers protesting
Gulf War); Sinn v. Daily Nebraskan, 638 F. Supp. 143, 151 (D. Neb. 1986) (holding
that university newspaper which is nonpublic forum may use reasonable regulation
as long as it is "not an attempt to suppress expression which the state finds offen-
sive, such as not selecting advertising due to its content").
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lic forum: limited public fora subject to fairly minimal regula-
tion." ° Limited fora seem to be those which the government
"owner" has dedicated for limited types of speech.141 In these
fora, the government cannot only restrict the method of speech,
but also its content, as in nonpublic fora. 1 2 The plurality in Den-
ver Area E.T.C. reserved the question of what scrutiny level
would be applied to a limited forum, though the opinion inti-
mated that heightened scrutiny would be applied.'
Along with the private property metaphor, the Court began
to develop a persona for its owner. Ironically, it was Justice
Blackmun'" who, in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,"5 spoke
most directly using personification. "' Justice Blackmun first
140 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 n.7 (finding that public forum may be created for
limited purpose such as use by certain groups or for discussion of certain subjects);
see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267, n-5 (1981) (public university); Hef-
fron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 652 (1981)
(Minnesota State Fairgrounds); Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1259
(3d Cir. 1992) (public library); Kaplan v. County of Los Angeles, 894 F.2d 1076, 1079
(9th Cir. 1990) (voter's registration pamphlet); San Diego Comm. Against Registra-
tion & the Draft v. Governing Bd., 790 F.2d 1471, 1478 (9th Cir. 1986) (school news-
paper); Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 741 F.2d. 538, 547 n.12 (3d Cir.
1984) (high school), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986); Slotterback v.
Interboro Sch. Dist., 766 F. Supp. 280, 290 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (high school literature
distribution policy); Thompson v. Waynesboro Area Sch. Dist., 673 F. Supp. 1379,
1385-87 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (junior high school); University of Utah Students Against
Apartheid v. Peterson, 649 F. Supp. 1200, 1209 (D. Utah 1986) (university); Prince-
ton Educ. Ass'n v. Princeton Bd. of Educ., 480 F. Supp. 962, 968 (S.D. Ohio 1979)
(school board meeting); Toward a Gayer Bicentennial Comm. v. Rhode Island Bicen-
tennial Found., 417 F. Supp. 632, 638 (D.R.I. 1976) (Old State House, for bicenten-
nial activities). But see Alaska Gay Coalition v. Sullivan, 578 P.2d 951 (Alaska 1978)
(stating that paperback guide to city services is traditional public forum).
141 See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 655 (finding that Minnesota State Fairgrounds is
limited public forum); State v. Linares, 630 A.2d 1340, 1348 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993)
(declaring House gallery to be limited public forum), affd in part, rev'd in part, 655
A.2d 737 (Conn. 1995).
142 See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 652 (upholding fairground rules which allow visitors
to espouse their views throughout fairgrounds, but restrict selling and distribution
of goods and solicitation of funds to booths available for rent).
143 116 S. Ct. at 2384.
' Blackmun later joined Justice Brennan's dissent in United States v. Kokinda,
497 U.S. 720, 739 (1990) (plurality) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan complains
about how the public forum doctrine has created "pigeonholes" for speech. See Mel-
lis, supra note 47, at 188 (citing Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 744).
'45 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality).
146 Personification is an ontological metaphor in which a physical object is speci-
fied as being a person in order to comprehend experiences with nonhuman entities
"in terms of human motivations, characteristics and activities." GEORGE LAKOFF &
MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 33 (1980). "The act of personification [is]
essential to all storytelling and storyreading. Unless the storyteller can create out of
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distinguished between public spaces, a metaphor which focused
on the property itself, and government activity, which focused on
the owner of the property.'47 Since the city was engaged in com-
merce, Justice Blackmun likened it to a newspaper, radio or
television station that has discretion about what advertising to
accept, subject to the "arbitrariness" ban.48 Thus, by describing
how a smart proprietor might think about his advertising, Jus-
tice Blackmun effectively imported tort law's governmental-
proprietary distinction " 9 into public forum law.80
words characters in whom we can believe, characters who seem to have a vivid in-
dependent life, we will not have much interest in the story." J. HILLIS MILLER,
VERSIONS OF PYGMALION vii (1990).
147 Lehman, 418 U.S. at 302-03. See generally Mellis, supra note 47, at 190-92
(criticizing use of government as proprietor to diminish First Amendment protec-
tions).
'48 Lehman, 418 U.S. at 303.
'49 See Alexandria Scrap Corp. v. Hughes, 391 F. Supp. 46, 54-55 (D. Md. 1975),
rev'd, 426 U.S. 794 (1976). The district court stated:
tg]overnments in the United States traditionally possess two kinds of
power: one, governmental or public, in the exercise of which it is a sover-
eign and governs its people; the other, proprietary or business, by means of
which the government acts and contracts for the private advantage of its
constituents and of the government itself .... When the state exercises its
proprietary or business power ... it is subject to no more limitation than a
private individual or corporation would be in transacting the same busi-
ness.
Id. at 54-55. The governmental-proprietary distinction is traditionally used in the
context of municipal corporations. See STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., 2 THE AMERICAN
LAW OF TORTS § 6:9 (1985) (describing debate surrounding distinction in tort law);
FOWLER v. HARPER ET AL., 5 THE LAW OF TORTS § 29.6 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 2 1995).
For a general discussion of governmental immunities, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 895A-895C (1979). The federal government has not adopted the gov-
ernmental-propriety distinction. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61
(1955); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895A cmt. b (1979). The Federal Tort
Claims Act allows a suit to be brought against the federal government "if a private
personfl would be liable" in a similar incidence. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994). The Su-
preme Court has held, however, that the phrase "a private person would be liable"
does not grant the United States immunity if the action is a function specifically
limited to governmental entities. Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 64-65. Additionally,
the Court has declared that the "[glovernment is not partly public or partly private,
depending upon the governmental pedigree of the type of a particular activity or the
manner in which the Government conducts it." Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill,
332 U.S. 380, 383-84 (1947).
' The majority in Lehman, however, was persuaded not by the proprietary
distinction, but by the captive audience theory. Mellis, supra note 47, at 192 &
n.195.
Justice Scalia also picked up this trend when, dissenting in Rutan v. Republi-
can Party, he argued that in government employment, the government acts not "as
lawmaker, ... but, rather, as proprietor, to manage [its] internal operatio[ns,]" sub-
jecting such employment to a lesser level of scrutiny. 497 U.S. 62, 98 (1990) (Scalia,
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Under the personification approach used by the Court in
subsequent cases, government is not "government" when it is
teaching school, delivering mail, caring for parks, providing pub-
lic transportation, training soldiers, jailing criminals, or even
running an airport. ' It seems to make no difference, in the
Court's analysis, whether "government" is doing things tradi-
tionally done by a private person or by a government.'52 The
"business" of training soldiers and jailing criminals is treated on
par with the "business" of delivering mail or running an airport.
Similarly, it seems not to matter whether the branch of govern-
ment under scrutiny is charged with funding itself through sales,
like with the post office, or whether it is fully funded with tax
dollars, like with the public schools.
53
J., dissenting) (quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
896 (1961)). Finally, Justice Rehnquist utilized the proprietor metaphor in Interna-
tional Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, justifying the treatment of airport
terminals as nonpublic fora. 505 U.S. 672, 677 (1992).
'51 In Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (plurality), and Greer v. Spock, 424
U.S. 828 (1976), the Court used this "business" personification theory to describe a
traditional government activity, the training of soldiers. Id. at 838 (stating that "the
business of a military installation ... [is] to train soldiers, not to provide a public fo-
rum"). The Court has also resorted to the business metaphor where the government
was in the postal business, United States Postal Serv. v. Council Greenborough
Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 133 (1981), in the state fair business, Heffron v. Interna-
tional Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 654-55 (1981), where the
government was an educator, Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 46-47 (1983), and where government was a park preservationist. Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296 (1984). Justice O'Connor
adopted the business personification argument in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal De-
fense & Education Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 799 (1985), where government was an em-
ployer, and United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 731 (1990) (plurality), where
again, the government was in the postal business.
152 In non-federal tort cases, one of the factors determining whether an activity
should be classified as governmental or proprietary is "whether the function is one
historically performed by government." HARPER, supra note 149, § 29.6, at 627.
"'[I]t is only where the duty is a new one and is such as is ordinarily performed by
trading corporations, that an intention to give a private action for a neglect in its
performance is to be presumed." HARPER, supra note 149, § 29.6, at 627 (quoting
Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344, 369 (1877)); see also Indian Towing Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. at 68 ("[Ilt is hard to think of any governmental activity ... which is
'uniquely governmental,' in the sense that its kind has not at one time or another
been, or could not conceivably be, privately performed.").
113 Another consideration in making tort law's governmental-proprietary dis-
tinction is "whether the function is allocated to the municipality for its profit or
special advantage or whether for the purpose of carrying out the public functions of
the state without special advantage to the city." HARPER, supra note 149, § 29.6, at
625. This is not a truly accurate test, however, because "[mIany of the functions now
generally considered governmental were privately performed in the not very distant
past. Id. § 29.6, at 628. Although "[tihe fact that the municipality makes a charge or
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Nor does it seem to matter whether the activity in question
is one which governments have performed throughout history
(e.g., military, prisons); one which governments have usually
performed, but in modern times only (e.g., state fairs, dedicating
and caring for public parks); one which gradually was ceded by
private corporations to the government (e.g., schools);TM or one in
which the government is in competition with private vendors
(e.g., transportation).'55 Rather, regardless of the origin and type
of government function, the Court invites us to utilize the per-
spective of a private person who is using his property to accom-
plish certain business goals--"managing [his] internal opera-
tions, rather than acting as a lawmaker with the power to
regulate or license.' "156
a profit in connection with the service rendered has often been considered ... fumc-
tions have been held governmental in spite of a charge, and functions have been
held proprietary where there is neither a charge nor profit." Id. at 628-29.
Speiser states:
[T]he prevailing American view has been that school districts ... are mere
public agencies or instrumentalities of the state, often denominated quasi-
public corporations ... and that all their authorized functions or activities
are of a governmental character. In a number of other jurisdictions, how-
ever, the courts have taken the view that school districts ... may exercise
functions or engage in activities of a private or proprietary nature and that
as to such functions or activities the rule of immunity is inapplicable.
SPEISER, supra note 149, § 6:9, at 57-58.
" Harper states:
Certain ... activities that are relatively recent additions to the responsi-
bilities of municipal governments are ... typically ... classified [as govern-
mental], e.g., police activity, firefighting, education and public health. On
the other hand the operation and maintenance of utilities (waterworks,
sewer systems, gas or electric plants, street railways, airports) are gener-
ally regarded as proprietary functions. There is conflict among the
authorities as to a number of miscellaneous fimctions that are fairly com-
monly carried out by municipalities, such as street cleaning, the operation
and maintenance of parks and of swimming pools, garbage collection, the
performance and reporting of inspections, and the erection and mainte-
nance of public buildings.
HARPER, supra note 149, § 29.6, at 631-35.
' Denver Area E.T.C., 116 S. Ct. at 2413 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part) (quoting ISKON v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678-79 (1992)). Justice Ken-
nedy, who agrees that the government acting as proprietor is subject only to non-
public forum review, risks his own argument on the new technologies. If the
government is contracting for a property easement on public access channels with
the cable operator, it must be acting more as a "proprietor" than regulating as a
"lawmaker." But the nonpublic forum doctrine invokes rational basis scrutiny and
permits content discrimination, a result that might worry even Justice Stevens, who
sees the public forum designation as putting Congress to an "all or nothing-at-all
choice in deciding whether to open certain cable channels to programmers who
would otherwise lack the resources to participate in the marketplace of ideas" and
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At first glance, the metaphors of "property" and "property
owner" seem inviting because they call for the Court to recognize
the varied enterprises and needs in which governments engage,
and tailor its jurisprudence accordingly. Such an approach sug-
gests the sort of contextualization that contemporary critical
scholars are calling for in the application of law to the daily lives
of human beings. Property metaphors seem to remove speech
doctrine from the abstraction of theories and simple formulas to
the specific dynamics of a particular social setting.15
In practice, however, the trend toward government personi-
fication and the privatization of government property has simply
added to the formalism and theoretical confusion over public fo-
rum jurisprudence. Perhaps the clearest example is United
States v. Kokinda,"5 ' where the Court posed the riddle: When is a
sidewalk not a sidewalk?..9 In Kokinda, the apparent bright-line
rule of earlier cases such as United States v. Grace,16 which des-
ignated streets, sidewalks and parks as public fora, was under-
cut by a shift toward the personification approach. The Court
held that the postal sidewalk was not the "traditional public fo-
rum sidewalk" because it was owned by an enterprise, the gov-
ernment post office.1
61
From the Kokinda twist to the public forum doctrine, a co-
nundrum arises with respect to the judicial values of clarity and
predictability.1 62 If a forum's classification is no longer deter-
as "dissuading the Government from creating access rights altogether." Denver Area
E.T.C., 116 S. Ct. at 2398-99 (Stevens, J., concurring). Yet even Justice Stevens ex-
pects that the government open channels "on an impartial basis." Id. at 2399
(Stevens, J., concurring).
157 See, e.g., Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, in CRITIcAL RACE THEORY:
THE CUTrING EDGE 38, 40-41 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995); Ann C. Scales, The Emer-
gence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUN-
DATIONS 40, 44-48 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993).
'5 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (plurality).
'9 Id.; see Scherago, supra note 47, at 241 (posing same riddle in discussion of
public forum doctrine).
160 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
"' United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 700, 727 (1990). This line of reasoning
originated in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 497 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting),
where Justice Stevens suggested that not all public streets rise to the level of public
forum.
6' Professor Day argues that the shift to the property metaphor changed the
burden of proof in speech cases. Instead of the state having to rebut a presumption
that speech was welcome, the Kokinda opinion "started with the assumption that
public property was closed to the public unless it is 'expressly dedicated ... to ex-
pressive activity.' "Day, supra note 47, at 189-90 (citing Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730).
[Vol. 71:217
PUBLIC FORUM SPEECH
mined by its physical characteristics"s or communicative pur-
poses,"M or even by physical notice to the public that they have
"entered some special type of enclave, "165 courts must return to
post-hoc, context-dependent determinations. 66 Indeed, Interna-
tional Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee (ISKCON) sug-
gested that even where public property is both physically and
functionally analogous to a public thoroughfare, and where most
local courts regard it as such, the public forum doctrine may not
apply.1"
From a policy perspective, the personification of government
and the immediate move to analogize public property to private
'0 See, e.g., Longo v. United States Postal Serv., 761 F. Supp. 220, 227 (D. Conn.
1991), rev'd on other grounds, 953 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated, 506 U.S. 802
(1992) (rejecting argument that physical characteristics alone should determine fo-
rum analysis).
16 See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 269 (1988) (noting
that school newspaper is not public forum); United States Postal Serv. v. Green-
burgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 128 (1981) (stating that letter box is not public fo-
rum, though it is used solely for communication). As these cases indicate, even
regulations describing communication as permissible do not necessarily create a
public forum. These speech cases create the tautological constitutionalism most fa-
vored by Justice Rehnquist. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (plurality).
But see Wallace v. Washoe County Sch. Dist., 701 F. Supp. 187 (D. Nev. 1988)
(holding that school districtfs "community use" policy creates public forum, so any
restrictions on that policy, even if contained within policy itself, must be justified).
'c United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983) (distinguishing sidewalk
outside Supreme Court building, which is generally indistinguishable from other
Washington sidewalks, from sidewalk on enclosed military base in Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828 (1976)); see Scherago, supra note 47, at 255-56.
' In Longo, for instance, the district court determined that the public forum
designation would be dependent on the location and purpose of a publicly owned
sidewalk, and made extensive findings about the situation of the sidewalk compared
to local thoroughfares. Longo, 761 F. Supp. at 227-29.
"7 ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 680. Before ISKCON, it had come to be accepted that
government-owned airports were public fora. See, e.g., Gannett Satellite Info. Inter-
network v. Berger, 716 F. Supp. 140, 149 (D.N.J. 1989) (citing considerable body of
case law recognizing airports as public fora), affd in part, rev'd in part, 894 F.2d 61
(3d Cir. 1990); Chicago Trib. Co. v. City of Chicago, 705 F. Supp. 1345 (N.D. Ill.
1989) (noting that Chicago airport was public forum and that authorities may not
seize newsboxes without demonstration of significant government interest and am-
ple alternatives). Citing two other circuit decisions, the court in Berger noted that
airport concourses are places where " 'the general public may shop, dine, imbibe,
and site [sic] see' " and observed that airports " 'resembl[e] those public thorough-
fares which have long been recognized to be particularly appropriate places for the
exercise of constitutionally protected rights....' " Berger, 716 F. Supp. at 149
(quoting Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 627 (5th Cir. 1981)); Chicago Area
Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921, 925 (7th Cir. 1975). See generally
Leedes, supra note 47, at 501-02 (summarizing types of judicial scrutiny applied to
various forms of regulation in public fora).
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property is more insidious than it may appear. The focus on pri-
vate property rights as the appropriate analogy for public prop-
erty not only fails to effectuate the purposes for which speech
rights or property rights are designed; it also creates a problem-
atic relationship between citizen and government.
Since the term "private property" is used as the metaphor
for how government views public property, it is important to un-
derstand the precise nature of the property claim that Justice
Holmes and others have made in the public forum cases. Profes-
sor Lloyd Cohen distinguishes three types of property rights:
(1) private property - property with respect to which a single
person has the rights to exclude, use, and alienate ... ; (2) com-
munal property - property which everyone has an identical right
to use and from which no one has the right to exclude or alien-
ate ...; and (3) collective property - property with regard to
which some political body has the right to alienate, exclude, and
define the set of permitted uses and terms of access .... 16
Although on the surface, the public forum doctrine would
seem to be an example of "collective property," the Supreme
Court actually appears to have treated government property as
the first of these types: private property which happens to be
owned by the government. The public forum doctrine developed
in these cases suggests that a single "person," the government,
owns public land and thus has the entire bundle of rights, in-
cluding the right to exclude and the right to use as the govern-
ment sees fit. Even "dedicated" speech areas are subject to the
private property regime because although the government as
proprietor may decide to open dedicated speech areas, it may
just as promptly close them, perhaps even arbitrarily.6 '
168 Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL.
W. L. REV. 239, 241 (1992). Cohen argues that the permitted uses for collective
property "may be as limited and quasi-private as those with respect to the space
shuttle Atlantis or as broad and quasi-communal as state forests." Id. Professor
Lawrence Lessig has proposed a grouping of speech associations which may have
some connection to these distinctions: associations in private, among known parties
who choose their conversation partners and topics; associations in public, where
participants add to a conversation with no real knowledge about who will read what
they write; and associations in construction, where participants enter a virtual room
and know with whom they converse, a virtual room subject to community control.
Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1746-47 (1995).
169 See Berger, 716 F. Supp. at 148. The state is not required to maintain these
designated forums indefinitely. Id. It is not clear from the cases whether the gov-
ernment's closure of a dedicated forum will be subjected even to the "arbitrary and
irrational" test. While a "non-traditional" or "designated" public forum remains
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The one exception to the rule that the government has vir-
tually complete discretion over speech on public property is, of
course, the quintessential public forum. Even though public fo-
rum jurisprudence treats the government as having granted a
prescriptive speech easement to the people, in Cohen's terms,
such property is not fully communal property just as a prescrip-
tive easement is not an unlimited property right. Rather, like
the prescriptive easement owner, the people have the right or
"privilege" to use the property for speech purposes so long as
that use is not in derogation of the property owner's-the gov-
ernment's-selected "higher" uses, such as traffic or foot pas-
sage.'
7 0
Even in the case of the speech easement, the determination
of these higher uses is not, as is implied in the collective prop-
erty definition, consciously debated and determined by a political
body which deliberately defines a set of uses and the terms of ac-
cess. Rather, it is defined by implication: the legislator enacts
legislation regarding traffic safety and the administrator decides
that traffic purposes are paramount to speech purposes when he
or she decides to arrest the speaker on the street.' Further-
more, in the case of non-quintessential public fora, the adminis-
trator's decisions need not even take into consideration the
speech interests at stake. Thus, the administrator's decision to
ban speech from public property is much more akin to a private
business proprietor's decision to allow certain people into his or
her store than it is akin to a public decision to reserve collective
property, e.g., wetland preservation.
From both free speech and public life perspectives, govern-
ment property, particularly government-sponsored cyberspace,
would ideally be considered communal property. Yet, because of
"real world" constraints, a collective property concept, inhibited
open, though, the government is bound by the same standards as apply to tradi-
tional public fora. Id.
'7 See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939) (plurality) (Roberts, J., concur-
ring) (claiming that speech interests are regulable "in the interest of all" and exer-
cised "in subordination to the general comfort and convenience," but not something
to be "abridged or denied"); see also Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98 (1972)
(noting possibility that state has legitimate interest in prohibiting some picketing to
protect public order).
171 See ACORN v. St. Louis County, 726 F. Supp. 747 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (banning
solicitation at toll booths for pedestrian and traffic safety impliedly subordinated
free speech right in traditional public forum to "higher use" of traffic safety), affd,
930 F.2d 591 (8th Cir. 1991).
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by hard review by the courts, is probably the best we can hope
for. So long as the government views public property as a pri-
vate right and, as such, "a legally enforceable claim of one person
against another, that the other shall do a given act or not do a
given act,"'72 both the individual and the public values of speech
are undercut.
II. GOVERNmENT PROPERTY AS PRIVATE PROPERTY: A PROPERTY
PERSPECTIVE
A brief review of the justifications for awarding and protect-
ing private property rights will reveal why the private prop-
erty/private person metaphors embedded in the public forum
doctrine are flawed when applied to public property.173 First, as
the "will" theory suggests, the private property metaphor threat-
ens our notion of a limited form of government."' Second, as
some arguments from possession show, a community under-
standing of the citizen's role, and particularly the role of the
speaker, in public life is at stake.17 5 Third, following "fairness"
arguments from natural rights or labor theory, a private prop-
erty regime distorts the self-understanding of the government
worker and his or her role.176 Fourth, following the social rela-
tions theory, the private property metaphor runs contrary to the
grain of egalitarianism that has demarked our social life. 77 Fi-
nally, following consequential arguments such as efficiency, the
private property metaphor dislocates the proper authority from
balancing competing public values. 1
78
A. The 'Will" Theory and the Concept of Limited Government
The application of a "will" theory of property through the
metaphor of private property risks serious distortion of our view
that government power is limited. If we begin to talk as if the
172 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 1 (1936) (emphasis added).
173 Here I will follow Singer's organization, which divides property theories into
five types: possession; the labor theory of property; rights theories including natural
rights, social contract, and human flourishing; consequentialist theories of property,
including economic efficiency and utilitarianism; and social relations theories.
JOSEPH W. SINGER, PROPERTY LAW 12-23 (1993).
174 See discussion infra Part IIA.
17 See discussion infra Part II.B.
176 See discussion infra Part II.C.
127 See discussion infra Part II.D.
178 See discussion infra Part II.E.
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government has its own persona with the ability to "choose" how
"he/she" uses that land, we may well forget the basic principles
of restraint that characterize our government: first, the principle
that the government receives its power from the governed rather
than from its own "will"; and second, that even such power is cir-
cunscribed not by the limits of the government's own strength,
but by constitutional constraints.
Since "positivism" envisions government as similar to a hu-
man being,"9 not just in its "proprietary" capacity but also in all
opportunities it has to govern, it is not surprising that positivist
assumptions color the public forum doctrine. After all, Justice
Holmes, often associated with positivist jurisprudence in the
U.S.," 0 introduced us to the private property metaphor for re-
viewing speech claims on government lands.
Just as the positivist concept of the state focuses on the as-
sertion of human will and human force against the natural order
as the defining characteristic of government, the positivist con-
cept of property assigns protection rights based on the assertion
of human will against land. Conflating these two images into
one-that government, like a human being, can will ownership of
17 According to one principle of classical positivism known as the "command
theory of law," law is an expression of human will, reducible to a command "directed
toward a class of the public" and "accompanied by sanctions." See Anthony J. Sebok,
Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2054, 2064 (1995). Austin stated in
1832:
A command is distinguished from other significations of desire, not by the
style in which the desire is signified, but by the power and the purpose of
the party commanding to inflict an evil or pain in case the desire be disre-
garded .... [Wihere [a command] obliges generally to acts or forbearances of
a class, a command is a law or rule .... [A] class or description of acts is de-
termined by a law or rule, and acts of that class or description are enjoined
or forbidden generally.
JOHN AusTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 21, 25-26 (Wilfred E.
Rumble, ed., 1995). Under the "sources thesis," another principle of classical positiv-
ism, all legal norms stem from and are "promulgated by the legal system's sover-
eign." Sebok, supra, at 2064. According to Jeremy Bentham, every law is the prod-
uct of a (sovereign) will which is preferred " 'to the will of any other.' " Id- (quoting
JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL 18 (H.L.A. Hard ed., 1970)).
"0 For a discussion of Holmes' positivist ideas, see Mark DeWolfe Howe, Hol-
mes' Positivism-A Brief Rejoinder, 64 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1951); Henry M. Hart,
Jr., Holmes, Positivism-An Addendum, 64 HARV. L. REV. 929 (1951); Howe, The
Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1951). But see Thomas C.
Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787 (1989); Catherine Wells
Hantzis, Legal Innovation Within the Wider Intellectual Tradition: The Pragmatism
of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 82 NW. U. L. REV. 541 (1988) (characterizing Holmes
as pragmatist, not positivist).
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land-is not a modern proposition. In this metaphor, the United
States has merely followed the Western European tradition of
discovery, which permitted countries to "own" large parts of the
New World based solely on their claim that these countries had
the intent to possess colonies and the ability to enforce their will
against native peoples.181
In Johnson v. M'Intosh,82 the Supreme Court recognized this
positivist formulation early in the creation of land title, and par-
ticularly in the creation of title in the government.1" Justice
Marshall explained that the right of a society to draw rules for
acquiring title is not to be questioned and must "depend entirely
on the law of the nation in which [such property] lie[s]." "' The
Court accepted the European concept of discovery as a valid ba-
sis for giving title to one European country as against other
European countries." The Court further acknowledged that the
United States "maintain[s], as all others have maintained, that
discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of
occupancy, either by purchase or conquest and also gave a right
to such a degree of sovereignty, as the circumstances of the peo-
ple would allow them to exercise."'86 If the United States ac-
quired title in this manner, argued Marshall, it may sell or cede
that property to private individuals over the objections of resi-
dent tribes."8 7
In the "will" theory of property, normative concerns, such as
fairness to workers, and practical concerns, such as the efficiency
of particular ownership, are subsumed under the notion that to
"discover" or "want" a property is to have it. To be sure, as even
Marshall recognized, not all public land in the United States is a
pure result of "will theory"; for instance, the Louisiana Territory
was purchased from another sovereign.'88 Yet, the dominant as-
181 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
182 Id.
13 Id. at 585 ("It has never been doubted, that either the United States or the
Several States, had a clear title to all the land within [its] boundary lines ... and
that the exclusive power to extinguish that right, was vested in [the] government
184 Id. at 572.
185 Id. at 587.
Johnson, 21 U.S. at 587-88.
187 Id. at 587.
"s See FRANK BOND, THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE 13 (2d prtg. 1967) (1933) ("April
30, 1803, France ceded to the United States the territory of Louisiana .... " );
ALEXANDER DECONDE, THIS AFFAIR OF LOUISIANA 171 (1976) (stating that United
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sumption governing the designation of land as "public property"
is that the government "wills" to own everything that is not al-
ready in private hands; it is only when the government "wills" to
own privately owned property that the problems of taking arise.
The property owner metaphor suggests that once the owner
acquires his property by legally accepted norms such as by occu-
pation, labor, adverse possession, or contract, the owner is enti-
tled to exercise every strand of the bundle of rights, including
possession, disposal, use, enjoyment of fruits, and destruction.'89
And, as Justice Rehnquist noted in Loretto v. Teleprompter Man-
hattan CATV Corp.9' and other Fifth Amendment "takings"
cases, 9' the right to exclude is the first among equals, at least
where the individual stands against government.'92 That indi-
vidual's right is subject only to any prior claims of another prop-
erty owner, such as an easement owner, and to the demand that
he or she not interfere with the rights of adjacent property own-
ers.
193
States purchased Louisiana territory for total price of $15 million dollars).
"89 ROGER A. CUNNINGHAi ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 6 (2d ed. 1993). The
authors note that these civil law expectations are all protected by the common law,
although the rights to possession and exclusion are "rights proper" under the
Hohfeldian analysis; and the rights to use (jus utendi), enjoy the profits (jus fru-
endi), and destroy (jus abutendi) are properly described as "privileges," id. at 6, or
the legal freedom as against another for a person to do or not do a given act. Id. at 3.
The right to transfer or dispose of one's property (jus disponendi) is described as a
"power," id. at 6, or the "ability ... to produce a change in a given legal relation by
doing or not doing a given act." Id. at 4 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 3
(1936)); see also COHEN, supra note 90, at 46.
The United States Supreme Court has enumerated the property rights of pos-
session, use, and disposal. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373,
378 (1945); see also 63 AMAl. JUR. 2D Property § 1 (1984) (noting that property rights
include "the unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing, the right to dispose of it in
every legal way, to possess it, use it, and to exclude everyone else from interfering
with it, that is, the exclusive right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing");
73 C.J.S. Property § 5 (1983) (explaining that "[ilt is generally recognized that prop-
erty includes the right of acquisition, the right of dominion, the right of possession,
the right of use and enjoyment, the right of exclusion, and the right of disposition").
'9' 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
'9' Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384, 393 (1994); Pruneyard Shopping
Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
179-80 (1979) ("[W]e hold that the 'right to exclude,' so universally held to be a fun-
damental element of the property right, falls within ... [the] category of interests
that the Government cannot take without compensation.").
"92Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 ("The power to exclude has traditionally been consid-
ered one of the most treasured strands in an owner's bundle of property rights.").
See also COHEN, supra note 90, at 46.
' A "usual claim of absolute ownership ... allows one to destroy ... anything he
owns if it pleases him, so long as he does not destroy as well the person or property
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Pursuing the private property/will metaphor, government
may exercise every right it has as against its own citizens"' after
the government has established its right to acquire the property,
either by force, as it did originally, or by free or coerced con-
tract.195 It may use its own land free from public objection, even
if that use makes the land a nuclear waste dump; or transfer the
land cheaply for private gain.19 The government has no enforce-
of another." Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221,
1229 (1979).
' See COHEN, supra note 90, at 46.
's Although one party may have no decision about it, it could be argued that a
government taking is simply a contract-the agreement of one party to perform
(give up his property rights) in exchange for monetary consideration (just compen-
sation). Takings are initially pursued as offer and acceptance. The difference is that
the government can force the acceptor to stay at the bargaining table, and, much
like an arbitration clause, impose a third party's view about the appropriate value of
consideration for the party's property.
"' See, e.g., Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1554 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting
challenges to federal governments selection of Yucca Mountain, Nevada as possible
national nuclear waste repository site); Tennessee v. Herrington, 806 F.2d 642, 651
(6th Cir. 1986) (holding that pursuant to Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Secre-
tary of Energy is not required to confer with state before recommending site within
state as monitored retrievable storage site for nuclear waste). Minnesota's Northern
States Power Company (NSP), which currently stores nuclear waste in storage
casks at Prairie Island in Red Wing, Minnesota, is attempting to find alternate stor-
age space outside of the state before the legislative deadline of 2002. Tom Meers-
man, NSP's Talks on Nuclear Waste Break Off. Storage Sought in New Mexico, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Apr. 19, 1996, at 8A. It is predicted that maximum ca-
pacity will be reached in the year 2002. Id. One alternative being negotiated by NSP
and other utility companies reliant on nuclear fuel is to ship the waste to Mescalero
Apache tribal lands in New Mexico; however, these negotiations broke down in
April, 1996. Tom Meersman, NSPs Options to Store Nuclear Waste Dwindle After
Talks Break Down: Used Fuel May Stay in State for Decades, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis-St. Paul), Apr. 21, 1996, at 22A. Nuclear fueled utility companies are
also lobbying the United States Congress to amend the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of
1982 to allow the creation of a temporary storage cite on federal land until a perma-
nent national site can be constructed. Id. at 22A. It is expected that it will be ap-
proximately 15 years before a national site is created. Id.
In the 1980s, we learned that government may dispose or transfer its land
notwithstanding the fact that disposal was to private exploiters of natural re-
sources. James G. Watt, Secretary of the Interior under Ronald Reagan, supported
commercial developers by providing "huge tracts of federal land to mining, logging,
drilling, and other uses." Emily T. Smith et al., This Land is Whose Land? Federal
Agencies are Taking Heat for Public Land Mismanagement, Bus. WK., Apr. 24,
1989, at 48.
The government may transfer the land even if the transfer, as by lease, is for
little consideration, as with the grazing leases in the Southwest United States. Pur-
suant to the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, ranchers in the West may purchase a sec-
tion of land with water access and then lease large amounts of public land for their
cattle to graze upon. William Hart, Ex-Ranchers Seek Compensation for Land Seized
as Missile Range, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 24, 1988, at 41A. Although the Fed-
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able obligation to act as a fiduciary of the property belonging to
"the government."'97 Unless some Congressional Act designates
a particular trusteeship, as the National Parks Act does, 9 ' no
specific "trust" constraints require government to make the
highest use of its property. The government is not required to
ensure that private competitive uses of public lands are good for
the aggregate of private individuals,'99 to ensure that it receives
the highest return on land transfers20 or even to account to its
citizens for its specific decisions unless there is a congressional
inquiry. More correctly, it is presumed that government is
making the best use of public property for the benefit of citizens,
just as it does in all of its work,20 ' and the presumption is well
nigh irrebuttable.
eral Land Policy & Management Act of 1976 orders consideration of environmental
effects due to development, requires multiple use management, and dictates that a
fair price be paid for public resources, critics argue that the government is not fol-
lowing these mandates. Smith, supra, at 49. In terms of grazing alone, it is esti-
mated that the government loses an estimated $65 million in potential income each
year due to low grazing fees charged ranchers. Id. at 48. In 1987 alone, management
of the grazing program cost the government $17 million. Id. at 49.
"9 "Congress exercises the powers both of a proprietor and of a legislature over
the public domain." Kieppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976). "Consistent
with these powers, Congress may control the occupancy and use of the public lands
... protect the public from hazardous conditions on those lands, and regulate wildlife
on those lands." Watkins, 914 F.2d at 1553 (citations omitted).
National Parks Organic Act of 1916, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1994).
"s Cohen reminds us that property law does not merely protect possession but
determines what share of such goods people acquire. COHEN, supra note 90, at 47.
Similarly, government as a marketplace competitor with private individuals can use
its property to acquire goods for itself, to the disadvantage of individuals. This real-
ity seems opposite to the theory of the Takings Clause, which proposes that gov-
ernment, in its capacity as a proprietor, is bound by standards of substantive fair-
ness in the acquisition of property. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
200 From 1982 to 1989, the Forest Service lost an estimated $400 million through
the granting of timber cutting permits. Smith, supra note 196, at 49. In the area of
mining, the government continues to sell land for mining at prices set under the
Mining Law of 1872. Id. at 49. The General Accounting Office reports that at these
prices, 12 mining sites would sell for a total of $16,000. Id. at 50. This same land has
an appraised value ranging from $14 to $47 million. Id.
2 The Constitution's Property Clause states that "Congress shall have power to
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The
U.S. Supreme Court has construed the Property Clause to mean that "[tlhe power
over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations." United
States v. City of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940); see also California Coastal
Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 580 (1987) (noting Congressional power
over and entrusted to it under Constitution is unlimited); Kleppe v. New Mexico,
426 U.S. 529, 540-41 (1976) (acknowledging that Congress' broad authority to regu-
late public land includes regulation of animals and ecology).
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The chances that government will in fact be held account-
able for its decisions on use of public lands, particularly for
speech, begin to erode if we accept as a popular axiom that the
property belongs to the government and that the government can
make "its" "private" decisions about use. Opposition to govern-
ment action is likely only to be heard in cases where government
revokes private use rights such as grazing permits, or in a par-
ticular locality where its ownership activity causes something
akin to a nuisance. Even in these clashes with private interests,
the debate is likely to be framed in terms of a conflict of private
rights. In permit revocation cases, the conflict which arises is
based on the contention that the government has interfered with
a private owner's easement in exercising its land use rights. In
the nuisance cases, the debate is likely to center upon the idea
that the government's private property use interfered with the
harmed owner's private property use.
In cases where no such private property uses are infringed,
such as the speech cases, it is not likely anyone will be willing to
accept responsibility to ensure that speech is permitted much
less welcomed on public lands. Similarly, the government's de-
cision to step into the Babel of voices and act as if it "owns" cy-
berspace in order to regulate it is likely to be accepted by many
as a fact of ownership of the Internet. Individuals will imagine
their speech rights to extend to only that which is their own pri-
vate property, e.g., their private communications through e-mail.
As government regulation of the Internet increases, the govern-
ment will be seen as a limitless sovereign against which indi-
viduals can protest, rather than as a host for a public conversa-
tion.
B. The Theory of Possession and the Concept of Citizenship
Viewing the private property metaphor from the perspective
of possession theory, one can see similar possibilities for erosion
of individuals' conception of themselves as citizens, as people
who have some rights in and responsibilities for the way in
which government property is used. While the theory of posses-
sion is often treated as a subset of the "will" theory,"'2 some
scholars have suggested that possession is more properly consid-




ered a labor or social relations theory of property. For instance,
Professor Carol Rose has suggested that in economic theory, pos-
session is tantamount to labor, as the useful work of possessing
land gives clear notice of who is the owner of the land, which
"facilitate[s] trade and minimize[s] resource-wasting conflict." °3
In Rose's view, possession is a communicative act, signaling to
all others the individual's intention to have and use the property.
If it is clear enough, that communicative act obviates the need
for violence or litigation as a means of establishing title.2°4 In-
stead, possession encourages a more efficient exchange mecha-
nism, namely bargaining, for the transfer of land for its highest
and best use."5
Applying these concepts to the government's use of its land,
it is clear that possession theory cannot justify government con-
trol over public property, especially with respect to the exercise
of free speech rights. The economic argument that possession as
communication is efficient in creating clarity has not always
been accurate in the case of government. Historically, the gov-
ernment's method of asserting claims over its own property,
particularly in the Western states, has been so ambivalent as a
communication that it has created many opportunities for blood-
shed.08
In more modern times, government has depended on the
213 Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 81
(1985) [hereinafter Origin of Property].
21 Id. at 81-82. Similarly, the adverse possession doctrine constitutes a public
act requiring the acquiring party to "keep on speaking, lest he lose his title...." Id. at
79.
205 Id. at 82.
200 In the late 18th and early 19th century, "national land programs never
worked as they were meant to work on paper. Field administration was the weak
point: feeble, incompetent, corrupt .... Washington's arm was never long enough or
steady enough to carry through." LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 232 (2d ed. 1985). In the mid-1800s, the situation was ambivalent:
[Plublic-land laws were hopelessly inconsistent. Some land was free for
settlers; other land was for sale. The government proposed to sell some
land to the highest bidder; proposed using other land to induce private en-
terprise to build railroads; gave other land to the state to fud their col-
leges. Administration of land laws was notoriously weak.
Id. at 417. The recognition of non-assigned land as public property may have pre-
vented more serious land wars than those that occurred as the West was forced
open to European settlement. It is far from clear, however, that the government's
exercise of its entire "bundle" of rights, including the right of exclusion, has simi-
larly prevented "non-wasteful conflict" by contending private parties. See supra
notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
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people being "on notice" that unassigned property belongs to the
government, that when they walk onto a public playground or
into a park or a building with a United States seal, they are
walking with the permission of the government. Yet, the implied
"notice" of government's intentions for the use of its property is
at best ambivalent and at worst non-existent. Such decisions are
usually left to the discretion of those government workers who
happen to work on the particular parcel of government property.
In reality, government intentions with respect to speech and as-
sembly are rarely communicated until after the fact. One does
not, for instance, see a sign on the door of a federal building
stating, "no petitioning the government permitted" in the same
way one might see "no solicitors" on the door of a private busi-
ness. Similarly, unlike most private property, government rarely
marks the boundaries of public land as a way of clarifying own-
ership and thus preventing conflict. Rather, many existing gov-
ernment markers on public property-State Park or Community
Policing Center-implicitly invite people inside."7
The lack of clarity surrounding the government's intent to
own and exclude is most sharply illustrated by the number of
cases which are brought after speakers have used public land
and been evicted. That these speakers bring suits suggests that,
at least at the time they elected to speak, some did not recognize
the government's "markers" as notice that their speech was off-
limits.
More importantly, however, possession as communication
has a moral dimension that is inconsistent with democratic ide-
als about government, specifically the ideals of citizen participa-
tion and equal respect. According to Rose, if the "text" which the
government follows is a private owner model with strong and
regular exercise of the right to exclude, where the people are the
"interpretive community" for such a text, government sends a
"message" that people are alien to the daily activity of govern-
ment."8 If government property is "private," I have the right to
go to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles only when and if they invite
207 Public notice of the right to exclude is extremely rare. For instance, govern-
ment only marks exclusion on borders with other nations and in those areas where
it has security concerns or has leased property to private owners and so needs to
protect its exclusivity. Or occasionally a government building will post a "no solicit-
ing" sign, suggesting that other speech activity is permitted.
208 See Origin of Property, supra note 203, at 84-85.
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me. If I do not come for their purposes-to get my driver's li-
cense or plate tags-I have violated the duty not to trespass. So
when I sit down on the Bureau's government-issued chairs to eat
my sandwich, read a newspaper, or merely rest my weary feet, I
have been a law-breaker, a bad citizen whom the state is per-
fectly free to eject with whatever force it desires.
Contrast the private property metaphor with another politi-
cal-social metaphor historically used to describe how Americans
have understood their relationship to the West, the United
States "range." The "range" metaphor trumpets, even romanti-
cizes, the right of citizens to roam freely on open, truly public
lands, on which they may find a home if they work that land and
make it their own. That the metaphor of the "range" is not quite
historically correct2 9 does not minimize its power in American
myth.21 In the "range" vision, the public would be welcome to
use public lands so long as they did not attempt to cordon them
off as their own "private" property. In the public forum vision,
by contrast, the government has raced the private citizen to the
land and staked its claim, so the private citizen must move on to
find increasingly scarce, indeed non-existent, "free" land on
which to exercise his rights as a citizen.
In the private property metaphor, then, citizens are ex-
cluded from ownership over their own public property, and thus
over the decisions being made concerning it. If the government
has successfully communicated a message of "keep out" to the
public-for example, through arrests of speakers and widely
219 See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 206, at 230-34, 414-19 (describing set-
tlement of West and government attempts to regulate public land within settle-
ment).
210 This is evidenced by the way in which government often gave property rights
to unclaimed Western lands, as with the Oklahoma rush. Lawrence Friedman pro-
vides a description of the race to settle the West:
Settlers (and speculators) streamed into the West far ahead of the formal
date of sale, sometimes even ahead of the official survey. Theoretically, no
one could gain a good title to the land until it was surveyed and sold. But a
series of laws gave piecemeal preference (pre-emption rights) to actual
settlers, even illegal settlers, or recognized and ratified state policies on
pre-emption. Finally, in 1841, Congress passed a general pre-emption law.
The head of a family who had settled "in person" on land and "improved" it
had first choice or claim to buy the land, up to 160 acres, at the minimum
government price.... [Tihe most important aspect of the law was its general
concept. It removed the last shred of pretense that the squatters were
acting either illegally or immorally.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 206, at 233-34.
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publicized litigation resisting Hare Krishnas' solicitation at air-
ports-then the people will keep out of the property and busi-
ness of government and stick to "their own" business.
Particularly when the rights of public speech and assembly
are involved, the message that people should "keep out" poses
significant problems. The First Amendment posits an affirma-
tive right to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances. As the Court has delineated it, this beneficial right
protects society against official abuse and governmental indiffer-
ence."' Yet, the effectiveness of such a right is dependent upon
citizens who see themselves as "owners" in their government.
Citizens who do not imagine themselves as more than individual
rights-holders, with citizenship rights and responsibilities to-
ward public work and public space, will not understand that they
should be protesting against government acts that do not imme-
diately affect them. If they do not demand that their govern-
ment treat people according to democratic ideals, then they can-
not take affirmative steps to guard those democratic ideals
against political abuses. Without ownership, they cannot be ex-
cited about political participation, as we saw repeated in the
woes of last year's major party convention planners, who worried
about "captur[ing] bored television viewers"212 using entertainers
like Barbra Streisand.
The private property metaphor also poses problems for the
value of equal respect, which embraces the notion that all citi-
zens have life experiences and perspectives that must be ac-
counted for in the search for the common good. In the demo-
cratic vision, such respect is due each person intrinsically, and
his other wishes count the same as each other person's. In the
republican vision, each individual has at least information to
contribute to reasoning about the common good.1 3 Yet, the pri-
vate property metaphor directly encourages the creation of citi-
211 See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 552 (1965) (holding that convictions
for "disturbing the peace" and "obstructing public passages" against demonstrator
who led demonstration across from courthouse could not stand); Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (holding that participating in peaceful march
around South Carolina State House was within protesters' constitutional rights).
2 Washington Whispers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 27, 1994, at 24
(Charles Fenyvesi ed.). Ironically, the Democrats, who were most worried, had their
convention in Chicago, a place described in 1968 as a "very participatory" conven-
tion. Id.




zenship classes. It empowers the wealthiest to wield not just
political power, but also public moral influence, over the poor-
est.214 Citizens, often business owners attempting to "clean up"
urban areas in order to attract business, have effectively ex-
ploited the metaphor to eject homeless people from the streets
where they are panhandling215 and arrest those who suspiciously
loiter on street corners. Police have also followed public man-
dates and made sweeps of parks and abandoned buildings where
the homeless were sleeping to arrest them2 6 and, in some cases,
214 Vagrancy laws have been used since Elizabethan times to control the poor
who were forced off their lands. These wandering, unemployed indigents were pun-
ished because they were believed to have criminal natures or were a "moral pesti-
lence," as the Supreme Court described in Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) 102, 142 (1837). During the Depression, however, when California refused to
accept its share of the poor trying to migrate there, the Court in Edwards v. Cali-
fornia, 314 U.S. 160, 163 (1941), held the California statute making it a misde-
meanor for a person to assist in bringing a non-resident indigent into the state un-
constitutional. See Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutional and
Historical Analysis of Official Efforts to Drive Homeless Persons from American Cit-
ies, 66 TUL. L. REV. 631, 636-41 (1992) (discussing history of English and American
vagrancy laws).
The private property metaphor has been critical in many of the recent contro-
versies involving the poor and marginal in the U.S. In particular, the metaphor af-
fects the homeless, whose numbers are estimated to range from 300,000 to 3 million.
See Stephanie B. Goldberg, In Praise of Skid Row NU Professor Offers Some Sur-
prising Solutions to the Homeless Problem, Cmu. TRIB., June 27, 1994, at Tempo 1
(reviewing CHRISTOPHER S. JENCKS, THE HOMELESs (1994)). Christopher Jencks, a
Northwestern sociologist, estimated that this epidemic was as much caused by the
crack epidemic and the demise of Skid Row housing as de-institutionalization of the
mentally ill. See id.; see also William W. Berg, Note, Roulette v. City of Seattle: A
City Lives with its Homeless, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 147 (1994) (discussing impact of
homeless laws).
21s The courts have split on whether begging is a protected activity or not. Com-
pare Roulette v. City of Seattle., 850 F. Supp. 1442, 1449-53 (W.D. Wash. 1994)
(holding that Seattle's ban on sitting or lying down on business district sidewalks
between 7 a.m. and 9 p.m. was not overbroad, and did not violate due process or
equal protection), affd, 78 F.3d 1425 (9th Cir. 1996), with Berkeley Community
Health Project v. City of Berkeley, 902 F. Supp. 1084, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(enjoining enforcement of California ban on begging near ATMs because "solicitation
of donations is a form of speech, protected under both the federal and state consti-
tutions").
216 See, e.g., City of Pompano Beach v. Capalbo, 455 So. 2d 468, 470 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1984) (challenging ordinance prohibiting sleeping in one's car); Paul Ades,
Comment, The Unconstitutionality of Antihomeless' Laws: Ordinances Prohibiting
Sleeping in Outdoor Public Areas as a Violation of the Right to Travel, 77 CAL. L.
REV. 595, 596 (1989) (analyzing municipal ordinances banning pubic sleeping, such
as Long Beach ordinance banning sleeping outside between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.);
Kathleen M. Quinn, Note, Connecticut v. Mooney and Expectation of Privacy: The
Double-Edged Sword of Advocacy for the Homeless, 13 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 87
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to confiscate or burn their belongings.217
What opposition there has been to the use of the private
property metaphor in responding to the homeless situation has
been mostly technical, focusing on problems such as vagueness
and overbreadth, rather than challenging the metaphor itself.21
Although police are occasionally deterred from arrest sweeps by
a sympathetic press, public attention and pressure more often
focuses on retaining the private property aspects of government
property.219
Sometimes arguments against use of public lands by the
poor and marginal can be framed in terms of general public
benefit or utilitarian theory. Private property owners claim that
(1993) (describing Fourth Amendment challenge to search of homeless person's
area); Jonathan Eig, Status of Homeless is Tough Legal Issue: Judges, Cities Wrestle
with Question, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 4, 1994, at 31A (discussing permitting
removal of shanty town so long as trespassers from all economic brackets are
stopped); Letters to the Editor, S. F. CHRoN., May 14, 1995, at 6 (describing arrest of
2,582 homeless persons under Operation Matrix); Don Morain & Harold Maass,
Compassion for Homelessness is Wearing Thin in Bay Area, L.A. TIMES, July 20,
1990, at Al (discussing mayoral ban on sleeping in parks and anti-homeless demon-
stration demanding that park sleepers leave town); Coleman Warner, Furor Over
Homeless; Sleeping Ban Urged for Jackson Square, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE,
Aug. 16, 1995, at BI (reporting urge by sidewalk artists to ban sleeping in French
Quarter).
217 Police have seized shopping carts from the homeless in San Francisco under
Operation Matrix, see Berg, supra note 214, at 149, burned their possessions, see
Simon, supra note 214, at 633, and handcuffed them for many hours without food or
water before releasing them. Id. at 632. The same police in Santa Ana, California
who spotted homeless people by climbing to the roof with binoculars and radioing to
officers below, used markers to write numbers on the arms of the homeless. Id.
218 See Berg, supra note 214, at 160-63. While loafing and loitering ordinances
have often been successfully challenged for vagueness since Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), sleeping and camping ordinances often survive
vagueness and overbreadth charges. See Berg, supra note 214, at 161. Some courts
have found that sleeping was not protected as an expression. Id. at 160. By contrast,
in Parr v. Municipal Court, 479 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1971), and subsequent cases, courts
have struck down loitering and sleeping bans passed with improper motives, e.g.,
aimed at "hippies" or as a declaration of "war on the homeless." See Berg, supra note
214, at 163. Other courts have required intent elements in loitering statutes. See id.
at 164. Some plaintiffs have, however, challenged the metaphor of private property
by arguing that anti-sleeping ordinances violate their right to travel, see Ades, su-
pra note 216, at 616-23, although this has not been a very successful argument. See
Seeley v. State, 655 P.2d 803, 808 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (arguing that prohibition of
sedentary activities such as sleeping did not discourage movement).
219 In Miami, for instance, about seventy-five persons sleeping around a home-
less shelter that was too full to take them were arrested immediately prior to the
King Orange Bowl parade in order to eliminate their unsightly presence. Donald E.
Baker, Comment, "Anti-Homeless" Legislation: Unconstitutional Efforts to Punish
the Homeless, 45 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 417, 417-18 (1991).
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the business generated by a clean, safe "suburban-type" down-
town will conduce to the benefit of more citizens than will allow-
ing "such people" to occupy public sidewalks and parks. ° These
arguments, however, often smack of property notions. Promi-
nent citizens assert that the government is trustee ' for respon-
sible taxpayers; that business owners and subdivision dwellers
"own" the streets, sidewalks and parks, and these non-
contributing "types" do not "own" them.'
One dramatic example of the government's successful use of
the private property metaphor against the poor, directly in a
speech context, can be seen in Young v. New York City Transit
Authority.' In Young, the Transit Authority permitted charita-
ble solicitors to solicit money if they obtained authorization, but
denied beggars the right to do So.2' Any beggar who solicited
funds from a terminal passersby was ejected from the termi-
nal.2" While the District Court focused on the similarity of beg-
ging and charitable solicitation,226 the Court of Appeals expressed
"grave doubt as to whether begging and panhandling in the sub-
way were sufficiently imbued with a communicative character to
justify constitutional protection." 7 The Court of Appeals' opin-
ion, which pays homage to Justice Scalia's "common sense,"228 is
220 These arguments sometimes parallel those made in obscenity cases, that
permitting some homeless will "signal a breakdown in social order" because
passersby who fear the homeless camping out and verbally harassing them will
start avoiding public places and then the community altogether. See Berg, supra
note 214, at 183-84.
22' See infra notes 423-45, and accompanying text (discussing public trust doc-
trine).
A Chicago Sun-Times editorial argued that sleeping bans "are about as cruel
as closing times, which are routine in many parks, zoos and public buildings" and as
hostile to the poor as "industrial and commercial zoning is hostile to residents."
Robert Teir, Crippling Civic Interaction Isn't a Right, CI. SUN TIMES, Jan. 15,
1994, at 16. The editorial complained that the right to sleep on public property
"would extend to the White House dining room and Arlington National Cemetery."
Id.
903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'g and vacating, 729 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y.)
[hereinafter Young 11.
224 Young I, 903 F.2d at 160.
Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341, 344-45 (S.D.N.Y),
rev'd and vacated, 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Young Ill.
22 Young II, 729 F. Supp. at 352-53.
Young I, 903 F.2d at 153.
The Court cites Circuit Judge Scalia's dissenting opinion in Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd by Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984), for the proposition that
it is common-sense that begging is conduct, not speech. Young I, 903 F.2d at 153.
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worth quoting at length:
[B]egging is not inseparably intertwined with a "particularized
message." It seems fair to say that most individuals who beg
are not doing so to convey any social or political message.
Rather, they beg to collect money. Arguably, any given beggar
may have "[a]n intent to convey a particularized message," e.g.:
"Government benefits are inadequate;" "I am homeless;" or
"There is a living to be made in panhandling" .... However, de-
spite the intent of an individual beggar, there hardly seems to
be a "great likelihood" that the subway passengers who witness
the conduct are able to discern what the particularized message
might be .... 229
The only message that we are able to espy as common to all acts
of begging is that beggars want to exact money from those
whom they accost. While we acknowledge that passengers gen-
erally understand this generic message, we think it falls far
outside the scope of protected speech under the First Amend-
ment. We certainly do not consider it as a "means indispensable
to the discovery and spread of political truth." Nor do we deem
it as communicating one of the "inexpressible emotions" falling
"'under the protection of free speech as fully as do Keats' poems
or Donne's sermons.' ,23o
Moreover, the Court of Appeals distinguished charitable so-
licitation on the basis that it, unlike begging, involves
"'communication of information, the dissemination and propa-
gation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes.' "' Ap-
parently, the verbal statement, "I need money. Can you give me
some?" does not convey information or advocate any "cause."
Perhaps more telling, the Court of Appeals brushed off the
district court's claim that alms-giving was a traditional virtue.
The appellate court countered that while charitable solicitation
served community interests, begging was "nothing less than a
menace to the common good."2 2 Thus, the court failed to give
credence to the district court's lament:
While the government has an interest in 'preserv[ing] the qual-
Young I, 903 F.2d at 153-54 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,
410-11 (1974)).
2" Id. at 153-54 (citations omitted).
2" Id. at 155 (quoting Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444
U.S. 620, 632 (1980)).
212 Id. at 156 (citing members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 805 (1984)).
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ity of urban life' and in protecting citizens from [nuisance meth-
ods of expression], this interest must be discounted where the
regulation has the principal effect of keeping a public problem
involving human beings out of sight and therefore out of mind.
Indeed, it is the very unsettling appearance and message con-
veyed by the beggars that gives their conduct its expressive
quality.
233
The impact that the private property metaphor has on the
homeless is not pure fancy, but is reality in places such as Long
Beach, New York,' and San Francisco, California.23 5 One does
not have to resort to fiction to understand what is being said to
homeless people: even though you live here and you have con-
tributed or now contribute taxes to the government, there is not
one square foot in this land that you can call your own.23" A 1996
Picket Fences episode exposed this irony. In the story, a men-
tally damaged Vietnam veteran who returned to his home town
was effectively barred from the city limits because he had no-
where to go. Homeless and penniless, he could not sleep on oth-
ers' private property without breaking trespass laws, he could
not sleep in public parks because it was banned by ordinance,
and there was no public shelter to house him. Townspeople were
outraged at the possibility that they should either have to care
for the vet or put up with him sleeping on "their" public land.
Fiction solves what real life cannot: the vet died before a court
order to build him a shelter was executed.
Still others who enter public lands with some self-conception
2' Young II, 729 F. Supp. at 358 (citations omitted); see also, Anthony J. Rose,
Note, The Beggar's Free Speech Claim, 65 IND. L.J. 191, 205 (1989) (stating that
"while the beggar's speech amounts, on the surface, to a mere request for funds, her
appeal necessarily includes a communication of far greater import") [hereinafter
Beggar's Free Speech].
The court in Stoner v. Miller, 377 F. Supp. 177 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), invalidated a
zoning ordinance in Long Beach, New York that prohibited boarding houses from
registering persons requiring medical or psychiatric services. Since these were the
only places where patients awaiting release from a state mental hospital could stay
in Long Beach, they were effectively forced to leave the city. See id. at 196; see also
Ades, supra note 216 at 621-22.
2' See Simon, supra note 214, at 654 (discussing ban of homeless from sleeping
anywhere on public land).
's Indeed, Professors James Wilson and George Kelling have compared va-
grants to broken windows in a building-if the police fail to do anything about
drunks or vagrants, an entire community may be destroyed. See Simon, supra note
214, at 645 (citing James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, AT-
LANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29, 35).
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of citizenship, or "ownership" of public property, will be likely to
turn from naive idealists to mistrustful cynics. Like Jesse
Cantwell wandering around Hartford playing an anti-Catholic
record attempting to convert his audience to Jehovah's Wit-
ness, 7 they may be either oblivious to or ignorant of the implicit
understanding shared by everyone else that public property is
not really theirs. These speakers face a rude awakening when
the government officer comes to evict them from public property
(or cancels their cable access show as "not right for River City.")
Not understanding the implied "ownership" of the govern-
ment, these "naive idealist" speakers will understandably attrib-
ute the government's ejection to "viewpoint discrimination." As-
suming that the government's attempts to sweep them out
originate from its desire to cleanse public property of their par-
ticular message, such speakers will become cynical. The faint-
hearted will give up and go home to their privacy while the sus-
picious will attribute their arrests to government conspiracies.
The hope that they will trust the government to hear their next
complaint is modest, even though both the faint-hearted and the
suspicious need to be heard.
Another class of speakers who will not "keep out," deliber-
ate "trespassers," are stripped of their self-image as citizens in
yet a different way. They enter onto public land precisely be-
cause they know they are not welcome, hoping and planning to
be ejected in order to gain the sympathy of the media-watching
public.23 If they're sufficiently savvy, they will ensure the pres-
ence of at least a gawking audience by the grand gesture of pro-
test or the startling choice of location, symbolic action, or noise
level. They may even call the media in advance to make sure
their "act" receives attention.
When these protesters enter public property, however, they
enter inside the metaphor. That is, they enter well aware of
their status as trespassers. As trespassers, these speakers ac-
cept the power of government to exclude them from decision-
making and from ownership of the resources of the polity; their
237 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 301 (1940).
m See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Move-
ment, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 141-49 (1994) (discussing how civil rights activists inten-
tionally used media coverage to influence public opinion and hasten introduction of




speech is poised not to convince, but to protest. Thus, they re-
gard their audience, the officials considered the surrogate own-
ers of public property, as unwilling listeners to whom, at best,
they can shake their fists. Their speech will, therefore, be de-
signed to utter a cry of complaint with no expectation that it will
be heard and truly considered by the officials to whom they pu-
tatively protest, for the inhospitable property owner is unlikely
to hear the trespasser's complaint.
Ironically, these deliberate defiers will have succeeded at the
very thing which government hopes to deny them by refusing a
forum, whether deviously (to quash their content) or in good
faith (to prevent disorder). Just as they count on their audience
being broadened by television when they are excluded from pub-
lic space, they will exacerbate the disruption of the government
workplace, the irritation of building inhabitants, the invasion of
others' privacy-those "evils" the public forum doctrine was de-
signed to avoid.
Similarly, as government continues to regulate the Internet
and other forms of interactive communication, we may expect to
see more of these "non-owner" dialogues between the citizen and
the government. The disruptions, however may be of a different
kind. For example, "deliberate defier" techies may use viruses
and other technology jammers, or post Unabomber-type manifes-
tos on public Internet spaces to get the government or the press
to take notice. The more government treats its own sites as pri-
vate, and the more it attempts to regulate the "space" of other
interactions, the more likely there will be reactions, ranging
from resignation to cynicism to paranoia, from its citizens.
Thus, the government's claim to its "private" property by
possession slices deep into the rationale for the preservation of
speech. On one hand, it immediately excludes those who may
have something of genuine importance to contribute to the public
discussion of the public's future, and those who may not have the
ear of legislators. On the other, it breeds cynicism by those who
cross the line with the expectation that they will be heard. To
these speakers, the government is, in fact, out to suppress par-
ticular viewpoints from the public conversation.
C. The Labor Theory and the Concept of Servanthood for
Government Workers
The labor theory of property similarly makes understanding
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government lands as private property problematical. An argu-
ment that government is entitled, as a laborer, to its property,
either by natural right or as a matter of fairness, particularly
distorts the self concept of the government worker. Contrary to
the ideal of public servanthood-that public employees aid both
the general public and specific citizens-the private property
metaphor encourages public employees to view government
property as their dominion, with themselves as masters.
Though the labor theory of property can be rooted in either
natural rights or economic theory,239 the natural rights version is
critical to this particular discussion. Under natural rights the-
ory, the right to possess is an extension of a person's right in his
own person.24 John Locke, in his Second Treatise on Govern-
ment, posited:
The labor of his body and the work of his hands, we may say,
are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state
that nature has provided and left it in, he has mixed his labor
with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby
makes it his property .... For this labor being the unquestion-
able property of the laborer, no man but he can have a right to
what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough and
as good left in common for others.24 '
As Cohen points out, this equation of labor and desert is
assumed to be self-evident by both socialists and conservatives
who believe that capital is the result of the savings of labor.242
Of course, as a theory of natural rights, the labor theory is
problematic as applied to a democratic government. If one as-
signs these "natural" rights to the state, one has to wrestle with
a resurrected theory that the state is a natural "being" possess-
ing natural rights, a step which moves even beyond the "divine
right of kings,"" who are at least persons. Moreover, such an
argument does not comport with democratic theory, since it pos-
239 See Epstein, supra note 193, at 1225-30 (discussing roots of and problems
with labor theory).
2 See D.R. DENMAN, THE PLACE OF PROPERTY 1 (1978).
2A1 JOHN LoCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 17, para 2.7 (Thomas
P. Peardon ed., The Liberal Arts Press 1952) (1690).
242 COHEN, supra note 90, at 51.
243 See ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA OR THE NATURAL POwERS OF KINGS (1680)
(defending "divine right of kings"). But see generally JOHN LOCKE, First Treatise of
Government, in TwO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 7, 7-118 (Thomas J. Cook ed.,
Hafner Press 6th ed. 1947) (1764) (criticizing Filmer's "divine right of kings" thesis).
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its a creature with a separate will and rights at possible odds
with the parameters "the people" impose on their form of gov-
ernment and their laws.
Another derivation from Locke's theory of natural rights as-
signs rights based on fairness. People are entitled to property in
which they have mixed their labor because they deserve it in ex-
change for their work.' The corollary works as well: if I have
worked to earn property A (such as money), then my transfer of
property A to someone in exchange for property B (such as land)
is similarly deserved.
It is most difficult to find coherence in the metaphor of
"government property" under the labor theory of property. Un-
der this theory, an individual becomes morally entitled to prop-
erty by mixing his labor with matter found in the state of nature.
His exertion of effort plus his claim on property serves as a
moral justification for awarding such property to him. To be
sure, the assignment of property rights to the government based
on the labor theory is more compelling in modern times, when
government has expended considerable resources in paving roads
and sidewalks, erecting and maintaining buildings, and even
managing the forestry of its public lands. The labor theory, how-
ever, posits that the owner has a natural right to that which he
can subdue. Applying the theory to public property would per-
mit government to resurrect a moral justification for control over
lands gained by conquest, a doctrine which modern democratic
polity seems not to wish to return.
As applied to government ownership of all "free" land, a
fairness doctrine has inherent limitations. For property which
the government achieved by conquest, for instance, one must ar-
gue that the government "earned" such property by massacring
those who stood in the way of its claims.245 Furthermore, the
claim that the government deserves public land because it pur-
24 See Origin of Property, supra note 203, at 73 (citing JOHN LOcKE, Second
Treatise of Government para. 25, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 327 (P. Laslett
rev. ed. 1960) (1690)).
2s See generally ALVIN M. JOSEPHY, JR., THE INDIAN HERITAGE OF AmERICA
295-343 (1968) (describing European conquest over American Indian tribes);
WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, THE INDIAN IN AMERICA 126-96 (Henry S. Commager &
Richard B. Morris eds., 1975). Referring to the period from the mid-1840s to the
mid-1850s, Washburn states that "[t]he greatest real estate transaction in history,
effected through wars, treaties, and a mass population movement, had been ac-
complished." Id. at 196.
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chased vast tracts from other countries loses its salt given that
the taxpayers, and not the "government," supplied the "sweat
equity" necessary to achieve the exchange property. 6
More importantly, the careless implied assignment of these
"natural" rights over public property to individual government
workers, rather than the government, may cause real difficulties
for challenging speech. A government worker with any signifi-
cant number of years in service is quite likely to come to think of
the government building in which she works, or the government
land which he supervises and tends, as his or her "own." The
desk space which the worker earned by many years of typing
forms slowly fills with family pictures and personal items. The
corridor which a government worker travels through from day to
day becomes filled with want ads and community announce-
ments.
Indeed, the changes in public space over the past decades
which are meant to imply the openness to the public, have para-
doxically only reinforced such possessive tendencies. Richard
Sennett has described how the changes in public buildings have
fortified feelings of isolation from the community and insecurity
in those who inhabit them.' The advent of modern architec-
tural movements has created dead space, full of anxiety and
danger, where once there was community space.248 Similarly, the
change from enclosed offices to common spaces with work sta-
tions, meant to create the illusion of community while cutting
down on chatter, has rather increased the anxiety of workers
stripped of any personal "space."249
In Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Pa-
tients and Other Inmates, Erving Goffman helps us understand
how the human instinct to create "real property" might be dis-
Pointing out the fallacy of assuming that the value of any finished product
can be properly attributed to any one person, Cohen asks: "How shall we determine
what part of the value of a table should belong to the carpenter, to the lumberman,
to the transport worker, to the policeman who guarded the peace while the work
was being done, and to the indefinitely large numbers of others whose cooperation
was necessary?" COHEN, supra note 90, at 51.
247 SENNETT, supra note 55, at 12-16.
2 As one example, Sennett notes the replication of International School sky-
scrapers, which create the illusion of community space through first-floor, open-air
courtyards while concealing the fact that no human activity occurs on the first floor,
with the exception of passage. Id. at 12-13.
29 Id. at 15 (noting that "[d]ead public space is one reason ... that people seek
out on intimate terrain what is denied them.").
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torted in government workers in the circumstances Sennett de-
scribes.' ° He notes that people will create a sense of ownership
in physical space, particularly in settings where they have been
stripped of usual protections (rooms, drawers, locks) for their
personal property. 1 In the mental institution which Goffman
describes, patients develop "personal territories," ranging from
the top of a radiator to a chair in front of the television and
"stashes" on their person or on window sills or trees designed to
hide and protect their personal possessions. 2 A popular old
television show, WKRP in Cincinnati, made a running gag
of this instinct. Newcomers were warned to knock at the
door of Les Nessman's invisible "office" before entering, and
he was often shown opening the invisible door to this in-
visible office to let himself out or others in.
Government workers, confronted with the anxiety of deper-
sonalized, insecure space created by such "commons" architec-
ture, have come to see the government building as their own be-
cause of their labor. Thus, they are likely to pursue the
metaphor of private property through the lens of their own ex-
perience when citizens come through the door of the government
office. 3 Government supervisors, the "fathers" or "mothers" of
the office, are likely to exercise their parental instincts and drive
off those whom they perceive to be threatening their workers'
privacy or peace. Their subordinates may well see the "stranger"
as an intrusion on their space, an invading microorganism in a
healthy cell, rather than as the ultimate "bosses" of their work,
or even the "customers" they are there to serve.
Even those values which pervade government service for the
benefit of the public interest push toward the exclusion of irritat-
ing or challenging speech. If government servants are to serve
and please, to go by the book, and to be efficient in the perform-
ance of their duties, then the irritating speaker challenges each
of these values. To serve and please efficiently, the government
worker must act to reduce dissonance by finding the first avail-
able peace-keeping solution. When immediate compromise of in-
Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients
and Other Inmates (1961), reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 1, 1-3
(Robert C. Ellickson et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995).
2" Id. at 1-3.
252 Id. at 3-5.
' ' See JOEL F. HANDLER, LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR COMMuNITY 28-31 (1990)
(discussing power of social service agencies and social workers).
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terests is impossible because of the complexity of issues and
emotions, the government supervisor is forced to eliminate dis-
sonance by resorting either to "bureaucratese," following the
rules to cut off the argument, or to eviction of the troublemaker.
The implications for speech when the estranged public space
meets the intuited "labor" theory of property, reinforced by gov-
ernment values of service and efficiency, are obvious. Those
speakers whose speech is either irrelevant to the government
worker's perceived notion about the function of his space or
threatening to the worker's daily habit and sense of tranquillity
are the first to be ejected. Moreover, the government worker is
likely to feel quite righteous about the ejection of such a for-
eigner. After all, the government worker has earned the right to
be secure and is also acting for the good of other, more compliant
clients who will be upset by the speaker's threat.
A seemingly far-fetched extension of the property metaphor
becomes not so unrealistic in real life. For example, a Twin Cit-
ies newspaper recently reported that the county prosecutor in
Minneapolis expressed displeasure with the independent Do-
mestic Abuse Project (DAP) by trying to strip the project of the
attributes of official presence.254 The prosecutor threatened the
project's official status by taking away its share of government
"property"-attempting to turn off its telephone, having its mail
stopped, and trying to eject its workers from their government
office space."' DAP's crime, according to the news report, was its
refusal to help the prosecutor gather evidence against a victim's
abuser by disclosing confidences of the victim. 6 The story shows
that by taking away its "property" rights to public space, the
prosecutor understood precisely how to discredit the independent
DAP in the eyes of the public.
The public employee who brings a labor or political dispute
to the office is similarly charged with offending the privacy and
tranquillity of his co-workers, a privacy purchased through their
years of service. Similarly, the homeless person begging in a
public corridor, who will not complete public assistance forms, is
perceived as threatening to regulations constraining the case-
worker's administration of largesse.257 The right to exclude,
'4 MINN. WOMEN'S PREss, Feb. 21, 1996, at 6-7.
25 Id.
256 Id.
217 See HANDLER, supra note 253, at 21-25 (discussing power of government of-
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which protects both the tranquillity and the routine of private
life in the home, is the first to be trotted out by the bureaucrat.
Meanwhile, other rights in the bundle, such as the rights to
share, to permit use, and to exchange, are forgotten.
Again, government-created cyberspace is just as likely to
raise the anxieties of government workers who have invested
their labor in creating and regulating these spaces, and thus
have a sense of "ownership" in what they have created. As com-
puter communication replaces in-office confrontations between
the government worker and the uninvited individual, the at-
tempts of the worker to regulate the ways in which the public
can interact with him will simply be exacerbated. Indeed, with
the computer, the government worker can truly "shut off" con-
versation in a way that is impossible in a government office
without a security escort. Just as government workers now use
voice-mail and busy signals to avoid talking to members of the
public, they will also have the discretion to "listen," erase, or
forward into limbo the complaints or cries for help that come
over the computer. Clearly then, the problem of government
servanthood under the private property metaphor will increase.
D. Social Relationships Theory, Power, and Equal Citizenship
The social relations theories of property create similar diffi-
culties for the notion of government-owned property. These
theories understand property to be a relational category258 and
emphasize how property regimes can recognize and affect human
relationships by creating power and vulnerability in those re-
lated through the property. 9 As Morris Cohen notes, "we must
not overlook the actual fact that dominion over things is also im-
perium over our fellow human beings" 6
In Rethinking Democracy, Carol Gould argues that assign-
ment of property rights to A may give A control over the condi-
ficial over client).
2 See COHEN, supra note 90, at 45 (noting that property right is "a relation not
between an owner and a thing, but between the owner and other individuals in ref-
erence to things").
29 JOSEPH W. SINGER, Legal Theory: Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW. U. L.
REV. 1, 41-42 (1991).
2c0 COHEN, supra note 90, at 46-47. Cohen quotes Ahrens, who argues that " '[ilt
is undoubtedly contrary to the right of personality to have persons dependent on
others on account of material goods.' But if this is so," argues Cohen, "the primary
effect of property on a large scale is to limit freedom." Id. at 54 (citation omitted).
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tions that B requires for her own agency."1 Property then be-
comes either an instance of, or tool for, A's domination over B, or
of B's freedom from such domination, depending on how it is le-
gally recognized and distributed.262 Similarly, Margaret Jane
Radin argues that some property, such as a wedding ring or a
piece of clothing, can be constitutive of the self as a "continuing
personal entity" in the world.2" Then the award of such property
to A can invest A with the ability to tear B's self-constitution
apart.
The danger of viewing government property as identical to
personal property becomes quite obvious in the speech context
under a social relations view, particularly in Gould's terms. The
government may have vast control over the conditions that B re-
quires for her own agency. Imagine a welfare recipient, B, who
has been driven to the point of collapse by the bureaucratic re-
quirements that she verify every fact she has recited in her ap-
plication for welfare benefits if she wants to receive aid. In an
attempt to voice her frustration and her right to respect as a
human being, which she believes is being threatened by such
demands, she goes to the welfare office, where her loud com-
plaints earn her a police escort out of the office.
Under the social relations theory, the government's demand
that its "property" rights be respected has not just given the
applicant's caseworker the power to force the applicant's compli-
ance with the verification rules, that is, the power to change the
applicant's behavior. These rights have also given the govern-
ment power to force the applicant's silence about the justness of
the policy, that is, the power to mute her expression of belief and
feeling.
From the standpoint of the constitutional community, the
"pall of orthodoxy,"2 which accompanies suppression of the ex-
pression of belief, should warrant serious concern for the Court.
Moreover, to the extent that the autonomy theory of the speech
21 CAROL GOULD, RETHINKING DEMOCRACY: FREEDOM AND SOCIAL COOP-
ERATION IN POLITICS, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 179 (1988).
26 Id.
213 Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON
PROPERTY LAW 8, 9 (Robert C. Ellickson et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995).
2" See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(holding that Jehovah's Witness students are not required to salute flag); Stevens,




clause holds any water, B's ability to constitute herself as an
agent through speech is critical.2' The government's ability to
take that speech-agency away from her at the very place where it
is likely to do some good-at the source of her maltreatment-
precisely threatens her agency. She is more than demoralized by
the government's demand to exercise its property rights: she is
unmasked and unheard.
The equation does not change appreciably for the better if
we invest the government worker, rather than the government
itself, with the power to dominate by assigning the government's
property rights in public space to the government worker.
Whether the worker exercises those rights by placing a counter
between him or her and our welfare recipient, or requires the
government "customer" to wait in a separate office until his
number is called, the government is placing the power to exert
control over the citizen in the hands of that worker.
As suggested previously, the move toward computer com-
munication between citizen and government worker does not
lessen, but rather exacerbates the ability to disempower the con-
stituent. In addition to the government worker's ability to put
off a complainer indefinitely in computer interactions, the
worker may have the power to identify the speaker, to share the
complaint with anyone in the public or any other government of-
fice, or to "edit" it to conform to the worker's desires. The power
to shame and control by delay and disclosure is simply multi-
plied.
In the hands of the petty bureaucrat, the power to exclude
speech can be used in an abusive manner against all but the
most compliant citizen. Yet even in the hands of the most well-
meaning government servant, the power to invite or exclude the
citizen from public space is especially tempting when the gov-
ernment worker needs some privacy, has had a bad day, or is
feeling stressed by demands that may seem more important at
the time." Even the compliant client may back up the govern-
2'5 See GOULD, supra note 261, at 60-71 (arguing that no agent has more right to
free choice, understood as capacity for self-development, than any other agent); see
also HANDLER, supra note 253, at 19 (observing that clients must complain in order
to protect their rights).
2"' See HANDLER, supra note 253, at 29 ("In public agencies, which chronically
lack the resources to meet demand, social workers are relatively powerless to
change the situation; thus, they develop various personal coping mechanisms such
as withdrawal and client victimization.").
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ment servant ready to evict a speaker. He or she too may have
had a bad day. In any case, the compliant client may feel a
threat to the stability of his or her own relationship to the case-
worker or the bureaucracy, however demeaning, which the strain
of conflicting voices creates.
E. Efficiency Concerns and the Dislocation of Decision Making
As the labor theory of property suggests, one basis for as-
signing property rights is utilitarian. That is, property will be
used most efficiently and productively for the entire society if
exclusive ownership is vested in particular persons. Following
the labor metaphor, a government worker may feel duty-bound
to eject a speaker, for the work he or she has been assigned in
the office is the work that the government prizes most highly.
After all, if the government prized speech that highly, it would
give the speakers their own office and pay them.
In economic theory, awarding property to the laborer gives
the first possessor an incentive to use the land rather than allow-
ing it to run fallow. 67 In this view, those who are assured that
they will receive the fruits of their work will both use it well and
conserve it for the future.268 By contrast, if property is not owned
by anyone, or is owned in common, users will attempt to overuse
it to gain the most profit, refusing to contribute labor and re-
sources into others' efforts to conserve it. In such a system, a
free-rider might immediately obtain more rewards than if he or
she cooperated, but the long-term effects of non-cooperation in
establishing a property regime are worse for everyone."' Thus,
people enter into private property regimes in order to get their
second-best choices.270
27 See Epstein, supra note 193, at 1221 (noting that ownership could create ef-
fective incentives for development and improvement of property); see also COHEN,
supra note 90, at 55 (discussing economic justification of private property is maxi-
mum productivity); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce,
and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 711 (1986) [hereinafter
Comedy of Commons] (stating that exclusive control of property encourages owners
to invest time and labor into development resources).
20 See Comedy of Commons, supra note 267, at 711-12 (noting that right to ex-
clude others makes private property fruitful).
269 See id. at 712 (discussing idea of "tragedy of the commons" where property
open to public is wasted by overuse or underuse). See generally Garrett Hardin, The
Tragedy of the Common, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
27 This story of the "self-interested rational maximizer," as Professor Rose
pointed out, has evolved from a fictional history of theory found in the work of Locke
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The efficiency theory, as recognized by Justice Rehnquist, is
probably the most coherent theory supporting the protection of
government property rights similar to those of a private land-
owner. In this view, awarding public property rights to the gov-
ernment is most likely to result in the most efficient use of such
property on behalf of the people. Government, not the private
individual, is likely to know and reflect the most individual de-
sires for its use. Of course, this macro conception of efficiency
rests on the assumption that government bureaucrats who con-
trol property are following a fairly comprehensive legislative
scheme which prioritizes the use of public lands.
The micro conception of efficiency as entailing the need for
private property rights surfaces in government speech cases such
as Pickering v. Board of Education... and Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Defense & Education, Fund Inc.272 The progression in the
arguments in these cases is telling: both cases begin with a focus
on employees' rights, shift to the concerns of government as em-
ployer, and then imply property rights emanating from that gov-
ernment status.
Thus, in terms of doctrinal progression, the public employ-
ment cases first embrace Justice Holmes' notion that public em-
ployment is a privilege, such that public employees waive their
and others, to an unstated maxim about the human essence embedded in Western
legal regimes of property. See Comedy of Commons, supra note 267, at 73-75. In-
deed, Senator Henry Dawes, having visited the Five Civilized Tribes (Cherokee,
Creek, Chotaw, Chikawa, and Seminole) in 1877, made the following moral evalua-
tion after noting their success in preventing pauperism or community debt through
a system of common ownership: "They have not got as far as they can go because
they own their land in common, and under that [system] there is no enterprise to
make your home any better than that of your neighbor's. There is no selfishness,
which is at the bottom of civilization." Maijane Ambler, The Long Tradition of Defy-
ing Selfishness, VII TRIBAL COLL. J. 8 (Winter 1996). The view of the Bureau of In-
dian Affairs that common ownership was indeed immoral was further evidenced by
Indian Commissioner Charles Burke's 1923 admonition to the tribes about their
practice of "give-aways" at festive occasions: "You do yourselves and your families
great injustice when at dances you give away money or other property, perhaps
clothing, a cow, a horse, or a team and wagon." Id. Dawes quickly corrected that
"moral failing" by sponsoring the Allotment Act, which divided Native American
communal lands into individual parcels privately owned by individuals and families,
a move which many Native Americans credit with the destruction of their self-
sufficiency. See 138 CONG. REC. E873 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1992) (statement of Rep.
Faleomavaega).
21 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968) (dismissing teacher for criticizing board in letter to
newspaper editor).
27 473 U.S. 788, 813 (1985) (soliciting funds in federal offices limited to particu-
lar groups).
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rights to speak.2 73 Then, rejecting that view, the Court focuses on
balancing the interests of the public employee, "as a citizen, in
commenting on matters of public concern" and of the state, "as
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees."274 Finally, in Cornelius, the fo-
cus is on property: "The federal workplace, like any place of em-
ployment, exists to accomplish the business of the employer ...
[and the] Government has the right to exercise control over ac-
cess to the federal workplace in order to avoid interruptions to
the performance of the duties of its employees."275
The difficulty with this "private property" view of efficiency
is that government managers who exclude speakers from the
workplace are being directed by a very narrow notion of what is
efficient. They do not always think of efficiency in the sense of
"efficacious"--the "power to bring about an intended result"276-
when they decide who will be allowed to use property. In speech
theory, what will effect the goal of government is active partici-
pation by people in discussing the concerns of government (the
self-governance rationale), exposition of falsehood (truth-
seeking), challenge to abuses of power (checking), and expression
of frustration with perceived injustice (the safety valve).277 The
government bureaucrat, however, does not figure these speech-
related methods for affecting democratic government into his ef-
ficiency calculus. Rather, like any specialist in a large bureauc-
racy, he organizes his department by the norms and goals pre-
273 See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (Mass. 1892)
(stating that "[t]here are few employments for hire in which the servant does not
agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech"); Bailey v. Richardson, 182
F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), affd per curiam, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
274 Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); see also Rutan v. Re-
publican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 64, 74-75 (1990) (plurality); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 140 (1983) (applying Pickering balancing test to case involving public employee
and questionnaire distribution to fellow workers). It should be noted that this type
of internal efficiency rationale is a far cry from the democratic "government neutral-
ity" argument which was implemented in United States Civil Service Commission v.
National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973), to uphold the Hatch Act, 5
U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1994) (relevant portion).
25 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 813, 805-06
(1985) (emphasis added).
276 See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 725 (1989).
See THOMAS EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST




scribed for that specialty and the tasks necessary to further the
general goals of the organization. 8
In Robert Presthus' theory, organization by specialization
goals is fraught with landmines for the "big picture" of the or-
ganization. 9 Needing prestige and influence, specialists become
so invested in the concerns of their specialty in a competitive
workplace that they forget the driving values and concerns of the
organization."0 Moreover, the more influence specialists gain,
the more they refuse to listen to those in the "line of authority""'
who are likely more in touch with the organization's customers.
So too in government, a bureaucrat may forget the ethical
"big picture" of democracy for the narrow interpretation which
his task imposes on him. This may cause him to shut out voices,
whether employees or outsiders, who are closest to the fears and
desires of those the bureaucracy is designed to serve. Justice
Marshall alluded to this in Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence 2 when he suggested that the biggest danger to
speech is not that government will arbitrarily suppress particu-
lar speech on the basis of viewpoint, but that the bureaucrat will
suppress all speech simply because it creates problems and dis-
rupts the efficient performance of duties.2"
Still more problematic for a democracy is that, even if the
organization could run on the views of specialists, there is no
"speech" specialist who will protect the values of speech for
democratic government. There is no one who can be counted on
to advocate for the instrumental utility of speech in the face of
conflicting demands by other departments. To the extent that
the courts have acted as "speech specialists," the public forum
doctrine has stripped them of their organizational checking
function by excluding their opinions favoring speech whenever
the speaker speaks on "private" government land. It is, of
2'8 See ROBERT PRESTHUS, THE ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY: AN ANALYSIS AND A
THEORY 28-29 (1962) (discussing specialization of big organizations for greater pro-
ductivity).
27 Id. at 29 (stating that "e]ach feels that his role is more essential to the or-
ganization").
Id. at 30 (stating that "specialists ... fight[] among themselves about re-
sources and recognition ... [and that] [e]ach department or division tends to become
a world in itself').
2" Id. at 34 (finding that "[k]nowledge ... challenges hierarchical definitions of
authority and role").
2' 468 U.S. 288, 301 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 313-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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course, not beyond a bureaucracy to demand that all of its spe-
cialties make speech interests a high priority in their efficiency
analysis, but such a demand requires sustained visionary lead-
ership from the bureaucratic head, an unlikely prospect in a de-
mocracy that keeps its Presidents only four years. (As a test, we
might give government employees a quiz on the values of the
"organization" to see how many of them mention speech as a top
priority!)
In summary, from a property perspective, the "private prop-
erty" metaphor employed by the Court in public forum cases has
the potential to delegitimize democratic government. In its
"will" manifestation, it justifies government action which is un-
principled and unchecked. In its possession garb, it encourages
citizens to abandon their public role of oversight for their own
private spaces. In its labor form, it encourages the government
worker to turn from servanthood to mastery as his way of under-
standing his relationship with the public. In its social relations
form, it threatens the agency of particularly vulnerable members
of that public. Finally, as a means of efficiency, property theory
elides the responsibility of government to balance competing
public values conscientiously and carefully.
III. PRIVATE PROPERTY AND SPEECH JUSTIFICATIONS
Just as the private property metaphor viewed from a prop-
erty theory perspective raises deep concerns for the quality of
our public life, it raises similar concerns when traditional speech
justifications are considered. The metaphor of private property
becomes particularly problematic when viewed in this context,
for it challenges most of the justifications for protecting speech
as a preferred individual right: the autonomy rationale, the
truth-seeking and checking functions of the First Amendment,
and the safety valve and tolerance arguments."
A. Rights v. Rights: Speech as Autonomy and as Invasion of
Privacy
In modern times, speech jurisprudence has significantly be-
come aligned with the "autonomy" emphasis which undergirds
such unenumerated rights as the right of privacy and the right
2" See Day, supra note 47, at 200 (attributing these arguments to Thomas Em-
erson's book, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970)).
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to travel.285 Those who justify speech using the autonomy theory
usually argue that autonomy, especially as enhanced through
political speech, is valuable to the wider community and thus is
not simply a protection against government involvement in pri-
vate lives. 6 Yet, autonomy has increasingly become a critical
aspect of the defense of speech in its own right.287
In the public forum literature and cases, the constitutional
problem is often defined as a clash between two autonomy rights:
the right of the speaker to express himself against the right of
the hearer not to have his or her privacy invaded.288 Yet, the use
of the private property metaphor is clearly problematic under the
"autonomy" rationale for speech, even considering the state in-
terests in protecting workers and others from invasion of their
rightful "space."289
The private property metaphor is usually invoked in those
cases where the Court seems most disposed to understand the
speech right at issue as an autonomy right. Two of Justice
O'Connor's public forum decisions will serve as examples. In
'5 See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (finding that right not to
have expression censored is meant to "assure self-fulfillment for each individual")
(emphasis added).
Frank Michelman describes autonomy, or self-government, as the direction of
"our actions in accordance with law-like reasons that we adopt for ourselves, as
proper to ourselves, upon conscious, critical reflection on our identities (or natures)
and social situations." Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government,
100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 26-27 (1986). "[I]ts requisite forum is 'a political community of
equals,'" where individual reason corresponds to public rational debate. Id. (quoting
R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTriSM AND RELATMSM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS,
AND PRAXIS (1983)).
Indeed, Dean Gaffney has suggested that for liberals like Bruce Ackerman,
the "goal of autonomy [within the context of public discourse] is a per se good that is
virtually comprehensive." Edward M. Gaffney, Politics Without Brackets on Relig-
ious Convictions: Michael Perry and Bruce Ackerman on Neutrality, 64 TUL. L. REV.
1143, 1147 (1990).
's See Ben A. Montenegro, Note, Injunction Provisions Establishing Both a
Thirty-Six-Foot Buffer Zone Around an Abortion Clinic Entrance and Driveway and
Limited Noise Restrictions Do Not Violate the First Amendment, But Other Provi-
sions of the Injunction are Unconstitutional- Madsen v. Women's Health Center,
Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994), 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1530, 1532 (1995) (noting con-
flict between right to speak and right not to hear).
29 Allen E. Brownstein & Stephen M. Hawkins, Pruning Pruneyard: Limiting
Free Speech Rights Under State Constitutions on the Property of Private Medical
Clinics Providing Abortion Services, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1073, 1078 (1991)
(analyzing potential conflict in protecting both free speech and private property
rights).
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Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc.,29°
plaintiffs sought to solicit contributions for their charities, in-
cluding the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., an
organization that has conducted or underwritten many of the de-
segregation cases of the last half of this century.29' However,
they were excluded because an Executive Order permitted only
the "official" federal charities drive, the Combined Federal Cam-
paign (CFC), to solicit employees during working hours.29 Thus,
several advocacy groups,293 including the plaintiffs, were ex-
cluded from applying for funds from the official charities drive 94
because the CFC limited participation to nonprofit organizations
that provided direct health and welfare services to individuals or
their families.296
In the view of Justice O'Connor, the solicitation "speech" was
a personal interest of the plaintiffs rather than a public good. 9 '
Although such speech furthered the individual's interest in ex-
pressing his or her beliefs and commitments, Justice O'Connor
concluded that the CFC constituted a "nonpublic forum" and,
therefore, that the speech could be prohibited because "[t]he
First Amendment does not forbid a viewpoint-neutral exclusion
of speakers who would disrupt a nonpublic forum and hinder its
effectiveness for its intended purpose."297 Thus, because it was
the government's land, the government could decide whether
money given for food and shelter for the needy was a better use
of charitable funds than political advocacy and litigation."'
29 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
2' Id. at 793-94.
292 Id. at 792.
' The legal defense fund groups included the "NAACP Legal Defenses and
Educational Fund, Inc., the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, the Puerto Rican Legal
Defense and Education Fund, the Federally Employed Women Legal Defense and
Education Fund, the Indian Law Resource Center, the Lawyer's Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law, and the Natural Resources Defense Council." Id. at 793.
'4 Id. at 793.
25 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 795.
m See id. at 799 (finding that literature directly advances speaker's interest).
29 Id. at 811.
2' See id. at 809. The Court determined that "avoiding the appearance of politi-
cal favoritism is a valid justification for limiting speech in a nonpublic forum." Id. at
809. The Court stated that: "[hiere the President could reasonably conclude that a
dollar directly spent on providing food or shelter to the needy is more beneficial




Similarly, in United States v. Kokinda,29 9 Justice O'Connor
found that a U.S. Postal Service regulation prohibiting political
advocacy leafleting and solicitations upon a public sidewalk
leading to the post office constituted a reasonable measure de-
signed to "ensure the most effective and efficient distribution of
the mails.""' Given that view, the state's interest in protecting
unwilling hearers on the public sidewalk, designed to create ac-
cess to the post office, outweighed the speaker's personal interest
in reaching both willing and unwilling hearers.0 1
In both Cornelius and Kokinda, Justice O'Connor understood
the government to be in the position of choosing between the
autonomy rights of speech and privacy, as a landowner could.
Thus, if the government, as a landowner, wished to invite on its
property those non-threatening persons who wish to conduct
their business-such as getting stamps-but not those who
wanted to engage others, that property right of the government
needed to be respected.
Yet, according to the rights versus rights conception, the
government acts as a neutral arbiter among equally respected
citizens, adjudicating between speakers and unwilling hearers.
In the economic version of such speech arbitration, the govern-
ment must act to free up the "marketplace" by permitting the
hearer to walk away from a deal. However, the hearer is unable
to escape from earshot because he is "captive" to the speaker and
is forced to "buy" the speech, whether he wants to or not.0 2 Un-
der this view, articulated in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,"3
the government recreates market conditions by forcing the
speaker to confront the hearer in a place where she can choose
whether to place value on the speech (by listening to it) or refuse
to put a value on it (by averting her eyes)."'
497 U.S. 720 (1990) (plurality).
3" Id. at 735.3"1 Id. at 732-33. The Court found that, because solicitation is disruptive to the
business of the post office, restrictions banning solicitation on postal sidewalks were
reasonable. Id.
See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (noting that
public transportation car card displays may impose view upon captive audience).
o30 Id.
304 See, e.g., Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127-
28 (1989) (stating that "dial-it" media, such as "dial-a-porn" services, require lis-
tener to take affirmative steps to receive communication and thus a "captive audi-
ence problem does not exist"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (stating
that one has ability to avert one's eyes in courthouse to avoid seeing offensive lan-
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In the "spatial" version of the unwilling hearer argument,
speakers who invade the non-public forum are violating the pri-
vacy and personal space of the hearer, thus causing him or her
some substantive harm."0 5 Government must act by either physi-
cally expelling the speaker from the hearer's zone of privacy, by
preventing speech from invading the hearer's ears,"6 or by dis-
tancing the speaker so that the hearer must elect to go closer if
he or she wishes to listen.0 7
In the government workplace, however, the government
worker may become confused about his or her role in arbitrating
between the speaker and the unwilling hearer who is concerned
about his or her "privacy."0 8 Government workers may misin-
terpret their neutral arbiter role as a conflict-avoidance respon-
sibility. If they are imbued with a government servant ethic,
they may believe that it is their responsibility to ensure that
people are "nice" to each other, to de-escalate conflict by remov-
ing the person who appears to be causing the conflict. If the
workers are concerned about trouble from complaints or law-
suits, they may take the easiest alternative and simply ban any
speech from their area of responsibility by disciplining their
workers and by evicting everyone else who creates conflict.0 9 In-
deed, within the context of the public forum doctrine, this
speech-avoidance mentality gives every incentive to suppress
guage on jacket).
.g Eugene Volokh argues that the captive audience doctrine is really a "privacy
of the home doctrine," and that cases such as Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418
U.S. 298 (1974), have been misread to extend the doctrine beyond the home. See
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV.
1791, 1833, 1836-38 (1992) [hereinafter Workplace Harassment].
306 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (censoring indecent language
broadcast over radio).
307 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41, 52 (1986). In Playtime
Theaters, the Supreme Court upheld the authority of cities to regulate adult thea-
'ters by dispersing them or by concentrating them in a given area. Id. This method of
speech regulation requires the willing hearer to travel to the designated area in or-
der to listen to the speech. Id.
30 See Workplace Harassment, supra note 305, at 1809-10 (examining incentives
for employers to suppress speech of employee and noting that "many of the recently
adopted employer anti-harassment policies bear the marks of the employer's con-
cern about liability").
30 Similarly, private employers fearing liability tend to suppress speech which
would be protected by implementing overbroad workplace policies that reach even
questionable speech and taking disciplinary action against those who violate them.
See id. at 1809-10. Employers take such measures out of fear that they will be liable
for their employees' offensive speech. Id. at 1810.
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speech and no incentive to encourage it. l°
Moreover, to turn the tables on the government personifica-
tion concept used by Justice Blackmun and others,311 at the very
least, the government should make a distinction when it is act-
ing qua government and when it is acting qua employer. As an
employer, its interests are partisan and one-sided. It may elect,
in some senses, not to hear even an important speaker by
claiming that it must complete its governmental tasks. As the
referee between a speaker and an unwilling hearer, however, it
must act impartially-as government acts-not favoring the in-
terests of either speaker or hearer except on the basis of some
principle applied equally and fairly.
Nevertheless, it is not clear that government, as employer,
can always act in a manner that is required of an impartial de-
cision-maker. The Cornelius case provides a good example of
this potential for confusion and conflict with its neutral role.312
In Cornelius, the government's interest in its own efficiency was
potentially threatened by government employees soliciting each
other without limitation in the workplace.313 In such a position,
the government can easily resolve any conflict by collecting
money through a combined charity drive that includes all chari-
ties requesting to be listed, or by designating a time and a place
in which individual employees can solicit each other and any
manner restrictions it deems appropriate-such as prohibiting
flashy signs or the acceptance of credit cards. In Cornelius, the
government did neither, excluding some charities through the
creation of the Combined Federal Campaign.1 4
In Cornelius, the government confused its interest in mini-
mizing solicitations in the workplace with its alleged interests in
protecting employees' captivity or privacy interests. Fearful that
employees might make a bad or coerced choice with their chari-
table dollars under the pressure of solicitation, the government
in Cornelius decided for them that "service" charities were more
deserving of their contributions than "advocacy" charities; the
10 See id. at 1810-11 (noting that harassment laws provide incentive for em-
ployers to suppress employee speech because such laws impose liability on employer
for offensive employee speech, whereas libel laws impose liability on speaker and,
therefore, do not encourage employer to restrict employee speech).
311 See supra notes 145-56 and accompanying text.
3,2 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
" Id. at 795-801, 812.
314 Id. at 790-91; see also supra note 290 and accompanying text.
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government, therefore excluded advocacy charities from work-
place solicitation.' To justify its policy, the government set
forth a "workplace explanation": if an individual employee felt
offended or "invaded" by solicitations from "advocacy" charities,
then the workplace will be disrupted."'
As a neutral arbiter, by contrast, the government would be-
gin with the premise that its employees' interests in avoiding
speech were equal in importance to the speakers' interests in
speaking. In quintessential public fora, in fact, the Supreme
Court has required that one right should not be sacrificed for the
other."1 In the workplace and other nonpublic fora, however, the
government partly prefers the interests of the unwilling hearer
over the interests of the willing speaker, ironically preferring the
unenumerated right to privacy over the enumerated right to
speak. 18
As Cornelius makes clear, in the public forum doctrine, the
government chooses the interests of the unwilling hearer even
when the government is not sure if he is unwilling.3 9 The public
forum doctrine bars the speaker from the premises even before
the public employee has a chance to decide whether his privacy
interests are being invaded.20 While such a blanket rule might
be justified in a circumstance of true captivity, where the hearer
literally has no choice of whether or not to listen, it is difficult to
understand in a government building, where few employees
would be unable to walk away from a speaker.32'
Moreover, the captive audience doctrine presumes that the
315 Id. at 795.
316 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809-10.
317 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (finding that when speaker
wore his "Fuck the Draft" jacket, unwilling viewers could choose to look or not look,
but they could not veto his speech).
318 See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 300, 304 (1974)
(affirming governmental ban on advertisement of political candidate in public
transportation in order to shield unwilling viewers); Cornelius, 473 U.S. 788
(upholding government restriction on solicitation of contributions in federal work-
place).
3 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 807 ("[The government] contends that there is likely to
be a general consensus among employees that traditional ... charities are worth-
while, as compared with ... [advocacy] organizations like respondents.").
310 See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727-30 (1990) (plurality)
(allowing prohibition on political soliciting and leafletting on public sidewalk in front
of post office because postal sidewalk is not traditional public forum).
321 See Workplace Harassment, supra note 305, at 1838-43 (noting implausibility
of "captive audience" doctrine when applied beyond home to workplace).
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willing hearer has some other equally accessible venue in which
to hear the speaker. In Pacifica, for instance, the concurring
opinion emphasized that those people who wanted to hear
George Carlin's "Seven Dirty Words" monologue could buy rec-
ords, watch late night television, listen to off-hours radio, go to a
theater, or read a book.3" In the government employment con-
text, however, there is no realistic way that a speaker can gain
access to a government employee without tracking him to his
home, a threat to his privacy much more substantial than a con-
frontation in the workplace.
Indeed, the captive audience doctrine, as applied to the
unwilling hearers in Lehman and Pacifica, also presumes that
once an unwilling hearer, always an unwilling hearer.323 The
Court does not believe its own rhetoric: that speech can change
minds, and that a speaker can change the mind of a government
official whom he encounters, or that a worker can change the
mind of a fellow employee whom he solicits.
The public forum doctrine conclusively marks as unwilling
hearers all persons who work in public buildings and presumes
that no speaker, however candid and compelling his speech,
could speak truth that would influence those hearers to act more
justly and fairly to those with whom they deal. Apparently, the
only people the Court trusts to be willing to hear the speaker
and to change their minds are lodged in the halls of Congress,
the state legislatures, the courts, and possibly the occasional
person passing by on the street, in the park, or on the sidewalk-
places where the speaker is assured he can go.
A more insidious consequence of the public forum doctrine,
as previously described, is that government workers will start
viewing their workspace and the interests which they are as-
signed as "private." If the government worker recognizes an in-
vasion of his workspace as wrongful, then the stranger who dis-
rupts his space has implicitly committed a wrong against the
worker, even though she may have had a legitimate concern
relevant to the mission of the government agency. Consequently,
the worker can choose to shut out the stranger at his own dis-
cretion.
However, even if the problem of speech on government prop-
22 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 760 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
3 Id.; Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 298 (1974).
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erty is conceived as the abstract clash of two autonomy rights-
speech and privacy-it is not clear that privacy should triumph.
In comparison to the right to freedom of speech, the right to be
shielded from speech has a fairly recent history, whether one
treats it as a sub-right of speech" or as a sub-right of privacy."
The right to protection against speech on public property came to
constitutional fruition only in the mid-1970s,325 while the right to
privacy as a right to be let alone is largely a child of the 1960s.327
By contrast, the right to freedom of speech dates back to the
adoption of the First Amendment,"8 and the practice of censor-
ship was abandoned years before that Amendment was
drafted.329
In terms of the clash of speech and privacy rights, cases such
as Martin v. City of Struthers33 ° and Kovacs v. Cooper3 3'represent
the traditional thinking of the Court that speech versus privacy
cases require contextualization and interest-balancing, not a
prior determination that privacy clearly outweighs speech as an
interest. As the Court in Martin stated, it has the obligation to
"'weigh the circumstances and appraise the substantiality of the
reasons' " government may have for preferring the interests of
the unwilling hearer to the speaker.332
324 See, e.g., Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 (plurality) (finding that individual's right
to be left alone in their own home outweighs First Amendment rights of intruder
presenting offensive material); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (plurality)
(explaining that rights of free speech do not necessarily extend to speech that of-
fends listener).
35 See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208-09 (1975)
(stating that protecting privacy rights of individual justify speech restrictions); Co-
hen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (noting that government's ability to restrict
speech depends on privacy interests involved).
326 See Lehman, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (allowing government regulation of
public transportation in order to protect unwilling hearers).
327 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (plurality)
(finding penumbral right of privacy in contraceptive decisions); see also Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (extending application of Griswold). The right
to privacy does, however, have its antecedents in early 20th century theory. See
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
"" See 4 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 20.2-20.5 (2d ed. 1992) (providing his-
tory of freedom of speech).
See id. § 20.5, at 11.
330 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
33' 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (plurality).
332 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 144 (1943) (quoting Schneider v.
New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)).
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In Martin, the Court weighed the circumstances and con-
cluded that a preference for speech over privacy is justified ex-
cept in situations where a homeowner posts his demand to be
undisturbed.333 The Court declared that "[fireedom to distribute
information to every citizen whenever he desires to receive it is
so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that, putting
aside reasonable police and health regulations of time and man-
ner of distribution, it must be fully preserved.""u In contrast, the
Court in Kovacs permitted a ban on "loud and raucous" sound
trucks used to broadcast messages based upon the need for
"reasonable protection" in "homes and business houses" where
"easy means of publicity are open," for example, "by the human
voice, by newspapers, by pamphlets, [and] by dodgers."335
The Court in Martin relied heavily on the notion that, al-
though speakers cannot invade the private property of unwilling
hearers, such hearers must declare themselves to be unwilling.336
Similarly, the Court in Kovacs suggested that what is protected
are the individuals' rights to "tranquillity" in their private homes
when they are in no position to escape the speech, and thus are
captive audiences.337
Through the late 1960s, the Court preferred the rights of
speech over the rights of the unwilling hearer, at least in public
spaces. With the exception of narrowly defined "fighting words,"
the Court consistently rejected arguments that offensive speech
is not appropriate in the public sphere. As late as 1971 in Cohen
v. California,33 the Court paved a clear path for the right of
speech against the right to be protected from speech.339 In Co-
hen, which involved the famous "Fuck the Draft" jacket,340 and
even later in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,34' where passing
drivers were offended by nudity on drive-in movie screens, the
Id. at 146-48.
Id. at 146-47.
Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 89 (plurality).
Martin, 319 U.S. at 146-49 (noting that householder should assert his right
to decide who may enter his property if he is unwilling to receive information from
speaker).
37 Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 87.
-3s 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
3' Id. at 26 (holding that criminalizing public display of four-letter expletive
without compelling reason violates freedom of expression).
Id. at 16.
'' 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
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Court declared that the unwilling viewer could "avert his eyes","
or make known to potential speakers his disinterest in receiving
the information.343  Yet, until Denver Area E.T.C., the Court
seemed to have forgotten the simple "averting" solution, even in
places such as airport terminals where it seems easiest to em-
ploy.3 The Denver Area E.T.C. plurality relied on viewers
averting their eyes through viewer-initiated blocking requests,
lockboxes, and v-chips as a major way of avoiding offense, 5 al-
though the Court noted that these viewer techniques are also
backed up by mandatory blocking requirements and local over-
sight on public access channels. 6
Even taking the "autonomy" rationale for speech to be the
dominant understanding of the Speech Clause, the public forum
doctrine does not enunciate any standards for determining how
the government, as property owner, should determine whose
autonomy rights should be given preference. As others have dis-
cussed at length elsewhere, it is difficult to make a constitutional
argument that a speaker's rights should succumb to a listener's
rights.3
47
Justice Brennan repeatedly makes the point, whether it is in
the context of censoring school library books 8 or dirty words, 9
that any clash of autonomy is indeed a three-way conflict be-
tween the interests of the speaker, the unwilling hearer, and the
willing hearer who might not otherwise easily encounter the
message.350 In Justice Brennan's view, the interests of the
m Id. at 212; see also Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.
33See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147-48 (1943) (using trespass
signs to indicate unwillingness to be disturbed).
3"See ISKCON v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (plurality) (upholding ban on solici-
tation in airport terminal operated by public authority).
116 S. Ct. at 2388 (1996).
3"Id. at 2493.
' See C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Context-Based Regulation of Per-
sons and Presses, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 57, 74 (suggesting that favoring listener
autonomy over speaker autonomy may not adequately serve constitutional goals);
Aleta G. Estreicher, Securities Regulation and the First Amendment, 24 GA. L. REV.
223, 240-41 (1990) (noting shift in Coures constitutional analysis concerning
speaker's rights and First Amendment rights of recipient); Note, The Message in the
Medium: The First Amendment on the Information Superhighway, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1062, 1086-87 (1997) (discussing potential constitutional argument in striking
balance between speaker's rights and listener's right to privacy).
Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality).
'"FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 762-66 (1978) (plurality) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
'so Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 764; Pico, 457 U.S. at 867.
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speaker and the willing hearer must always trump the interests
of the unwilling hearer when it is possible for the unwilling
hearer to avoid the message.351 The burden is on the unwilling
speaker to "avert his eyes" rather than on the speaker and will-
ing hearer to find another place to speak.
352
Still, the public forum doctrine reinforces the notion that the
government can arbitrarily decide how to balance the interests of
autonomous individuals. In Cornelius, the government decided
on workers' charities for them.353 Similarly, in Lehman, the gov-
ernment decided that a bus passenger's inconvenience in having
to avert his eyes from political posters is more significant than a
politician's desire to use such cards to reach an audience who
might not easily be reached by other affordable means, or a bus
rider's interest in being informed or even dazzled by a politician's
ad ."' Lehman suggests that the government can make such de-
cisions when it believes its ban will increase "sales" of transpor-
tation.55 In such a situation, even if its motives are self-
interested, the government has chosen the interests of the un-
willing hearer over those of the speaker and the willing hearer.
Additionally, one needs a fairly atomistic understanding of
"autonomy" to conclude that the right to be left alone takes prior-
ity over the right to communicate with others. The Court has
recognized time and again that each of these rights, taken to its
ultimate conclusion, will involve a serious invasion of the
other.35 Thus, the solicitor in Martin would have to stop if he
was turned away at the door, and the sound truck user in Kovacs
desist if he was blasting his message in a "raucous" and unbear-
able way into people's homes.
The problem in most public forum cases is rarely a clash of
absolutes where one must choose between a complete right to be
left alone with no speech-interaction by another person (the right
to live on a desert island), or a right to speak and hear, with no
opportunity to shut out the speaker (the "1984" specter of Big
Brother speaking to and watching human beings at every single
3' Pacifica, 438. U.S. at 765-66; Pico, 457 U.S. at 867.
3-2 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 765.
' Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 807
(1985).
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1974) (plurality).
'Id.
See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989) (considering conflict be-
tween personal privacy and freedom of speech).
19971 295
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
waking moment). Rather, most public forum cases involve
situations where the unwilling hearer can say, "no thanks, leave
me alone." Placing such a burden on the unwilling hearer re-
quires him to choose between speaking out or remaining irri-
tated by the unwanted communication.57 Yet, the hardship is
hardly the major inconvenience that Justice Rehnquist proffers
in ISKCON, where he projects people missing flights and air-
planes running on delayed schedules because a Hare Krishna
disciple selling flowers delays a rushing traveler.58 To the extent
that the speaker may be more persistent, criminal assault and
battery laws, as well as public regulation of verbal threats, are
sufficient to deal with the problem of confrontation.
The public forum cases suggest a greater threat, however,
than the threat that a "soft touch"/hearer will be coerced into
making a contribution to get out of the clutches of a solicitor. 9
In the Court's view, the major threat is that a stranger will
pierce the "bubble" of private space which protects us from un-
wanted encounters with the outside world. 6 While this consti-
tutes a separate problem not developed here, the Supreme
Court's public forum doctrine effectively encourages us to walk
through life in stretches of private space focused on our own im-
mediate wants and needs, rather than risk encountering those
who seem outwardly disconcerting, but might indeed teach us
something about our world, themselves, or even ourselves.
B. Public Justifications for Speech: Speaking Truth to Power vs.
Efficient Government Operations
In addition to autonomy-related arguments, theorists and
courts offer public justifications in support of speech. These
theorists have claimed that speech serves a foundational purpose
in a democratic society. Protecting speech will ensure that we
can seek the truth, check government power and criticize abuse,
57 See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving
"unwelcome" solicitations).
m ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 684.
... See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 733 (1990) (citation omitted)
("Reflection usually is not encouraged, and the person solicited often must make a
hasty decision ... while under the eager gaze of the solicitor.").
36 PATRIcK R. KEIFERT, WELCOMING THE STRANGER 21 (1992). However, there
is little need for protection from the world we choose to encounter because it meets
our immediate purposes and needs. Id.
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or use speech as a "safety valve" for society.3"' The foundational
role of the self-governance and safety valve functions were de-
scribed by Chief Justice Hughes in Stromberg v. California:36
"The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion
to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the
people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an
opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a funda-
mental principle of our constitutional system."363
Yet, these concerns clash precisely with another public in-
terest: the interest in government efficiency. The private prop-
erty metaphor values efficiency over these traditional speech
purposes, even when it is unclear whether the government
worker's determination about what is efficient is appropriate."'
Viewed most sympathetically, the government does have a sig-
nificant interest in controlling collective property. Even though
the government's invocation of the public forum doctrine may be
an over-enthusiastic attempt to operate efficiently, the govern-
ment does retain an interest in maintaining a workplace suffi-
ciently free from unwanted distractions so that employees can
complete a day's work. Similarly, although the government may
escalate the possibility of annoying behavior or the violent re-
sponse by the speaker by invoking the public forum protection, it
has an interest as government in protecting its employees and
"customers" from unduly invasive speech.
The "workplace efficiency" interest of the government can
be, and often is overstated, but it is not trivial. Government
workers in most facilities are used to numerous disruptions
during the day-personal phone calls, on-the-job problems of co-
workers, and emergencies that require them to set aside work
involving long-term goals to solve short-term crises. In an
imaginary "floodgates" world, if everyone who was disgruntled
staged a "sit-in" at the local government office, the chaos of space
and sound which would be created would threaten the govern-
ment's ability to get its work done. In a majoritarian system,
where the needs of the many are perceived to outweigh the needs
". See Day, supra note 47, at 200.
"6 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
" Id. at 369 (emphasis added); see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (pointing out that speech is necessary to continued building of
our culture); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 238 (1962) (same).
2" See supra notes 276-83 and accompanying text.
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of the few, the government has a strong interest in eliminating
speech which, for instance, disrupts a Social Security represen-
tative's ability to approve claimants for disability benefits, or
which floods the computer help-line with inquiries.
Nevertheless, part of the reason that personal calls or case
emergencies do not "break the stride" of the government worker
is that he or she has come to expect such disruptions as part of
the job. Conversely, the uninvited speaker is perceived as a dis-
ruption and a threat precisely because his or her appearance is
so unusual as to cause distraction and comment. Thus, the gov-
ernment employee may feel some pressure to respond to the
speaker in a way he or she would not respond to a regular dis-
ruption. That may be so whether the speaker is unknown and
disruptive-causing the employee to take some unusual step like
calling security or locking an office door--or even familiar, as in
Cornelius.365
Kokinda and Cornelius, of course, represent two more diffi-
cult cases in which the emphasis on governmental efficiency cre-
ates an imbalance in an unwilling hearer versus speaker contest.
In Cornelius, the government claimed that the preference for the
employee's privacy over the solicitor's speech would save the
employee time to do the government's business.3" In Kokinda,
the government made the ultimate proprietary "bottom-line" ar-
gument that there was a need to prefer customer privacy over
customer speech. 367
Indeed, the proprietary calculus preferring privacy interests
for efficiency reasons seems quite simple. In Cornelius, to make
a plausible claim of harm to government interests, the govern-
ment needed only show that the speaker's solicitation took an
3' In Cornelius, the fact that one's co-worker comes to ask for a charitable do-
nation rather than to do government business may cause the employee to give the
solicitor some of his money rather than brush him off with the usual bureaucratic
ritual to which both speaker and hearer have become accustomed. It is this irony, of
course, which the public forum doctrine exacerbates-the more ironclad the exclu-
sion of "unusual" disrupters, the more disruptive they will seem to be when they ap-
pear.
36 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 813
(1985).
' See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 736 (1990) (plurality); see also
Mellis, supra note 47, at 175 (noting that around 40 to 50 postal customers com-
plained about pair of solicitors situated on sidewalk seven foot wide and suggesting
patrons were more upset by solicitors' message than anything else).
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employee away from his usual working tasks for a moment.3" In
Kokinda, the government might have effectively made the argu-
ment that if solicitors were allowed, people would not traverse
the sidewalk to buy stamps.369 If they did not come, or if they
came in a bad mood not ready to spend their money, the post of-
fice would lose money.
Despite such efficiency interests, the specter of government
employees wasting all of their time soliciting and giving chari-
table gifts is quite easily remedied by a time, place, and manner
restriction. As in Cornelius, the government can either permit
other charities to come into the campaign, or it can provide a
brief opportunity for non-approved charities to solicit during
work hours.' Similarly, uninterested patrons such as those in
Kokinda can be easily protected by clarifying where solicitors
may park their tables and how they may approach patrons.
Kokinda raises yet another problem with the private owner
metaphor, created when a commercial model is imported, into
public organizations, and most particularly, the government. We
must ask whether the government should act precisely as a pri-
vate business owner and maximize its profit at the expense of all
other values. The private property metaphor accepts the fact
that government, as advertiser, encourages the public to pur-
chase its goods, using only profit to measure whether the busi-
ness is worthwhile or not. In the Kokinda case, this is not so
problematic, as it is hard to imagine public harm resulting from
overconsumption of stamps and envelopes. A more telling case,
however, is Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv-
ice Commission, 7' where the Court recognized that the state
may have an interest against consumption, in this case energy
consumption, that justifies suppression of advertising geared at
increasing consumers' use of electricity. 2
One might imagine a third circumstance (like the bus card
in Lehman) that raises the more difficult problem of when gov-
ernment's focus on the "bottom line" must be challenged in
36 See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 792.
's See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 736.
370 The Court in Cornelius failed to consider seriously such a brief opportunity,
whether it is a one-hour lunch meeting, a flyer listing non-approved charities, or an
opportunity for these charities to hand out leaflets as employees are leaving work.
37 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
372 Id.
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court.373 Hypothetically, a government bureaucrat charged with
maximizing the government's profit might decide that adver-
tisements for cigarettes, liquor, casinos, or gun shops bring in
the most revenue for the state. Or a public oversight committee
might decide that giving cable access to Minnesota's fishing
booster clubs will be more advantageous to tourism than airing
complaints about police brutality. However one might feel about
regulating private companies' advertising for these "vices""' one
might still ask whether government should import a private en-
terprise metaphor to justify its speech choices purely on a profit
basis. Expanding such justifications to their logical implications,
government could decide to charge schoolchildren for tuition,
fees or books, 75 or sell public parks to private developers solely
in order to gain revenues.37 Indeed, public forum jurisprudence
seems to underscore that governments have decided against be-
ing "a gentler and kindlier government than usually govern-
ments are expected to be."377
Another problem with the private ownership metaphor lies
in finding the locus of power where public "economic" decisions
are made. In ISKCON, for example, someone-probably under
the proprietorship metaphor-decided that it was not in the best
commercial interests of the airport for Hare Krishnas and others
to hawk their wares. 78 Such person was not accountable to the
33 Cf. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality).
314 See Posadas De Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 337 (1986)
(challenging constitutionality of Puerto Rico statute and regulations restricting ad-
vertising of casino gambling).
37 See, e.g., Betsy Bates & John Westcott, Sports Fees, Band Fees, Art Fees ... Is
This Legal?, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Oct. 8, 1994, at A01 (describing fees charged by
public schools in Orange County, California and student's lawsuit against high
school that charged $1,700 for students to participate in cheerleading); Janet Bing-
ham, Lawsuit Challenges Fees for Textbooks, DENVER POST, Sept. 11, 1994, at Al
(describing class action suit brought against Colorado school districts challenging
charging of fees for textbooks and instructional materials); Gary Rummler Taking
the "r'from 'Free', MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 2, 1995, at Neighbors 1 (describing
increasing fees charged to public school students); Sherrie RubI, Harford Proposes
Tuition for Summer Classes, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 16, 1995, at 2B (describing pro-
posal to charge tuition for summer school at Harford County Schools).
... See Donald Woutat, Mineral Rights: Dust Bowl's Heirs Miss a Big Boom, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 1987, at 1 (discussing reversion of mineral rights to government
ownership and government's subsequent lease of these rights to private companies
for exorbitant prices).
.. Cf. Grutzmacher v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 700 F. Supp. 1497, 1500 (N.D. Ill.
1988).
318 ISKCON v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 674-75 (1992) (plurality).
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general public authority except in the most indirect way, since
airports usually maintain an independent body of directors
whose primary concerns are the promotion of efficiency of the
particular public function of air transportation and not the gen-
eral public good.379 It is also doubtful that the public is suffi-
ciently aware of the cost of a non-solicitation regulation at the
airport (including the speech cost) to register their views with
legislators or even the airport authority. The First Amendment
litigation public announcements made at some airports are
probably the first indication the public has had that other uses
at the airport are even possible. When the airport is swept clean
of solicitors, the people who traverse the airport have no way of
knowing what they are missing.
Competing with efficiency for the Court's imprimatur are
traditional speech concerns. The truth-seeking function of the
First Amendment, however, would not seem enhanced by the
private property metaphor. As the Supreme Court has construed
it, the truth-seeking function concerns the interchange of ideas
through discussion, whether one imagines speech through a
marketplace metaphor or focuses on the relational aspect of
public conversation. If the test of truth is its ability to gain ac-
ceptance in the marketplace, as the Court would have it, the es-
sential participant is the "purchaser" of information. Without
the purchaser in a market transaction, marketable items like
speech have no intrinsic value. It is the purchaser who not only
recognizes, but creates, worth in an item, such as speech, by
electing to purchase or trade another recognized good for it.38°
Some people trade their money for speech, purchasing
379 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 4-3-5 (1981) (creating airport authority board of direc-
tors and description of membership and duties); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 302
(West Supp. 1996) (detailing composition and duties of Maine Aeronautical Advisory
Board); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 259.801-.802 (West 1990) (forming airport
authority and airport authority board); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 14.08.302,
14.08.304 (1993 & West Supp. 1997) (establishing procedure for creating board of
airport district commissioners and description of elections and terms); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 114.14(2) (1988 & West Supp. 1996) (establishing procedure for creation of
airport commission).
"' Some suggest, however, that information is a commodity which cannot be left
to the market because the producer of information does not consider the benefits of
his speech to third persons (particularly as compared to small cost of producing it
for large audience) and, therefore, has no incentive to create more information. See
Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First
Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554, 558-60 (1991).
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newspapers and movie tickets, while others trade their time and
lend their concentration to the speaker's offer. In some cases, in
fact, people place value on speech by investing their emotions in
speech. Even in offensive speech, the hearer has personally in-
vested in what the speaker says, though that investment may be
expressed as anger, resentment, or fear. Therefore, pursuing the
truth-seeking metaphor to its final conclusion, people, at times,
trade speech for speech. Through the exchange of expression,
individuals attempt to enhance the original understanding of the
speaker by exposing his falsehoods and refining his truths, to
reach Pareto optimality in which, in terms of wisdom, everyone
is better off. 81
In the interpersonal view, speech similarly becomes the con-
nective tissue between two people who, even if momentarily,
share what is deeply significant in their own lives in a way that
changes the world outside them. In the case of "private" speech
with intimates, one discloses one's inner thoughts and feelings in
a reciprocity of vulnerability with the other in an attempt to
make objective, shared reality of what is until the moment of
speech merely subjective thought. Intimate self-disclosure with-
out a partner to hear and respond is unsatisfying in part because
it does not fulfill the psychological need of the speaker to exter-
nalize his emotions and thoughts as a way of getting distance
upon the self and its concerns. Unheard private speech also fails
to bridge that brief common universe of trust and understanding
of the other that creates a new historical moment between
speaker and hearer.
Even in "public" speech, where the speaker and hearer re-
hearse their arguments using the mask of their social roles, the
drama of public speech without an audience is an uncompleted
ritual. Speech depends upon the response of the audience for its
completion, given the expectation that the hearer will be won
over by it. To be sure, the expectation carries many risks, from
embarrassment to rejection; but a public speech carries always
the freight of response by another. Indeed, like any argument or
drama, the response of the audience re-creates the play by revis-
381 Farber, however, notes that some of the most insightful speech is presented
by "kooks, and cranks," those whose motivations for speech are primarily non-
financial, and that they perform a valuable social function in a society in which fi-
nancial rewards are viewed as the only rational motive for the production of infor-
mation. Id. at 580.
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ing its essentials as the production ensues-an appellate advo-
cate molds her arguments to the questions of the judge; a good
actor changes inflection, gesture, and even words in response to
the tears, the laughter, or the derision of an audience.382
As the public forum doctrine strips controversial speakers of
an audience, it similarly changes the "moment of truth" in the
"speech drama." Public forum speech is reduced to soliloquy or
to "preaching to the choir"-to people who are most likely not lis-
tening to the speaker anyway because they presumably agree
with what he has to say. The chance that there will be an en-
counter between falsehood and truth, half-truth with full truth,
or truth with itself, in a situation where the speaker's words fall
on ears deafened by the agenda of the hearer, is at best slim.
Similarly, the First Amendment's checking function also
fails miserably under the public forum doctrine. The doctrine is
most likely to be invoked to "bounce" the speaker off public prop-
erty when the message threatens the intended audience. That
threat may be a "truth-seeking" threat, as in the civil rights
cases, when the hearers do not want to acknowledge the message
not only because they disagree with it, but also because they are
in denial about its genuineness.3"
The threat of speech may also be a power threat. In Perry
Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association, the
teachers' union was permitted to post messages in the teachers'
boxes because it had gained the approval of the teachers and the
acquiescence of the school system." 4 PLEA, the rival union, was
refused entrance to the teachers' boxes because its message was
critical of the approved union and threatened that union's status
quo and "labor peace.""5 By excluding the speech of the rival
union, the teachers' union gained the power to control reception
of the truth, and the power to remind both insiders and outsiders
that, as victor, it had the privilege of the audience.
= In earlier times, the criticality of the audience for the speaker was more pro-
nounced. In Shakespeare's day, for instance, actors would happily repeat scenes or
change dialogue at the behest of the audience, and would talk back to those in the
audience who wanted to add their "two cents' worth" to the action. KEIFERT, supra
note 360, at 21-22. The House of Commons retains this practice of ritual inter-
change between speaker and audience when the Prime Minister comes to "speak."
3" See Beggar's Free Speech, supra note 233, at 209 ("TIhe beggar conveys in-
formation regarding the true extent of her individual need in the appeal itself.").
'4 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 39-40 (1983).
Id. at 52.
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The private property metaphor recognizes such speech-
speech that threatens falsehood with the truth, threatens power
abuse with criticism, threatens hearers with emotions and en-
gagement-as valuable only when it threatens in
"quintessential" public fora. Yet, it is obvious that the opportu-
nities for private citizens to threaten an abusing government by
confrontation will be minimal if their right is confined to public
sidewalks, streets, and parks. These are locations where one
finds politicians generally only before election day and only when
they think the mood of the crowd will be favorable.
The Supreme Court similarly suggested how ineffective
speech in "quintessential" public fora may be when it scoffed at
the notion that a lonely picketer on the sidewalk in front of the
Court might threaten the Court's impartiality by influencing the
Court's decision through his speech.386 Unless one is prepared to
mount a Million Man March, to be arrested for disrupting traf-
fic,387 or to build a homeless camp in Lafayette Park,3" the effect
speakers may have on an intended audience, those in power, is
certainly questionable.
By contrast, in the 1960s civil rights demonstration cases,
the Court worked with a different understanding: that the
proper place of the speaker is on public property. Although the
Court used a variety of doctrines to invalidate convictions
against black protesters,8 9 the view of some outspoken Justices,
particularly Justice Douglas, was that public property is pre-
cisely the place where protesters should be"0 since they speak
38 See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1983).
Washington Mobilization Comm. v. Cullinane, 566 F.2d 107, 113 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (involving class action suit against police officers for violating demonstrators'
constitutional rights during seven different demonstrations, including one along
Pennsylvania Avenue).
'" Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
'8 See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (plurality) (public library sit-in);
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965) (sidewalk loitering); Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (demonstration outside courthouse); Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (protest march around State House).
391 See Brown, 383 U.S. at 141-42. To be sure, Justice Douglas' view on the pub-
licness of public property was not unanimous. See e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S.
39 (1966) (concluding that government property was private property and that gov-
ernment had right to exclude public from jails); Cox, 379 U.S. at 575 (Black, J., dis-
senting) (asserting that exclusion of public from courthouse was permissible). The
expectation, however, that public property belonged to the public precisely in those
times when government deludes itself about its constitutional obligations carried
the day in most of these cases.
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truth to power in precisely those places where power has un-
dermined democratic values.
Even if the audience for one's "truth-seeking" or "checking"
is the average man on the street who will confront his legislator
with the pamphleteer's claims, our construction of public space
has made the opening of government property for speech uses
imperative. Justice Kennedy understates the situation when he
says, "[m]inds are not changed in streets and parks, as they once
were."391 As the shopping center speech cases support, except for
a few downtown city streets, if one is going to find an audience,
the place to do it in America is at the mall.392
The quintessential public fora, where people have the irrevo-
cable right to speak, have become virtually useless as speech fo-
rums, except for preassembled audiences. With the exception of
the Mall in Washington, D.C., one will find few crowds in urban
public parks available to a speaker mounting a soapbox or solic-
iting support. Sidewalks have been transformed from places for
meeting acquaintances to conveyor-like tracks for hurried pedes-
trians afraid to look strangers in the eye. As most courts pre-
tend not to recognize, handing out leaflets in a busy urban street
is likely to be dangerous for the lonely pamphleteer,393 and it is
"more unlikely that the intended communication will reach its
intended audience."394 Indeed, a dusty rural road might be a
more effective and safer forum.395
The use of the metaphor of "public forum" is also ironic given
the restrictions placed upon it by the Supreme Court's doctrine.
In the Athenian forum, public speaking and political debate oc-
curred in the heart of the Athenian economy. The forum was in
the literal marketplace, where every citizen had to come to
"9' See Denver Area E.T.C. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. at 2414 (Kennedy, J., concurring
and dissenting).
"2 See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 77 (1980) (soliciting sig-
natures in privately owned shopping center); Amalgamated Food Employees Union
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 311 (1968) (picketing supermar-
ket located in large shopping center).
:93 See ACORN v. St. Louis County, 726 F. Supp. 747, 753 (E.D. Mo. 1989)
(applying "narrowly tailored" test and permitting county to ban soliciting by weav-
ing among traffic at toll booths), affd, 930 F.2d 591 (8th Cir. 1991).
4 Pineros Y Campesinos Unidos Del Noroeste v. Goldschmidt, 790 F. Supp.
216, 220 (D. Or. 1990) (stating court's response to suggestion that field laborers
should picket in urban areas).
.. See, e.g., id. at 220 (applying traditional public forum doctrine to rural roads
by harvesting sites where laboring picketing was occurring).
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transact business.39 Politics, including in the wider sense dis-
cussion of the good and true and beautiful, was understood not
as apart from daily life, but as integrally connected with such
daily tasks as buying food, clothing, and services.397
For the modern Court, the "marketplace of ideas" has be-
come ethereal, an idea or a symbol rather than a real place
where people talk about real subjects. Privately owned malls
and stores where people go to conduct the business of daily life
have, for the most part, effectively excluded controversial speech.
Sports and entertainment centers, also privately owned, have
similarly barred public speech by the design of their entrances.
Speakers' attempts to bring their messages to transportation
centers, another place where masses of people converge, have
been stymied by the Supreme Court, most recently in ISKCON.399
The use of the private ownership metaphor encourages the
exclusion of disturbing speech from the only locations where it is
likely to have some utility. Under the metaphor, government (as
owner) not only has the right, but also the encouragement of the
Court, to exclude speech which disturbs the government. After
all, any prudent property owner would expel those annoying him,
calling him names, or demanding that he shape up. Justice
Marshall noted that the tendency of bureaucracy is to suppress
anything that will threaten the status quo or the equilibrium of a
particular place.399 As suggested earlier, if the Court encourages
bureaucrats to understand government property as their own,
such speech is likely to be excluded, whether the property man-
agers agree with it or not, on the basis that it is disruptive to
those who are using the government property for "legitimate"
reasons.400
The ability of speech to function as a safety valve for those
who are fed up with government policies by providing the oppor-
tunity for words to take the place of violence is also undercut by
the public forum doctrine. According to the "safety valve" ra-
3" See ERNEST BARKER, GREEK POLITICAL THEORY: PLATO AND His PREDE-
CESSORS 21 (5th ed. 1979).
397 See id. at 21-22.
39' 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (plurality).
3" Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 312 & n.10
(1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'm See Leedes, supra note 47, at 517 ("[Plerformance speech by labor unions is
usually non-protected because courts routinely defer to Congress' judgment concern-
ing unfair picketing by those protesting economic conditions.").
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tionale, strongly emotional speech may be necessary to avert
violence by permitting the speaker to vent his frustrations in an
acceptable manner.'01 Yet, such venting may be perceived as a
prelude to violence by passersby in government buildings. Their
interest in avoiding violence at all costs will lead them to find a
security guard to evict the speaker or to search out the location
of their anonymous computer "crank." As previously suggested,
a speaker violating the public forum boundaries may be evicted
not because of the threat of the message itself, but because hear-
ers perceive the speech to violate their zone of privacy, even if
they agree with it. For instance, government workers passing
through building halls on their way to work may approve of the
Girl Scouts, but they may not be happy if the Girl Scouts leaflet
them on ways to improve the environment or try to sell them
cookies.
Exclusion of emotionally charged speakers from public
places, however, precisely undercuts the "safety valve" rationale.
A distraught speaker is unlikely to have his frustrations vented
except in the encounter with another who will hear him. The
fully emotional speaker, upset with his lack of control over gov-
ernment decisions, who is ordered out of public space where he is
trying to communicate his frustrations, is likely to understand
that order as a further threat to his ability to participate in con-
trolling the situation.' If the government wrests away the con-
trol that the speaker has obtained by selecting the forum and
standing his ground, the truly distraught and now publicly
shamed speaker may "up the ante" in some dramatic way. In the
most extreme cases, the speaker may "retake his territory" by
putting up some significant resistance to arrest, inflict indirect
harm, such as stalking or harassment of public officials, or even
escalate the encounter through direct violence. Or the speaker
may lose control and hurt someone else-a passerby, a wife, a
411 See id. at 516. "It is thought that men will be less inclined to resort to vio-
lence ... if they are free to express themselves through speech advocating ... [their]
ends." Id. (quoting M. N=IER, NimER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON
THE THEORY OF THE FIRST AMEENDMENT § 1.04 (1984)).
402 Imagine an angry constituent who comes to his legislator's office and is told
that he has to leave because it is not a public forum. The security guard has pre-
vented him from using his intelligence, his power of speech to name his problem, as
well as any feeling of control over his circumstance and any chance to change a pub-
lic official's mind. If he is ejected in front of others, knowing that passersby are
imagining him to be a criminal or a mentally disturbed misfit, the shame he feels is
likely to turn to rage.
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child, or himself.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE EXISTING PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE: A
PROPERTY PERSPECTIVE
The decision facing the government employer, however, is
not an all or nothing choice between the public forum doctrine or
anything-goes "floodgates"4"" any more than our social govern-
ance choices are anarchy and tyranny. Speech regimes which
impose rules of limitation, but not exclusion, can effectuate gov-
ernment interests without critically harming speech interests.
Ironically, the Supreme Court has recognized as much in its
"time, place and manner" (TPM) test, ill-named now that the
Court has replaced the "place" part by the public forum doctrine
in all but quintessential fora.4 ' The TPM doctrine recognizes
that content-neutral regulation may permit speech without
harming its essential character as communication with an in-
tended audience, including government and its employees.4"5
As the Court succinctly described it in United States v.
Grace, the "time, place and manner" test recognizes that gov-
ernment restrictions modifying the circumstances of speech can
appropriately respond to all of the interests involved in a public
setting, including the property interests of government.4 ' Grace
permits the government to enforce reasonable restrictions on
speech only if the restrictions " 'are content-neutral, are nar-
rowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and
leave open ample alternative channels of communication.' 407
Thus, so long as the government does not interfere with the
03 See generally COHEN, supra note 90 (discussing private property versus
communal property).
404 According to Grace and Perry, the TPM test applies only in quintessential
public fora or (as long as the government holds them open) public fora. United
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177-78 (1983); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Edu-
cators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). Thus, in non-public fora, the propriety of the
speaker's "place" will not be judged by the four-part TPM test, but by the reason-
ableness of the Government in excluding him. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
40 See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2446
(1995).
406 Grace, 461 U.S. at 177-78.
47 Id. at 177 (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 45). Grace also holds that "a particular
type of expression" can only be prohibited if the prohibition is "narrowly drawn to
accomplish a compelling governmental interest." Id. Farber and Nowack propose a
three-part test for balancing speech and government interests: articulation, per-
missibility, and balancing. Farber & Nowack, supra note 47, at 1243.
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communication itself, it may in certain circumstances regulate
the way in which such communication is made. 8
Unlike the public forum doctrine, the Grace test puts the
burden of proof on the government with respect to its decisions
as property owner. First, it requires that the government inter-
est be compelling, thus creating a somewhat higher burden than
the "reasonableness" test in nonpublic fora.4"9 Second, by requir-
ing narrow tailoring, the Court has mandated that the govern-
ment must carefully analyze the interests involved and impose
restrictions that are not substantially overbroad.41 Significantly,
though, the Court's view of narrow tailoring in this context
permits more flexibility than the "least restrictive alternative"
language applied in content cases.41 Narrow tailoring is more
like a "close enough" standard which focuses on whether the gov-
ernment is better off (in terms of its proffered interests) with the
regulation than without it. Yet, unlike the "least restrictive al-
ternative" language, the narrow tailoring requirement has been
taken seriously, and has been employed to strike down TPM re-
strictions such as the restriction on picketing the Supreme
Court.
412
Justice Breyer offers a different alternative in Denver Area
E.T.C., borrowed more from Pacifica than the TPM doctrine, one
which has its pros and cons. He would permit the regulation of
speech "to address extraordinary problems, where its regulations
are appropriately tailored to resolve those problems without im-
"" Farber and Nowack propose that content neutrality is the keystone, and that
TPM restrictions pose "relatively little threat" to the First Amendment. See Farber
& Nowack, supra note 47, at 1237.
4'9 Grace, 461 U.S.at 177. In most cases, however, the "compelling" requirement
has not resulted in greater speech protection. See generally Farber & Nowack, supra
note 47, at 1239.
410 See Grace, 461 U.S. at 177 ("[Rlestrictions such as an absolute prohibition on
a particular type of expression will be upheld only if narrowly drawn to accomplish a
compelling governmental interest.").
" See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797-99 (1989) (overturning
Second Circuit decision applying least restrictive alternative test to content regula-
tion case). In overturning the Second Circuit, the Court essentially modified the
principle that a restriction is not narrowly tailored where less restrictive means of
regulation are available. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech Permissible Tailor-
ing and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2423-25 (1996).
42 Grace, 461 U.S. at 171. However, the Court's explanation about why a pick-
eter does not threaten the impartiality of the Supreme Court sounds more like a
"give me a break!" test of government plausibility than a "how fine did you draw the
line?" test of government precision.
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posing an unnecessarily great restriction on speech," and
adapted to "the balance of competing interests and the special
circumstances of each field of application."413
Under the TPM test, Justice Breyer's formulation, or the
Grayned incompatibility test,414 the government's understanding
of the character of public property is not the sole key to balanc-
ing opposing interests. As we know from the cases, however,
Grace and Grayned rest on different notions of public property.
By presuming that the government can, with sufficient cause,
exclude the speaker if "ample alternatives" are available, the
Grace test still relies on a private property theory. While the
"ample alternatives" language would seem to give courts wide
latitude to consider the relative effectiveness of speech on gov-
ernment property versus speech in a remote "quintessential
public forum," in practice the availability of any public forum in
the vicinity seems to be sufficient to meet the requirement.41 S
The Grayned test, by contrast, presumes that government prop-
erty is the property of both the government and the people and
that both are properly on the premises if the activity in which
they are engaged is not mutually incompatible.416 On first
glance, Justice Breyer's test would not seem to impose any pre-
sumption about property ownership, though it is perhaps too
early to tell.
The difference between the property rights presumptions in
Grace and Grayned is not trivial. In Grace, if the government
has important, well-defined interests which might be compro-
mised and the speaker can go elsewhere, the government wins.4"7
Under Grayned, if the government has important interests but
they are not actually and substantially compromised, the
413 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2384 (1996).
414 See supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text (discussing incompatibility
doctrine).
41" One commentator has proposed that whether a forum is public should be
measured in part by whether equivalent private publications, or competitors, are
available for the speech; but if the state has a monopoly on the outlet, it should be a
public forum. See Schechter, supra note 47, at 253-55.
416 See Keith Werhan, The Liberalization of Freedom of Speech on a Conserva-
tive Court, 80 IOWA L. REV. 51, 77-78 (1994). The decision in Grayned, as described
by Professor Werhan, was unique in that it was unitary and speech protective. Id. at
78. The Grayned test applied to all forms of public property and presumed the
speaker, as a member of the general public, had a right to access the property. Id.
417 See Grace, 461 U.S. at 177 (noting government's ability to restrict expressive
conduct where ample alternative channels of communication exist).
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speaker and the government both may stay on their "own" prop-
erty, even if the speaker might have had "ample alternatives."418
In addition, the balancing set forth in Grace is still a theoretical
one. The government is not put to its proof that its significant
interest is impaired by the speech, and the "narrowly tailored"
requirement is read through the theoretical lens of a judge who
was not present during the attempted communication. Using
Grayned (and presumably Justice Breyer's test in Denver Area
E.T.C.), the Court tests this compatibility contextually, not ab-
stractly.419 The Grayned test specifically requires proof of incom-
patibility at the specific place and the specific time in which the
speaker wishes to speak.420
One criticism of Grayned, which will receive more attention,
is that it is much too contextual to yield principles that can be
relied on by either government or the speaker in a particular
case. Thus, what results may be the kind of disruption that the
government fears, since speakers will always find their speech
precisely relevant to and thus compatible with the forum they
choose. Moreover, like any contextual test, such as the
Brandenburg incitement test,42' it is open to arbitrary enforce-
ment based on dislike of content or speaker more than a blanket
test like the public forum doctrine.4"
A perhaps more important criticism of Grayned is that the
presumption that individual citizens share property rights to
public space with the government is simply wrong-headed. After
418 See Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and
Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1729-31 (1987) (noting that
Grayned decision strongly opposed government's right to treat public property as if
government owned such land exclusively).
4'9For an exception to contextual testing, see Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 844
(1976) (Powell, J., concurring), where Justice Powell explains the concepts of
"functional and symbolic incompatibility"- the notion that speech as a symbol of
independent thought and partisan choice is incompatible with the military as a
symbol of government impartiality and uniform mental discipline; see also Berg, su-
pra note 47, at 1273-76 (describing compatibility test laid down by Justice Kennedy
in ISKCON, 505 U.S. 672 (1992)).
420 See Dienes, supra note 47, at 121 (noting difference in Brown v. Louisiana,
383 U.S. 131 (1966) (plurality), if interest-balancing is used compared to public fo-
num doctrine).
42 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,449 (1969) (invalidating statute prohibit-
ing mere advocacy of violence).
42 See, e.g., Dixon, supra note 47, at 462. In ISKCON, Justice Kennedy also
criticized subjectivity in forum analysis, arguing for a "return to an objective exami-
nation of the physical characteristics and uses of the property," while Justice Souter
argued for a Grayned type incompatibility test. Id. at 455.
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all, the government represents everyone and uses space on be-
half of everyone, while the individual uses space only on behalf
of himself. In a democracy, critics argue, everyone wins over any
one. This debate over public use versus use by members of the
public might lead to a "public trust" notion of the public forum."3
While the public trust doctrine has an interesting history of ap-
plication in environmental law, it has not been seriously applied
to the free speech debate.4" Under the modern public trust anal-
ogy, the Supreme Court would require the government to act as
trustee of government property on behalf of the people, and allow
common use wherever the public interest required. Justice Ken-
nedy might have implied such an argument in Denver Area
E.T.C., when he suggested that the "locally accountable" mixed
public-private management/financing scheme through which
public access channels are operated is the place where important
"2 Originally, the public trust doctrine was a narrow doctrine derived from Ro-
man and then English law which stripped the king of his power to prohibit common
use of rivers, the sea, and the shore for navigation and fishing. See Patty Gersten-
blith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural Property in the
United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559, 647 (1995). The traditional principles of the
public trust doctrine as adopted in Colonial America are: (1) all tidelands and lands
under navigable waters were owned by the original thirteen states at the time of the
American Revolution as successors in sovereignty to the English Crown, and each
subsequent state was endowed with similar ownership rights at the time of its ad-
mission into the Union; (2) the states own these lands subject to a "public trust" for
the benefit of all their citizens with respect to certain rights of usage, particularly
uses related to maritime commerce, navigation, and fishing; and (3) all lawful
grants of such lands by a state to private owners have been made subject to that
trust and to the state's obligation to protect the public interest from any use that
would substantially impair the trust. See Daniel G. Kagan, Private Rights and the
Public Trust: Opposing Lakeshore Funnel Development, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
105, 123-24 (1987) (tracing development of public trust doctrine). Moreover, any
such conveyed lands must be used by their private owners so as to promote the
public interest and not unduly interfere with the public's several rights under the
public trust doctrine. JACK H. ARCHER ET AL., THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND
THE MANAGEMENT OF AMERICA'S COAST 3-4 (1994).
Beginning in 1970, the doctrine gained some modern currency in efforts to
protect environmental and recreational resources against private spoilage. Many
authors credit Professor Joseph Sax with expanding the public trust doctrine to
natural resources. See, e.g., Gerstenblith, supra note 423, at 648. More recently, the
public trust doctrine has been used to set aside wetlands and other natural re-
sources in need of protection from economic use by individuals, whether they are
titleholders of the land or members of the general public. See, e.g., Just v. Marinette
County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972); State v. Land Concepts, Ltd., 501 N.W.2d 817
(Wis. Ct. App. 1993); Village of Menomonee Falls v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Re-
sources, 412 N.W.2d 505 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
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decisions such as censorship should be made.425
In some ways, the rationale Professor Joseph Sax advocates
for application of the public trust doctrine in environmental law
fits well in the free speech/public forum debate. First, Sax ar-
gues that some resources are such that "their free availability
tends to mark the society as one of citizens rather than of
serfs.""6 This argument mimics the rationale of Justice Roberts
and other members of the Court in the quintessential public fo-
rum cases, which suggest that the availability of streets and
parks for speech is essential if people are to interact as citizens
rather than strangers in a dangerous world. 427
Second, Sax notes that certain natural resources "are so
particularly the gifts of nature's bounty" that they ought to be
reserved for the whole of the populace.4' This argument is par-
ticularly fitting in the public forum debate because government
property already belongs to the public. Thus, such property can-
not be claimed by private citizens as beyond the interests of the
people individually or as a whole.
Third, Sax claims that the public trust doctrine is the most
effective tool to enforce public duties to preserve natural re-
sources."' In this sense, the change in focus of government em-
ployees from a private property metaphor to a public trust meta-
phor might be crucial. The shift might alleviate the problem of
the public employer or employee guarding "his" space. Explicit
direction to public employers not to consider government prop-
erty as their own might lessen the instances where public em-
ployers and employees unwittingly start to mark territory. It
could serve to revitalize the notion that government work is
public work, not private work disrupted by public concerns.
116 S. Ct. at 2417 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting).
4' Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471,484 (1970).
"' See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969)
(recognizing picketing and parading in streets as methods of expression entitled to
First Amendment protection); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557-58 (1965) (finding
breach of peace statute preventing students from demonstrating in public violative
of First Amendment); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235-36 (1963)
(noting that demonstration on State House grounds to express grievances reflects
an exercise of basic constitutional rights "in their most pristine and classic form");
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 513 (1939) (plurality) (upholding injunction prohibiting
city from violating labor union members' speech and assembly rights).
4 Sax, supra note 426, at 484.
Id. at 485.
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Moreover, the "trust" concept also gives rise to special fidu-
ciary values-the trustee of a property must deal with the prop-
erty with a higher level of care than he deals with his own prop-
erty.430 The trustee cannot waste property like an absolute
owner can. His rights to alienate and use property are subject to
the requirement that he make the best possible use of the prop-
erty.43' If the Court reinforces the notion that the government
acts as a trustee of the people's property, rather than the ruler of
its own, through a "public trust" concept of the public forum, the
government employee may be forced to confront the possibility
that individual speech interests are part of the public interest-
indeed, the possibility that speech interests are the higher public
use, not that they are antithetical to it.
The trust concept, which assumes that government property
is collective property, not private property, appropriately recog-
nizes government workplaces as the type of property suited to
the imposition of a trust.4 32 From a public policy standpoint, gov-
ernment workers should not be driven to conserve public prop-
erty by the incentive that they will receive personal value from it
at a later date. They should conserve government property be-
cause that is their job. Although government property is ulti-
mately scarce in the sense that at some point sufficient incom-
patible uses would prevent its efficient use for its intended
purposes, it is not scarce in the "commons" sense of the word.
That is, allowing some reasonable number of speakers onto gov-
ernment property will not result in waste, nor will it detract
from the "enjoyment" of government workers, if "enjoyment" is
properly defined as the ability to do their jobs rather than as a
personal choice of their surroundings. A speaker does not neces-
sarily take resources from the government worker which are es-
sential to his productivity in the way that a worker in the com-
mons takes land away from someone else who could be tilling it.
4' See Kagan, supra note 423, at 125 (explaining fiduciary duties placed on
states as trustees of public trust properties).
4' Sax, supra note 426, at 477 (listing burdens placed on state because of fiduci-
ary duties, including duty to preserve public trust lands for intended uses).
42 In the economists' views, property which should be put into communal own-
ership is the property which cannot be made more efficient by granting private
property rights. Under the theory of the tragedy of the commons, property which is
not assigned to individual use will be despoiled by people who deplete it without any
incentive to continue restoration for the future. By contrast, communal property is
property where scarcity is not a factor; one person's use of the property will not de-
tract from the enjoyment by any other.
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It is also not true, as Professor Lloyd Cohen suggests, that in
the government property setting, an expanded public trust doc-
trine will be used to avoid the appropriate balancing of the costs
and benefits of speech as compared with other government activ-
ity.433 In Professor Cohen's view, the takings doctrine is more ef-
ficient than the public trust doctrine because it makes the major-
ity pay for an individual's property, which forces the majority to
weigh public gains against the individuals' losses to make sure
that the public gain is significant.4" By contrast, the use of the
public trust doctrine in speech cases does not avoid the question
of costs and benefits. Rather, it requires such a question to be
raised. Under the Supreme Court's current public forum doc-
trine, the government can evict a speaker without making any
evaluation of the costs associated with the loss of the speech to
the individual, to society, which might have benefited from the
speech, or to the government workers the individual may chal-
lenge.
Using the marketplace metaphor, when the government si-
lences a speaker under the public forum doctrine, it has decided
that such speech has no value in the marketplace.435 The gov-
ernment views such speech as an irrational personal frivolity,
free to be discarded without payment to the individual for
"taking" the effectiveness of his speech for an important govern-
ment purpose. A public trust regime for speech, by contrast,
would force government administrators to decide whether the
public interest would be served by allowing both speech interests
and the government's administrative interests to occupy the
same place. Therefore, a public trust regime could recognize
that speech has public value in addition to its private value,
whatever its content or its viewpoint. A change in the Court's
public forum doctrine could be a critical moment in the recogni-
tion of speech not as a private whim, but as a valuable, indeed
4 Cohen, supra note 168, at 262.
4 Id. at 261. Narrowing the taking of private property under the public trust
doctrine forces society to make sure that property is only taken over when neces-
sary, not for purposes in which society is only "mildly interested." Id. at 262.
Value within the marketplace metaphor not only includes any personal
value that the speaker may attach to the speech, but also the social value of the
speech for all participants as well as the value of openness in decision-making in the
democratic marketplace. See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimiz-
ing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 9 (1984).
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vital, public activity.43
Despite these arguments, adapting the public trust doctrine
to the public forum is not analogically perfect. The idea that we
should be borrowing from the public trust doctrine suggests the
irony of the public forum doctrine. We are now dipping into a
doctrine expanding public rights to individual private property so
that we may expand public rights to speech on public property.
The public trust doctrine has traditionally been such a narrow
exception to the private property rule precisely because we have
conceived of private property as having a high instrumental
value, both constitutionally and economically.4"7 With govern-
ment property, by contrast, there is no private owner and there-
fore it seems anomalous to talk about how far we should limit
the public trust in speech to protect the government from the
people.
More problematically, in its modern adaptation in ecological
protection cases, the public trust doctrine imposes a collective,
not communal, property regime on public property. When wet-
lands are protected under a public trust doctrine, they are not
open for the use of everyone. Indeed, they are closed to the use
'3 For twenty years, under the public forum doctrine, the Court has moved to-
ward treating speech as essentially a personal, emotive activity which bears no
critical relationship to the life of the community, even while reaching for rhetoric
that recognizes the public value of speech in its "content discrimination" cases.
"Content discrimination" cases include those cases in which the Court reviews total
bans on the content of speech, either within particular settings or from public dis-
course altogether. For example, when one looks at categorical balancing cases,
which permit banning of certain speech content, such as inciting speech, fighting
words, and libel, one still finds lofty language recognizing the foundational necessity
of protecting freedom of speech. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
339-40 (1974) (plurality) (libel); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 (1973)
(obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 570 (1942) (fighting
words). By contrast, this sort of language is conspicuously missing in the more re-
cent majority opinions curtailing speech protection on public forum grounds. See,
e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985)
(holding that Combined Federal Campaign drive is nonpublic forum); Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (finding that internal
school mail system is nonpublic forum); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (stating
that military bases are nonpublic fora).
47 See Kagan, supra note 423, at 125 (noting narrow nature of traditional public
trust doctrine and recent expansion of said doctrine by courts). Under our system,
private property protects the individual against the majority's desire to use what
the individual has earned and protects his security and his need against brute ma-
joritarian force, unless the government chooses to buy him out. See id. (explaining
difficulties involved in removing private land from its owner to create public trusts
under traditional trust doctrine).
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of everyone, including the title-holder, for some general benefits
we derive as a society that do not inhere in the actual use of the
property itself. Applying the modern view of the public trust
doctrine to speech, lawmakers would have the power to decide
which compelling interests benefit the community as a whole,
and exclude any use by anyone, including speakers, that would
derogate from those interests.
Thus, while it would be an improvement on the current doc-
trine to move from viewing government as "private property" to
viewing it as "collective property," the modern public trust doc-
trine would not give any particular right to the individual to use
public property for speech purposes. As a result, such a move
runs contrary to the common wisdom of speech doctrine, embod-
ied in the marketplace metaphor, that while speech is most im-
portant for the public good, the majority is rarely in the position
of deciding what speech is for its own good.43 Instead, in the
metaphor, that decision is entrusted to the "numerous private
choices of individuals" in the marketplace. Under the autonomy
rationale for speech, moreover, human dignity demands that we
ignore the collective observation about what is best for the public
in favor of protecting the individual humanity of the speaker, so
that the individual speaker does not become a means to the pub-
lic's utilitarian ends."9
The more traditional interpretation of the public trust doc-
trine strikes at the heart of what is at stake in speech challenges
on government property. Like the speech easement, the public
trust doctrine traditionally invaded private property only when
the public's use of the private property was long-standing and
the public interest high."0 Applying this traditional form of
4 See Ingber, supra note 435, at 9-10 (discussing importance of individual
speech in self-governance and need for government to remain outside of decision-
making process).
4 Id. at 10-11 (examining autonomy arguments in marketplace of ideas de-
bate).
In the paradigm of cases expanding the public trust doctrine, the states or-
dered private beach owners to open their sandy areas for walking, boat landing, and
other recreational activities because these areas were directly necessary to the use
of rivers, lakes, and oceans that had been reserved for the public "immemorial." See,
e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 363 (N.J. 1984)
(citations omitted); State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969). Thus, it
was proper for the courts to argue that the private property owner had no reliance
interest in his ability to exclude and that his residually small interest in exclusion
was overcome by the public's interest in use.
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public trust, the government acts not to preserve collective prop-
erty but to preserve (in limited form) communal property. That
is, the government's imposition of a public trust on private land
permits each individual citizen to enter and actually use the
property for his own purposes so long as they are within the pa-
rameters of the trust. Although the property is not fully com-
munal in Cohen's sense-property which everyone has the right
to use and no one has the right to exclude-it comes very close
within these parameters."'
However, in its traditional form, the public trust doctrine
probably provides no more help than the quintessential public
forum doctrine because it effectively mimics on private land
what the quintessential public forum doctrine does on public
land. In this traditional form, the public trust doctrine is de-
pendent on long use by the public, either of the trust land itself
(e.g., the beaches) or of adjacent property which is served by the
trust land (e.g., the ocean).' The quintessential public forum
doctrine is similarly dependent on the long use of that forum by
the public for speech purposes."3 Literal adaptation of the public
trust doctrine would, at most, open slightly the "curtilage" of ex-
isting quintessential public forums to speech." Extension of the
public trust doctrine to airports, postal sidewalks, and govern-
ment workplaces where the Court has not protected speech
would make a significant difference in the return of public
speech, if the requirement that property have been used from
" It is appropriate to exclude some uses which would interfere with the basis
for the public trust imposition. For instance, a person whose use of the beach for
commercial fishing destroyed it for recreational purposes might arguably be prohib-
ited from that use. However, the public trust principle, particularly as enunciated in
Matthews, 471 A.2d at 368-69, would not allow the exclusion of particular individu-
als from public trust property, even if they were unwilling to pay for its upkeep.
Thus, it was proper for the courts to argue that the private property owner had no
reliance interest in his ability to exclude, and that his residually small interest in
exclusion was overcome by the public's interest in use.
"2 See supra note 423 and accompanying text (reciting history and tradition of
public trust doctrine). Extensions of the public trust doctrine without the require-
ment that the property have been used from time immemorial, e.g., to airports and
postal sidewalks and government workplaces where the Court has not protected
speech, would make a significant difference in the return of speech to its public
place.
44 See Schechter, supra note 47, at 244 ("A public forum ... is state property
that has been used throughout history for purposes of assembly and the communi-
cations of thoughts between citizens.").
' For example, people could speak on grassy berms next to public sidewalks or
in government buildings surrounding parks.
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"time immemorial" were dropped.
In addition, the Court could meld two assumptions of the
"new" and the "traditional" public trust doctrine: (1) like preser-
vation of the wetlands, preservation of public lands for speech
uses, even against the private interests of government adminis-
trators, is necessary to preserve the vitality of the democratic
ecosystem which is interconnected to these speech "wetlands";
and (2) the public forum doctrine will open public lands not to
speech uses dictated by the government, as in the Perry case,"'
but speech uses which individuals select, much as the beach user
decides how he will exercise his communal rights protected by
the public trust to collect shells, fish, or sunbathe.
Indeed, this focus on the communal nature of the Internet
was a key factor in the court's decision in ACLU v. Reno."' In
ACLU, the court made extensive findings demonstrating the de-
centralization of the Internet, the easy means of accessing it
through various other networks, and the significance of these
facts in terms of the rationale for protecting free speech. 7 As
Judge Dalzell argued:
[If the goal of our First Amendment jurisprudence is the
"individual dignity and choice" that arises from "putting the de-
cision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of
each of us" ... then we should be especially vigilant in prevent-
ing content-based regulation of a medium that every minute al-
lows individual citizens actually to make those decisions. Any
content-based regulation of the Internet, no matter how benign
the purpose, could burn the global village to roast the pig. 48
A final solution is to reject completely a property approach
to the problem of speech on government-owned property in favor
of an interest-balancing approach. That appears to be the ap-
proach that Justice Breyer's plurality in Denver Area E. T. C. pre-
fers, at least for now. The Court could simply use the "time
place and manner" doctrine without the public forum gloss, or
the incompatibility doctrine, or perhaps a new analogy, such as
harassment law. A property approach, however, usually has the
advantage of clarity and predictability. Both the government
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
446ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
"' Id. at 830-36 (opinion of the court), 872-74 (opinion of Dalzell, J.).
44 Id. at 881-82 (quoting Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448-49 (1991)
(citation omitted)).
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and the speaker, at least theoretically, know where the govern-
ment's property stops and the public's property begins (at quin-
tessential public fora). The government and the speaker can
plan according to where their activities are permitted. The
speaker does not have to worry about arbitrary enforcement,
such as being kicked off the premises while a speaker with a less
objectionable message is allowed to stay. The government's
business can proceed absent unwanted interference from speak-
ers. The courts can resolve speech disputes merely by asking
whether the speaker stepped over the government's property line
or not, whether he was invited by the government or not, and
whether the invitation was revoked or not.
Yet, as suggested earlier, whatever the property approach
does for clarity and predictability, its ability to recognize that
speech is public and a publicly valuable act is minimal. Such an
approach recognizes the public place as essentially brittle, un-
able to tolerate the slightest speech disruption. Government
employees are viewed as essentially vulnerable, unable to make
good choices about whether to listen to the speaker, reason with
him, or even agree with him."9 To give the solicitor in Cornelius
the opportunity to make his charitable pitch to his co-worker,
which the Court did not require the federal government to do,
would merely require his fellow employees to tolerate some
slight intrusion on their efficiency, their feelings, and their pri-
vacy."' More generally, to permit speakers on all, not just quin-
tessential, public lands is simply to tolerate some isolated idio-
syncratic behavior and some occasional distracting speech. If the
speech becomes truly disruptive, the incompatibility doctrine
permits the government to oust the speaker.45' If the speech be-
comes disruptive because of the manner of presentation (too
noisy, too flashy, too physically threatening), or because of the
sheer amount of speech (too many speakers, too much time
49 By contrast, in private workplaces, courts have been reluctant to find liability
for even repeated offensive conduct, unless it is explicitly prohibited, e.g., by Title
VIrs ban on harassing speech, although some courts have gone outside the strict
confines of sexual harassment to find otherwise protected speech problematic. See,
e.g., Workplace Harassment, supra note 305, at 1800-06.
450 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
45' See generally Eastern Conn. Citizens Action Group v. Powers, 723 F.2d 1050,
1054 (2d Cir. 1983) (reciting history of incompatibility doctrine in Supreme Court




taken), the TPM doctrine is available to regulate the speaker's
actions.
To the extent that the public forum doctrine is justified by
its protection of the public employee's "personal space" rather
than the government's interest in disruption, the Court could
look to existing harassment law for guidance. Since Meritor Sav-
ings Bank v. Vinson,452 courts have recognized that invasion of
"personal space" in a public setting, such as a workplace, must
be governed by different rules than a similar invasion on one's
private property. Traditionally, truly private rights, such as the
right to protect one's physical person or one's land, can be in-
vaded by a single act.453 Harassment law recognizes that in pub-
lic settings, where the "space" invaded is space shared by em-
ployees, the legal tolerance threshold must be somewhat higher,
approaching abuse."
The law of harassment as it has developed in areas from Ti-
tle VII employment discrimination to criminal stalking laws455
focuses on the harm caused by repetitive invasion of personal
space, the intent of the harasser to cause harm to the victim, and
the nature and level of the invasion as necessary elements to es-
tablishing a harm. In particular, acts of physical invasion, such
as offensive touching or physical threats, have generally received
much less legal protection than harassing speech.456
452 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
4 A trespass requires only one incident of physical invasion of land; an assault
and battery only one blow.
4 See generally Juan F. Perea, Strange Fruit: Harassment and the First
Amendment, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875 (1996); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech
and Appellate Review in Workplace Harassment Cases, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1009
(1996). Title VII harassment, for instance, must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive
'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working
environment " based on the employee's race, sex, religion, or national origin. Meri-
tor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).45 For a list of current state stalking laws, see Eileen S. Ross, Note, E-Mail
Stalking; Is Adequate Legal Protection Available?, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 405, n.2 (1995). Maine and Arizona are the only states that have not en-
acted criminal stalking laws; however, both states use their existing laws to crimi-
nalize stalking. Harvey Wallace, Stalkers, the Constitution, and Victims' Remedies,
CRM . JUST., Spring 1995, at 16.
4' See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 65. Other non-verbal harm can in-
clude damage to coworkers' equipment and refusal to work with an employee be-
cause of race, sex, or other banned criteria. Workplace Harassment, supra note 305,
at 1800. See supra note 455 and accompanying text for articles providing examples
of stalking.
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Much like the law of nuisance, the law of harassment is
based on a personal interest-balancing approach which accepts
that some inappropriate, even wrongful, invasion of a person's
space and time must be tolerated before the law will step in to
protect the victim.45 7 When the invasion becomes too intolerable,
even in a single instance, because the abuse is "truly harrowing"
and of no benefit except for "the sadistic pleasure it gives to the
speaker,"458 the law responds. When the invasion becomes intol-
erable not because of a single instance but because a smaller
harm becomes a greater harm through repetition, such as sexual
remarks over a long period of time, the law responds.'5 9 When the
harasser's actions demonstrate that he is intent on creating a
"hostile environment" and when he is successful in doing so, the
law steps in to stop it.4"' Thus, harassment law expects the ob-
ject of harassment to be tough, but not to be a powerless victim.
In the speech context, an approach that focuses on the na-
ture and level of invasion, considering its repetition, and possibly
the apparent intent of the harasser, could better assist in distin-
guishing speech that needs to be stricken from public places from
speech that should be tolerated, even in "nonpublic fora." A re-
gime such as the public forum doctrine, which permits the gov-
ernment to eject or regulate for even an isolated case of disrup-
tive speech, has great power to exclude even the most timid
"back-talk" in public space.461
In terms of the government's interest in efficiency, low-level
speech disruptions on a one-time or occasional basis should be
counted as part of the cost of doing business as a public agent.
As the speaker elevates the nature of the invasion, however,
moving from a loud protest about the government's action to a
47 See Alan E. Brownstein, Rules of Engagement for Culture Wars: Regulating
Conduct, Unprotected Speech, and Protected Expression in Anti-Abortion Protests-
Section 11, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1163, 1169-70 (1996) (explaining that while har-
assment laws strive to protect victims of targeted private speech, victims are ex-
pected to accept mild public harassment under First Amendment).
Workplace Harassment, supra note 305, at 1807.
4' See EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1514-15 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding
that egregious racial and sexual comments on daily basis violate Title VII); see also
Workplace Harassment, supra note 305, at 1807-09.
See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1993) (holding that hos-
tile work environment constitutes sexual harassment).
.. See Workplace Harassment, supra note 305, at 1811 (noting that even hostile
environment test will suppress isolated instances of offensive speech because of con-
cern about where line is drawn).
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direct threat of harm to public employees, the government has
both the right and the responsibility to step in to eject the
speaker. Similarly, speakers who inundate a particular public
place so repeatedly that long-term effectiveness of the workplace
or the public service is undercut can be evicted under a harass-
ment theory. Finally, in cases where the speaker's apparent in-
terest, as judged over a repetitive period of threatening or inva-
sive speech acts, is not to communicate but to harass the hearer
with a sheer barrage of words, the state could step in and evict
the speaker.462
Even on the Internet, a harassment standard coupled with
mandated blocking technology for purposes of protecting un-
wanted exposure to information on a one-time basis might better
serve Congress' purposes.4' Other than the "immediate offense"
problem posed by messages sent to children and uninterested
adults, the CDA nods in this direction by banning communica-
tions which are "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent,
with the intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass another per-
son."4" Thus, the Act recognizes that the major threat to adult
interests on the Internet is speech which is intended not to
communicate but to harm.
Good test cases for an altered speech doctrine that concen-
trate on harassment-type interest-balancing rather than prop-
erty rights are the abortion clinic picket cases, represented by
Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.4" In Madsen, the prop-
erty test found the petitioners in a quintessential public forum,
albeit on the edge of private property, so their speech was pre-
sumptively protected.4" The Grace test then asked the signifi-
cance of the state interest, the question redefined in injunction
cases as "whether the challenged provisions of the injunction
burden no more speech than necessary,"4 7 and the availability of
ample alternatives. Under the Grace test, as applied in Madsen,
4 Prosecution of a speaker on the basis of intent, however, is a more significant
risk; and standards for defining and proving such intent would need to be developed
carefully by the courts.
Such blocking technologies would allow adult users to control access to ques-
tionable sites on the Internet while continuing to allow speakers to convey their
messages to the masses. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
4" CDA, § 502(1), 47 U.S.CA § 223(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1996).
46 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (plurality).
4' Id. at 769-71 (including clinic property, sidewalk and adjacent street, private
property adjacent to clinic, and private property across street within "buffer zone").
67 Id. at 765.
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the speakers won some ground. They were permitted to try to
communicate with unwilling patients approaching the clinics
and to show gruesome pictures to those inside; they could protest
on private property next to the clinic (with the owner's permis-
sion); and they could protest around staff residences, subject to
possible time and manner restrictions.4" But the speakers also
lost: they were prohibited from blocking access to the clinic, and
from making noise which would pervade the clinic walls.469
Insofar as new patients are concerned, the Court's ruling in
Madsen makes sense. As long as the speakers do not use lan-
guage which may be proscribed for other reasons (e.g., threats of
violence, fighting words), they should be allowed to approach
new patients to try to change their minds.47 Absent an atmos-
phere of violence or direct intimidation, such patients at worst
have suffered the isolated assault similar to a non-threatening,
oblique sexual remark directed at a worker. While such speech
may be reprehensible, it does not meet an actionable threshold.
At best, new patients may learn something from the speakers
which may change their minds, which might bring them closer to
the truth or change how they exercise their autonomy.
For the speakers and the clinic staff hearers at the time the
injunction is issued, however, the dispute no longer has much to
do with speech. After so many repetitions, the speakers' argu-
ment that they are still engaged in a pure speech act-a com-
munication which creates an objectively real history and a per-
sonal relationship between speaker and hearer-loses much of
its force. The likelihood that the speakers are using speech to
harass or wear down the audience, and not to communicate, be-
comes stronger. Similarly, the vulnerability of their audience in-
creases as a result of the "captivity" in which the staff works. It
is then more likely that the clinic staff and clients will change
their behavior not because they have "purchased" the pro-life
message in the marketplace but only so they can escape the
pounding of the speech.
To move the analogy to government buildings and the Inter-
net, a similar harassment test would permit individual speakers
46 Id. at 771, 774-75.
4'9 Id. at 769, 772-73.
47' See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 733, 744 (1994) (plurality)
(striking provision preventing protesters from approaching patients within 300 feet
of clinic as violative of First Amendment).
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to protest in all types of public places, so long as they do not
cross the line that distinguishes communication from harass-
ment. An isolated, non-threatening demand for justice by a wel-
fare recipient would be treated differently than a two month
long, daily, noisy sit-in by a community group or the jamming of
computer lines with nonsensical messages. By contrast, a
speaker who is effectively "stalking" his government employee
victim with speech would be properly dismissed from govern-
ment premises, not on the basis of the content of his speech, but
on the objectively demonstrated evidence that he repeatedly and
mercilessly imposed it on his hearer. However, government
workers, who have lived with long-standing but polite pickets so
long that they have become part of their routine, may not be able
to use an invasion of privacy or disruption in the workplace ra-
tionale as a means of ejecting the picketers and silencing speech.
VI. CONCLUSION
In property terms, the Court's decision to return to a contex-
tual analysis, whether the TPM test, the incompatibility test, or
a new test based on the harassment analogy, would move the
Court farther from a "private property" analogy. Ideally, the
Court would employ a true "communal property" regime, in
which all citizens, whether they are government employees or
disruptive speakers, were entitled to equal access and use of
government property. Such communal use for speech would be
subject only to the requirement that speakers not invade gov-
ernment workers' space in ways which were truly disruptive of
the long-term functioning of the office or truly harassing to the
worker.
In the real world, however, the need for clarity and predict-
ability for government workers' sense of security and stability in
their daily work may mean that, at least on physical government
property, we must settle for a limited "collective property" re-
gime. That is, we may need to accept a test which gives some
deference to government regulations that spell out speech condi-
tions in advance, but which have been through some "legislated,"
thoughtful process based on important state interests, not the
whim of an individual administrator who dislikes a particular
speaker. For instance, the government may appropriately de-
termine that certain kinds of workspaces are off-limits, such as
private offices to which workers can retreat to avoid "captivity,"
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areas with sensitive equipment or confidential information, sites
of danger or where extreme quiet is essential, or confidential e-
mail lines. Similarly, noise regulations, rules about hours for
speech activity, limits on the vehicles of expression and its repe-
tition4  may be necessary to ensure that legitimate government
and worker interests are protected.
Where the government regulates, however, the courts mini-
mally should be earnest in their application of the TPM doctrine.
Most importantly, the courts must take the "narrow tailoring"
requirement seriously to ensure that such regulations protect
government's and workers' long term interests against hanrass-
ment not disruptions or invasions of privacy which are of no con-
sequence. Thus, the narrow tailoring requirement should be
modified to require the government to prove some actual or
threatened damage to its efficiency; or in the case of worker in-
terests, that the speaker persisted in bombarding the hearer de-
spite his clear manifestation of unwillingness to listen.
Second, the Court should adopt the presumption of the
"incompatibility" test that both speech and government activity
can exist simultaneously unless some actual threat to the gov-
ernment activity is shown, rather than asking only whether the
speaker has "ample alternatives." The Court should properly
apply the "ample alternatives" test even for disruptive speech in
order to ensure that the speaker's alternatives constitute a
plausible alternative to reach those who must hear for the
speech to be effective. Thus, if a citizen is attempting to change
the mind of a government worker, a park which is five blocks
down the street is not sufficiently "ample" to reach that worker
because it does not effectively reach the intended audience.
Third, the Court should require sufficient notice to speakers
about the rules for speech on public property. Signs posting
noise or hour regulations, or signs indicating that certain areas
of government land are restricted, easily solve the problem of the
appearance or reality of government arbitrariness in permitting
some speakers but not others. Legends on web sites, much like
the etiquette rules posted on bulletin boards, can make the pub-
lic aware of what is expected in their interactions with govern-
ment. Moreover, like similar marker signs on other public
471 For instance, the government might wish to ban oversized posters, audiovis-
ual aids, even excessive use of e-mail or other computer communication devices in
order to avoid bombardment of workers.
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buildings such as museums and galleries, such signs welcome as
much as they exclude, for the act of saying that speech in some
places and times is forbidden is also the act of saying that in
other places and times it is welcomed.472
A poor version of such "welcoming marker" speech has been
the loudspeaker announcements at many airports, warning
travelers that people exercising their First Amendment rights
have the right to do so. While most such announcements have
been begrudging (and their repetition sometimes annoying), they
reinforce the speaker's freedom to exercise his rights and give
the willing hearer the opportunity to search out such speech, just
as the publicity about Speaker's Corner in London notifies people
where they can go to hear political speech.
More importantly, such "welcoming markers" protect the po-
tential unwilling hearer by warning him that he is not in private
space. They remind him that he is in public and that he should
be prepared to interact with a public face to those speakers he
might encounter. Welcoming marker signs or announcements in
other public buildings will similarly remind those who traverse
them that such halls belong to the people, not to private indi-
viduals, and that they are precisely the places for conversations
about public matters.
A "welcoming marker" regime is most sorely needed on new
technologies which the government is regulating, particularly
the Internet. The Internet is a truly amazing invitation by the
federal government to speech. The federal government could
have participated in the construction of a network that was lim-
ited only to those who were using it for government-approved
purposes, as it has done with most public property; or refused to
help, making access so expensive that it was out of the reach of
the ordinary citizen, as the government has effectively done with
radio and television licenses.
Instead, the federal government went beyond the minimum
to welcome speech rather than racing after it to regulate it, one
of the few times it has done so since the creation of the post of-
fice. The explosion of truly democratic speech-the ability of
people from even the poorest countries to share their thoughts
with those of the richest-has been remarkable. The Communi-
cations Decency Act is the first sign that the government's
472 See KEIFERT, supra note 360, at 120-21, 132-34.
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"welcoming" of all sorts of speech by all sorts of people may be
coming to an end. The potential for the repression of speech is
illustrated by China's response to the Internet, which has been
to censor certain political speech and require users to employ the
Internet only at locations that can be monitored by the govern-
ment. 473
As the courts confront the first limitations on the use of the
Internet, their understanding of how property theory applies to
government financed and controlled resources beyond the gov-
ernment's real property will have a telling effect on the future.
Their perception of the Internet as the government's "private
property" which can be restricted by content, by speaker and
hearer, even by economic level, as "collective property" subject to
specific legislative mandate of use (as the CDA is), or as
"communal property" open to all with only those restrictions nec-
essary to make it available to all, will make a profound differ-
ence in the national conversation.
413 See 142 CONG. REC. S1180, S1181 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Leahy); Ian Johnson, China Censors its Internet; Police Monitor Internet for Un-
popular Ideas; Viewers Risk Prison, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 23, 1996, at IA.
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